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August 5, 1981 
CHAIRMAN DOUGLAS H. BOSCO: I would like to welcome everyone 
and the members who are here. To my far right is Alister 
McAlister, who 1s Chairman of the full Finance Insurance and Commerce 
Committee, and to my far left is Assemblyman Larry Stirling. This 
is s first term and he is a very fine member of our Committee, and 
Jim Costa, who is not a member of the Committee, but who is the author 
of a bill that is one of the reasons we are holding this hearing. The 
eld of creative financing is one that is occupying a great deal of 
our thought on this particular subcommittee these days, because of the 
fact that we have been deeply immersed in the question of assumable 
loans, whether we should in Californ end assumability of loans 
or allow decisions. Obviously, 
that type of decision would have far reaching consequences for a 
number of people. 
The f ing that has taken place in the last 
is one of st to us 1 of this issue of loan 
as lity. Today, our s th the representative of 
the Department of Consumer Af who will lay some of the foundation 
for the hearing by describing the legal and economic climate in 
which the creative financing is f i The Commissioner of 
Real Estate is present to discuss the es of that Department's 
licensees from the point of view of the regulator. We plan to hear 
from two attorneys, who limit their practice to real property financing, 
on the practical aspect of putting together financing to accomplish 
a home sale and the legal implications of the participating parties. 
Only one of these gentlemen, however, is able to attend ... today 
because of the Air Traffic Controllers strike. 
We have a Deputy District Attorney from San Diego, who 
will describe for the Committee some of the schemes he has encountered 
in his work with the fraud division of the District Attorney's office 
and we have representatives of the Real Estate and lending industries 
to give us their perspectives in the way of definitions, issues, and 
problems associated with creating financing for borrowers and lenders, 
and we have two economists who will describe the economic fall-out, 
if you will, of creating financing and its implications for the 
future contours of the mortgage market. 
We would like to begin this morning by hearing from Dick 
Elbrecht, who is the supervising attorney for the Division of Consumer 
Services of the Department of Consumer Affairs. Welcome, Mr. Elbrecht. 
MR. DICK ELBRECHT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman 
and members of the Committee. I am appearing here today at the request 
of our Mr. Richard B. Spohn, who is presently on his annual 
two-week vacat with s fe and chi 
The purpose of this hear is to explore creative financing. 
Creative £inane is a method of home finance on which buyers and 
sellers have begun to rely more heavily as reasonably priced long-term 
credit has become unavailable. 
In the following testimony, I will share some thoughts on 
creative financing. I will look at it from the viewpoint of the 
consumers, both buyers and sellers. I will also attempt to describe 
the larger context in which creative financing is taking place. I 




the agrees to make a large balloon payment, is general 
table for use in today's market, the exact source of the 
funds needed to make the balloon payment is not known. 
As I use the term creative financing, the term does not 
include financing by long-term fixed or adjustable rate mortgages, 
or graduated payment mortgages, shared appreciation mortgages, or 
other traditional or innovative home mortgage instruments which provide 
long term home finance. Nor does it include equity loans made to 
persons who already own their own homes, borrowing on them to pay 
for living expenses, or luxuries, or to consolidate debts and the like. 
While some of the same thoughts will apply to each of these 
financing mechanisms, creative financing of the purchase of homes 
deserves the separate treatment it is being given at these hearings. 
Creative financing of residential ~eal estate has always been with 
us. At no time has long-term lending by financial institutions been 
the sole source of home finance. It has always been supplemented by 
some forms of creative financing. Indeed, prior to the great depression, 
was no such thing as long-term, fully amortized, home financing. 
Then, mortgage loans usually ran for only five years, and a much 
smaller percentage of the purchase ce was financed. Moreover, unless 
payments were quite large, the buyer was faced with a balloon 
payment at the end of the five-year term. 
that payment, buyers had to 
If buyers couldn't make 
loan or default. During 
the great depression, many home buyers defaulted when lenders refused 
to refinance their mortgages. It was only with the passage of the 
federal Housing Act of 1934, that the long-term, fully amortized, 
non-balloon payment home mortgage came into widespread use. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ALISTER MCALISTER: ... Mr. Elbrecht. Didn't 
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we have in fact during the depress 
foreclosures even in some states? 
moratorium legislation on 
MR. ELBRECHT: That's correct, and I believe that is also 
when our anti-deficiency legislation was adopted here in California. 
Since then, long-term, fully amortized home finance has 
become the norm with the total horne mortgage debt, financed mainly 
by long-term, fully amortized mortgages, increasing dramatically 
from $17 billion in 1940, to approximately $300 billion in 1970, 
to some $973 billion in 1980. It is the contrast between the norm 
of the 1940's through the 1970's and today's practices that has 
given rise to the use of the term creative financing, and it is the 
similarity between much of today's creative balloon-payment financing 
schemes and the conditions that preceded the great depression that 
has given many observers cause for concern. 
The Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco reports that 
delinquencies of sixty days or longer have increased to about .82 
percent of the mortgages held by California's savings and loans, up 
from .46 percent one year ago. The number of recorded notices of 
de also has increased. For instance, in Santa Clara County, for 
the fiscal year ending in June of 1981, approximately 6,100 notices 
of de were recorded, up from 3,800 in 1979 and 3,900 in 1980. 
In Los Angeles County, 19,385 default notices were 
recorded during the first six months of 1981, compared with 11,167 
and 13,194 in 1979 and 1980 respectively. 
These statistics show a radical increase in the default 
rate and also in the rate of filing of notices of default in connection 
with foreclosure proceedings. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: Could you give the numbers again. 
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MR. ELBRECHT: The numbers are on page three of the statement 
the le of page. Exact s are there and I could repeat 
them for you if you would like. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LARRY STIRLING: Is that above or below the 
national average? 
MR. ELBRECHT: I don't have that statistic. I think the 
message of these statistics is that there is a change, and, as I 
11 indicate here today, this gives rise to concern about the capacity 
of home mortgage borrowers to sustain the increases in the payments 
that will result upon refinancing of balloon payments in an economic 
environment in which interest rates are higher than they presently 
are, which is a distinct possibility. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: I understand, I am just trying to 
figure out why the California default is half the national average. 
MR. ELBRECHT: Well, we have a strong economy, probably 
one of strongest in the country, and that is something that we 
can really be proud of. We must be aware, take a look at the trends, 
and s at least keep our own local trends in mind in developing 
policy. That is the reason we have presented these statistics. 
I ASSEMBLYMAN JIM COSTA: Mr. Elbrecht. What is the common 
after a notice of default. 
MR. ELBRECHT: After the recording of the notice of default, 
buyer has a period of 90 days in which to reinstate the mortgage 
by paying delinquent payments, plus certain limited expenses; and 
after that 90-day period, the foreclosing creditor can complete the 
foreclosure proceeding. Until the actual time of sale, the consumer 
s 11 has the right to redeem by paying the full unpaid balance of 
the mortgage, plus all of the foreclosure costs and related charges, 
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which could become substantial; but that requires that the 
consumer actually obtain a new loan. The filing of the notice of 
default is the commencement of a three-month period in which the 
borrower can preserve the existing loan simply by paying the 
delinquent payments plus certain limited expenses. 
The rate of filing of notices of default doesn't necessarily 
reflect the rate of ultimate foreclosure sales, because a lot of 
people are, in fact, able to cure by bringing the payments current; 
and even when they don't, a lot of them are able to sell the property 
during the interim period and realize their equity and become renters 
instead of owners. And some perhaps move to a less expensive home. 
The critical issue today is just who is going to refinance, 
and at what cost, all of the short-term balloon-payment first, second 
and third mortgage loans that have been made and that are now beginning 
to become due and that will come due in steadily increasing volume 
during the next few months and years. Will the widespread unavailability 
of refinancing during the great depression repeat itself in the 1980's? 
Will the cost be more than most people can afford? An equally pertinent 
question is: Can any buyer today, or tomorrow, reasonably commit 
himself or herself to make a short-term balloon payment some three, 
four or five years hence? Can a lender or seller who provides short-
term balloon payment housing credit reasonably expect to be repaid when 
the balloon comes due? Can a realtor properly accept a commission on 
a sale in which the parties do not genuinely understand the risks 
of a balloon payment which perhaps cannot be refinanced? 
Today, very ttle thought is being given to the possibility 
that when these notes come due, the anticipated opportunities to 
refinance at an affordable rate may not materialize. Clearly, not 
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all short-term balloon payment 
transactions should be ques 
financing of home purchase 
financing has been with 
us for as long as real property has been sold and purchased. We have 
outlined in our statement a whole variety of kinds of creative 
financing techniques that have been used in past years. So creative 
financing is nothing new. It is the term that is new. 
It is difficult to find fault with creative financing of 
the purchase of a home in which the buyer is assured of receiving 
funds needed to make the balloon payment when it is due. For example, 
if the reasonably anticipates receiving proceeds from the sale 
of other property or a bonus, commission or tax refund, or an inheritance, 
or other ft, the use of creative financing techniques in which the 
buyers igations are linked to the receipt of additional funds may 
be most appropriate. If buyer intends to sell the house itself 
before the balloon payment is due, then aga , a balloon-payment 
mortgage may be appropriate with a reasonable assurance that the 
necessary funds 11 be in hand at the time they are needed. It is 
not unreasonable, most cases, for a purchaser to make 
co~~itments based on those expectations. In recent years, however, 
s have increasingly committed themselves to make purchase-
money balloon payments in the expectation that the source of the 
needed to make the balloon payment would be the property itself. 
Two premises have become ined in our thinking. First, 
that the property, every property, will appreciate substantially. 
Second, that because of the enhanced value of the property, it will 
be pass le to procure a refinancing loan encompassing both the 
rst-lien mortgage and the balloon or balloons, when they become 
due. 
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ASSEMBLYMAN LOUIS PAPAN: Let me ask you a question. Where 
was the Department on the Wellenkamp decision? 
MR. ELBRECHT: We have some statements to make on that 
issue today, sir. I'm leading into the question of the relevance 
of the Wellenkamp decision. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: I'll watch carefully and be sure he does 
not ... 
MR. ELBRECHT: We go into it in quite a bit of detail 
beginning on page eight or nine. As we have indicated there, because 
of the Wellenkamp decision, the Federal National Mortgage Association 
has required that all mortgages that it purchases from lenders in 
California must include the lender's option to call the loan after 
seven years. And the fact is that the Wellenkamp decision has meant 
that insofar as mortgages are destined for resale on the secondary 
market, they are all balloon-payment mortgages. They are all due in 
seven years. 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: You were into it in some detail when 
we were introducing a bill to reverse it. 
MR. ELBRECHT: I think this is our first statement on 
the subject, sir. 
MR. PAPAN: Last year did you oppose the bill being 
carried, and I don't know who the author was, that tried to undo 
Wellenkamp. 
MR. ELBRECHT: Honestly, I am not aware of ... 
MR. PAPAN: You are laying a lot of groundwork there 
and using state funds to reach a lot of people prematurely. 
MR. ELBRECHT: I don't think we were on that issue last 
year, I'm not aware that we were, sir. 
- 8 -
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MR. PAPAN: I think you were ... the Department of Consumer 
Affairs was. 
MR. ELBRECHT: We are making some statements here today. 
Two recent changes in the market have given rise to a great 
deal of concern. One is the prediction by housing economists that 
the rate of appreciation ln the nominal value of residential real 
estate is likely to slow or stop altogether, a prediction that seems 
to be coming true in many areas of the state with the softening in 
today's real estate market. 
The other change is ation's effect on our financial 
institutions, the organizations that act as financial intermediaries 
between persons who have money to save and those who wish to borrow, 
who have found it difficult to impossible to make long-term home 
loans today's economic environment. In the accompanying paper 
tled, ''Housing Costs: Past, Present and Future," we have 
summarized the findings and conclusions of several housing economists 
who have analyzed the real estate market, and who foresee, indeed, 
assure us that there will be, a significant moderation, if not a 
ces 
a 
the increase in real estate values. One of these 
sts, Professor Douglas P. Diamond, states that as people's 
continuing increases in real estate values diminish, 
component of the current market value of real property, 
reflecting expectations of further increases in real estate values, 
will no longer be present. That is why some investors have been 
willing to tolerate a negative cash flow on their real property 
investments. While the process is working, it works quite well. 
When the balloon payment comes due, the value of the property has 
sen to the point where it will support the larger refinancing loan. 
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The process depends upon continuing real estate appreciation. And 
with the anticipated softening in the market, of which there is 
always some evidence, the appreciation which is a prerequisite for 
such refinancings may not materialize. 
The second premise, that because of the enhanced value 
of the property, it will be possible to procure a refinancing loan 
encompassing both the first-lien mortgage and the balloon when it 
comes due, is also beginning to become unrealistic. The accompanying 
paper, "Interaction of Deposit, Interest Rate, Deregulation and Mortgage 
Instrument Design," explains some of the reasons for, and the 
consequences of, the drain of savings deposits from our financial 
institutions, mainly savings and loan associations, the effect of 
which has been to cut off what has been the major source of funds 
for use in making and refinancing home loans. Today, it is difficult 
to determine how successful the saving and loan industry will be in 
attracting the funds needed to continue making and refinancing home 
loans as they have in the past. 
One thing is certain, the cost of such refinancing credit, 
if it is available at all, will be considerably more than anyone could 
have predicted several years ago. With financial deregulation 
proceeding a pace, the home mortgage borrower is in competition with 
all other borrowers for funds, including the United States government 
and the entire commercial and industrial sectors. It is not clear 
that the individual consumer seeking a refinancing loan will win out 
over large corporations garnering funds to purchase other institutions 
or the U.S. Treasury in its continuing efforts to refinance the 
federal debts. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: Just a minute. There are changes today 
- 10 -
that relate to the 
normally centered 
pol 
the area of hous 
stment capital that has 
, and that change has 
focused itself the of money ts and T-bills which we see 
as an increase towards the 1 sector for investment capital. 
MR. ELBRECHT: Well, the Reagan administration, I believe, 





sector. The money market 
the movement of capital funds into 
shed from movement into the housing 
funds are a market response to 
lation and the 1 ts that savings and loan associations have on 
the amounts they can pay depositors. With federal regulation Q savings 
and loans and banks have been limited in what they can pay depositors. 
As a re t of that 1 haven't depositors enough to 
the sitors within their fold, so a market response to this 
phenomenon has been the emergence of the money market mutual funds 
which are I can't say that that has been the result 
of 's pol 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: You are s 
MR. ELBRECHT: Pres 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: Pres 
Regan? 
as opposed to Regan 
who heads the Department? 
of the 
MR. ELBRECHT: It's my understanding that a main thrust 
administration's economic policy is to foster and 
promote reindustrialization, and, if necessary, at the expense of 
hous 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: Can you tell me where Mr. Regan, the 
of Treasury, came from that President Reagan appointed? 
MR. ELBRECHT: I don't know, s 
- 11 -
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: Merrill Lynch. 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: So he is aoina to feather his bed in 
some way, since he came out of an industry that presentlv is takina 
funds from all over the country and from corrmunities ... 
MR. ELBRECHT: It is a very controversial question as to 
whether money market mutual funds should not be regulated in the same 
way that banks and savings and loans •.. 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: My question to you is could you possibly 
draw an inference as to someone who is involved in consumer affairs to 
say that here is a man who came out of a brokerage house that is 
presently contributing to the problem. Let's be political about it. 
MR. ELBRECHT: I think I can be political about it in the 
sense that I know that one of the basic, fundamental, economic premises 
of the Reagan administration is that the free market should be allowed 
to do what it will, and that .•. 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: I am asking you a question. The present 
head of the Treasury is a man named Mr. Regan. Did he not come out 
of a brokerage house? I am not encouraging President Reagan and his 
administration to continue the money ... 
MR. ELBRECHT: I supposed you could make an inference that 
his past connection with that industry ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: Let's make the inference, then. 
ASSEMBLYr1AN COSTA: I think that more important than that 
in the meetings that I have had, back in Washington in the last four 
or five months, there is, I think, a clear change in the intersection 
in the middle of the road. For the first time in thirty years, since 
World War II, housing no longer enjoys the priority that it had during 
Republican and Democratic administrations alike. And that investment 
- 12 -
• 
capital is not there. It takes the form in the comments that you are 
It takes the form other fashions which means that we are 
going to be more and more dependent on the state levels to try to 
create our own sources investment capital for housing. 
MR. ELBRECHT: That's correct. I think to be ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: Right or wrong, it may be good or bad, 
I'm not arguing policy, but nonetheless, it means that money for housing 
the sector is not going to be there. 
MR. ELBRECHT: To be politically even-handed, we should 
note that in President Carter's annual report to Congress of this 
last year, there was also a suggestion that there should be a 
reallocation of the nation's credit resources in the direction of 
re zation, not specifically from housing, but from consumption, 
generally, so I would say there is some political bipartisan movement 
in that It is not exclusively the Reagan administration's 
policy. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: When was the legislation that 
provided for the Regulation Q reform adopted? 
MR. ELBRECHT: In 1980. 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: It was introduced previously? 
MR. ELBRECHT: That's correct. And that, in turn, was 
the result of inflation, wh is the key to a lot of these 
problems. In short, the potential supply of low-cost funds for home 
financ is gone, and there is no reason to believe that these 
funds 11 be restored in time or volume or at a cost that will enable 
the increasing volume of creatively financed home purchases to be 
refinanced on terms like those that have prevailed in the past, even 
if real property should continue to appreciate at rates that were 
- 13 -
characteristic of the past. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: I think that is very important to know. 
That is the opinion of the Department. That the refinancing is not 
going to be there for those who have got themselves in ... 
MR. ELBRECHT: It's a question we are raising. It's impossible 
to predict. We have many sources of potential credit. The savings 
and loan industry is regearing. We can see in today's papers that they 
are paying larger amounts for certificates of deposit, together with 
additional funds to savers which in turn will be lendable to horne 
mortgage borrowers and others. We also have private investors and 
second mortgage loan brokers who will continue to be operative in 
the field. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: The Department is not making a statement 
as to whether or not you believe that refinancing will or will not be 
there. You question ... 
MR. ELBRECHT: We are raising a question of concern that 
both sellers and buyers and investors in the horne finance process be 
sensitive to the possibility that refinancing may be difficult, or 
that refinancing at an affordable cost may be difficult, in the case 
of one, two, three, four or five year balloon notes, and that it is 
really important that people should go into this kind of transaction 
with their eyes open. 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: In your research, how much money market 
investing was being done by the savings and loans in advance of the 
present prices? 
MR. ELBRECHT: I don't have those statistics, sir. I 
know that there was some. 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: Do these statistics indicate how 
- 14 -
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has fal of as oppo demand? 
MR. ELBRECH'I': it's te lear that housing construction 
has len off dramatical We have ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: How does that impact on the price of 
homes in the period of refinancing balloon payments? 
MR. ELBRECHT: The unavai lity of additional homes to 
meet demand 11 itself be a factor that 11 tend to increase real 
values. 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: So conceivab the people confronted 
with balloon payments could be in a market situation where values 
have a built-in factor of appreciation as opposed to leveling off? 
MR. ELBRECHT: There will be forces, as there always are 
a market context, going in opposite 
of how these will resolve themselves. 
rections, and it is a question 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: Your statement doesn't go into that 
of s stic, does it? 
MR. ELBRECHT: No, we don't. That's one of the factors 
that would bear on what the would hold. The main point is 
that if s' inflation and of 
real estate shed, then that factor 
itself will have an tant on the value of real property. 
That is es 1 the message of the two housing economists. 
ASSEMBLY~~N PAPAN: You have no information about how 
the and loan industry has with respect to money 
markets themselves advance of s period? 
MR. ELBRECHT: We know that 
as lenders and borrowers. 
have participated both 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: Do you have any statistics? These 
- 15 -
are the things that I think your department and I think Mr. Spohn .•• 
There are many people who understand what the statement is, but the 
specifics are something the Department should engage in more frequently 
because I still have the vast bad taste of their posturing with respect 
to Wellenkamp. You guys are so busy selling something to the public 
that just wasn't true. You've a long way to go as far as I am concerned. 
MR. ELBRECHT: We will do our best to gather some of these 
statistics, sir. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: I think Mr. Papan's point is one that 
I have too. Even if people start saving and the savings and loans 
are able to attract capital, what is to say that they will use it 
for housing? 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: They'll build new buildings. 
MR. ELBRECHT: Well, that's correct. Part of the economic 
deregulation mode is to deregulate on both the liability side and the 
asset side, and savings and loans have asked for and have received 
powers to engage in a lot of economic activity that doesn't have 
anything to do with housing -- consumer loans, trust services and so 
on. It may be that when rates are so high that borrowers can't afford 
to enter into mortgages at 16, 17 or 18 percent, the industry will 
need these other avenues of investment to simply stay afloat. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: Well, I know one thing, and I'll ask this 
when representatives of the industry are before us, but some of the 
changes in the law that we have been asked to make, at least relative 
to state chartered institutions are always put into terms of making 
money available for housing. I think it would be unfortunate if we 
made some of the changes and found out that the money wasn't available 
for housing anyway. 
- 16 -
MR. ELBRECHT: Well, the islature should be on guard 
against that poss ility. It's likely, in fact, that the savings 
and loan industry will be branching out into additional areas, and 
housing will have a lower priority, at least until inflation is 
dealt with -- cured -- and interest rates are back down to the point 
where people can afford to enter into home mortgages. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: I have noticed that the recent tax 
legislation that was passed apparently contained provisions that are 
hoped will encourage the savings and loan industry -- all all savers 
certificate. I'm reading from a Wall Street Journal article. It says, 
" ... ins tutions could pay 70 percent of the interest rate on one-
year Treasury Bill. This would probably attract funds from six-month 
savings certificates. Savers could exclude from their taxable income 
as much as $1,000 in interest earned on the proposed certificates, or 
as much as $2,000 per couple filing j returns." It's not quite 
clear. Was this part of the bill that was just passed? 
MR. ELBRECHT: That's correct. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: What do you think that will do 
insofar as attracting money away from the money market funds and 
back to the lenders who lend money on residential real estate? 
MR. ELBRECHT: It's very controversial. I know that some 
of the members of the Federal Reserve Board have expressed the view 
that it won't have much positive impact on the volume of new savings 
going into the savings and loans, that it will primarily result in 
shifting from one kind of savings instrument to another. On the 
other hand, only the future will tell. I think there is a lot of 
controversy on the question. A lot of people at the federal level 
opposed it on the ground that it was very costly in terms of the 
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federal budget, increasing the federal deficit while at the same time 
providing relatively marginal benefits to the home purchasers and 
the home construction industry. So, there is some skepticism about 
the extent to which that program, which is a very costly federal 
program, will actually resolve in additional housing. But it's 
impossible to say ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: If I'm not mistaken, I think the 
Wall Street Journal, itself editorialized against this •.. 
MR. ELBRECHT: That's right, the Wall Street Journal opposed 
it, and I believe Mr. Diehl, also, spoke in a recent article that was 
reported in the Wall Street Journal indicating that he had some 
questions about it's actual impact on the market. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: It seems to me there's a real clash 
of opinions here as to the future so far as whether the cost of housing 
is going to continue to appreciate. You've got this fairly new school 
of economists who are inclined to think that the appreciation is about 
at an end and may even go down and some of those folks in fact even 
think that we're going into a depression. But on the other hand, 
we've had kind of a period here of two or three years now in which 
there has been relatively little construction. We have a huge pent 
up demand for housing. We have a lot of the young people who've been 
going into apartments or into homes that were too small for them. 
We've had relatively little construction. If you look around a little 
bit you still find a lot of homes that contractors built that they 
can't sell. Those fellows are really hurting, but the volume of 
construction has gone down. At some point this is going to be like 
a dam that's going to burst. I mean you've got all these flood waters. 




in who have to l houses. The total number of 
househo s is is at a fairly good clip, not 
because of population increase so much as due to the smaller 
households. s means that housing is still going to keep appreciating 
rather than depreciating. 
MR. ELBRECHT: Well, this pent-up demand is surely a demand, 
but to make it an effective demand requires that the people who demand 
have wherewithal to make the payments on the mortgages. And that 
is probably the major constraint -- the financial capacity of the 
people who are demanding the housing. So, assuredly, the demand is 
there. Whether it will be an effective demand, whether it can be 
translated into an effective demand through available credit as a 
cost people can afford, is the great unknown question. That in turn 
will depend upon dealing with inflation and getting interest rates 
down. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: I mean all this money that's going 
to go apparently into reindustrialization, is, I guess, supposed to 
make the economy go, and people are going to be working for these 
es and so forth, but these people are going to live somewhere. 
There is a s ficant number of them aren't going to be satisfied 
to ei live a tent or an apartment house. 
MR. ELBRECHT: That's right, there is going to be an enormous 
demand for housing, of a kind that we haven't seen. The challenge 
is real to develop and create housing and provide housing finance 
of the kind that will enable people to actually realize their demand 
and acquire housing. And there's a tension there that will be a 
challenge for the state and for the housing sector to meet. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: The estimatesare 300,000 units a year 
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for the next five years in California. Last year we built 144,000 
units. 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: Can I ask you a very easy question? 
Tell me what usury is? 
MR. ELBRECHT: Usury refers to a law that limits the 
interest or finance charge or service charge that a creditor can 
impose. 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: Absent the law, what is usury? 
MR. ELBRECHT: Nothing. Usury refers to a legal restriction, 
it does not refer to simply a moral or an ethical •.• 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: Let me ask you sir, historically, 
because I always like to take you away from your statement. If Mr. 
Spohn were here I'd enjoy it a little more. How did we arrive at a 
limit one time of 10 percent and anything above that as being usurious? 
MR. ELBRECHT: Well, people believed that if you pass a 
law that limits the amount the creditor can charge, it will cost less 
for the credit. 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: People believe? Let's talk in facts. 
MR. ELBRECHT: And in fact, legal rate ceilings, depending 
upon the market, do limit what the creditor can charge. This originated ••• 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: What is your opinion of this, since 
you're heading a department on presumed salary, what is a usurious 
rate in number? Forget there is no law now because we've lifted the 
lid. 
MR. ELBRECHT: Inflation really wrecks all systems of legal 
restraint on interest rates, because of the disorientation. 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: Let me ask you, in the event they 
can't lend the money, what do you think will happen to the interest 
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rates or are 1 ? 
MR. ELBRECHT 
of course there aren't 
If there are interest rate ceilings, which 
the home area. With Prop. 2 
the banks and savings we've el rate 1 , not on 
and loans, but also 
brokers. 
loans made or arranged by mortgage loan 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: Let's get back to the first one. What 
do you the interest rates should be law, so that we can say 
is no longer usurious? 
e 
MR. ELBRECHT: In general, a competitive ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: Not general, I want speci cs. 
MR. ELBRECHT: In a competitive market where there is 
rate compe and that in turn prevents ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: I don't want to listen to this, what 
opinion ... do you have any opinions at all besides what you 
want ... to give us textbook answers. 
ef 
MR. ELBRECHT: This is a very definite opinion ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: Give me a number at the end . 
MR. ELBRECHT: ... where there is competition, effective 
on rates, you don't need rate ceilings. 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: G me a number now! 
MR. ELBRECHT: Zero, you don't need any law at all. There's 
rate competition, so that lenders compete among ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: Then you supported lifting the 10 
percent 1 t that we have in law, is that what you're telling me? 
as it was? I don't want to lose sight of the fact that at 
some these interest rates are usurious. I presume that with 
s of statement that you've read very well that you have some 
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op yourse f. 
el 
As far as 
we 




we sed some questions about 
mortgage loan brokers. 
, that was obviously too low and 
ASSEMBLYr-ffiN PAPAN: I'm go to to get a figure from 
and I'm to d 
s 
rate? 
MR. ELBRECHT: I'm going to try to answer your question, 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: What, 
MR. ELBRECHT: If ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: I'm 
your opinion is a usurious 
you money, when would you 
1 it and not call me ... what were money lenders called in the old 
? 
MR. ELBRECHT: Charlatans? 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: Loan sharks is a common word. 
. ELBRECHT: This is go to evasive, but a rate 
that uncons le. 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: What is a rate that is unconscionable? 
MR. ELBRECHT: It just s kes your conscience as being 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: Do any at all? What is the ... 
or lings. 
MR. ELBRECHT: I would say s. On a refinancing of a 
second loan or ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: No, don't say ... I'm asking you in a 
st -- ref inane and the terms. 
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ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: (Inaudible) 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: He's going around in circles here. I 
just want one figure in his mind that maybe we should reduce into 
law to stop all of this. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: But there are a lot of people that 
are loaning out on seconds, so there might be a ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: Y0u want to make that distinction and 
get to the primary lender, fine. 
MR. ELBRECHT: If there is no inflation, 18 percent sounds 
pretty high. 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: On a second? 
MR. ELBRECHT: Well, you asked me for a single figure. 
If we're talking about a noninflationary environment, 18 percent is 
a good rate ceiling. 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: That's a good ceiling? 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: Isn't that the Unruh Act ceiling 
on .•. 
MR. ELBRECHT: Which, however, you don't need if there is 
a competitive ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: What's wrong with 12 percent? It's 
obvious that lifting that ceiling is causing us havoc. If everybody 
has to lend within certain perimeters I think, I think we'll 
eliminate some of property and when we do set the law. 
MR. ELBRECHT: The problem with a 12 percent rate ceiling 
is that if inflation is 15 percent, the lender has a negative return 
and lenders aren't going to lend. 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: The way they reacted to that was 
prepaid interest which was in the form of a loan fee. 
- 23 -
MR. ELBRECHT: Well, that's funny business that should 
perhaps be ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: What do you mean, funny business? 
MR. ELBRECHT: That's interest in another guise. 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: That's their reaction to the inflation. 
They'll get some prepaid interest in advance. Let me ask you, do you 
support us setting into law a limit as to what you can lend? 
MR. ELBRECHT: In the real estate market today, no! 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: How could you say that? Look what we 
have here! I'm saying that ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: How does that help us? 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: When we had it at 10 percent it didn't 
affect the lending institutions, and we put 10 percent on it because 
at some point in time people felt that if it was in an excess of 10 
percent it was usurious. Now somewhere we have lost that concept. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: Could I ask a question here, Mr. 
Elbrecht? Before we passed Prop. 2 second mortgages could only be 
at 10 percent, right? 
MR. ELBRECHT: That's correct. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: Well, who in the world in their 
right mind would finance a second mortgage today at 10 percent. 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: Mr. McAlister, if we proceeded, sir, 
to limit the 10 percent to everybody or go to 12 percent and lend ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: Who would do that? 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: We do it in law. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: Well, so what? I mean you'll 
put your money in Eurodollars ... 
UNKNOWN VOICE: In Reagan dollars! (Laughter) 
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ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: There's a million places to invest 
your money if you're going to put that kind of limitations on it. 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: Placing that limitation on it, I think, 
would cause a situation to evolve where most people would not proceed 
to seek the higher interest. 
MR. ELBRECHT: There is no doubt that rate ceilings do have 
some impact on the market in most cases. 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: No question, and when we lifted the 
ceiling this is what we got. 
MR. ELBRECHT: There has certainly been a trend in the last 
few years of simply letting interest rates go wherever they will, and 
assuredly, when we experience some of the twenty and thirty percent 
rates that we're going to be hearing about when it comes to refinancing 
the ballon-payment mortgages that we're talking about here today, we 
are going to wonder whether that was really a wise decision. 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: Let me tell you sir, I envision that 
a lot of lenders in our country that were very solid institutions are 
being threatened by the fact that we opened a situation up here by 
lifting that arbitrary limit that wehad. Greed has set in. You know 
that money lenders were considered very greedy people. And I think 
that it's time we reexamine what we've done to ourselves and find 
another arbitrary level that begins to bring some sanity to this 
business of lending money or paying for money, at least in this 
state, and maybe nationally, maybe that would be the answer. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: Now, if you do that what do you 
think these people who are lending this money are going to do with 
their money? I mean think that if inflation is above the level that 
you said, what are they going to do with their money? 
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ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: Probably put it into property or find 
other outlets. But the cost of money ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: Buy gold, maybe? Gold? Paintings, 
precious art, antiques, old books? 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: There will be some of that, but there 
won't be the kind of chaos that we have now. 
MR. ELBRECHT: The first order of business is dealing with 
inflation, and a lot of the other problems will be resolved almost 
automatically if we get inflation down to a zero level. 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: You don't think these high interest 
rates are inflationary? 
MR. ELBRECHT: They are inflationary; but they are a result 
of inflation. 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: If borrowing stops for any reason and 
the cost of money gets so prohibitive the chances are that you'll 
find a leveling off and possibly a drop in the cost of money. Can 
we afford to buy that kind of risk or do we have to act now to impose 
an arbitrary limit to what you can receive and what you charge for 
the cost of money? 
MR. ELBRECHT: If you do establish limits, creditors will 
go elsewhere to make their investments. 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: I've heard that argument. 
MR. ELBRECHT: I don't want to argue too strongly against 
ceilings because we do support them in certain cases. 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: Have all states lifted the limits? 
MR. ELBRECHT: Several states have deregulated in the 
consumer credit area. Federal legislation has deregulated rate 
ceilings in real estate finance across the board. 
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ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: But the loosening up of what was once 
an accepted level has caused us to have the kind of situation that 
none of us wants. And I think we as a governmental body, Mr. Chairman, 
should reexamine and probably encourage the federal level of government 
to proceed at least for a period of time to set an arbitrary limit to 
the cost of money. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER) Lou, you're talking about a national 
e phenomenon, of course, you're not talking just about the State of 
California phenomenon. I don't think that the passage of Prop. 2 
has had anything to do with the basic problem that we're talking about. 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: You know, but if there is an interest, 
Mr. McAlister, in the kind of situation that we have, and there is 
a national interest, I don't know that the money lenders -- I mean 
the lending institutions of our country, all of them would be in 
agreement on this point. But I can tell you my concern is for the 
source of money that went into homes that came from savings and loans 
that presently are in some serious trouble and conceivably could cause 
a greater harm. Hopefully that does not occur, but there have been 
some pretty shaky ones across the country. It's time that we set 
1 an arbitrary limit, and if everybody has to live within those limits 
you'd be surprised how things would change. 
MR. ELBRECHT: Actually, the U.S. Savings and Loan League 
is involved in litigation at the federal level to prevent the 
Deregulation Committee from proceeding as fast as it has wanted to 
proceed. So, actually, the U.S. Savings and Loans League is in at 
least in some agreement with some of the things that you've said, 
Mr. Papan. 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: You call it deregulation and I call 
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it tolerating usury. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: I recall the two principal exponents 
of the usury concept in history were the medieval church and people 
like Ayatollah Khomeini. And in the Moslem countries, of course, I 
think they largely engage in a hypocritical device to avoid ..• 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: Did you ever try to find a house in 
Moslem country? 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: The closest I ever came to a Moslem 
country was when I visited Israel and briefly touched base in Lebanon. 
But I think they largely engage in hypocritical ways of charging 
interest without calling it interest, but those are the areas. The 
medievel church has long ago changed its views on that. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: Now they are right in with the rest of 
them. (Laughter) 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: Well that was before the Protestant 
Reformation, Catholicism and the emphasis that the church, both 
Protestant and Catholic, eventually came to place upon capitalism, 
the work ethic, and so forth. I think you've got to go back around 
the year 1400 or 1500 to get into the strong anti-usury feelings. 
There is a feature here though that I would like to explore for just 
a moment. There are those who say, and I'm not defending this, that 
the high interest rates are partially off-set by the fact they are 
deductible. If you are in, for instance, the 30 percent bracket, 
the 15 percent interest is of course, is equivalent to only 10 and 
a half percent because you're deducting four and a half of those 
15 points on your federal taxes plus of course whatever state taxes 
would exist. 
MR. ELBRECHT: By all means, our federal and state tax 
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policies have fostered higher interest rates than would otherwise be 
the case as the result of the deductibility of interest and the 
includability in gross income of interest income. Both of those 
policies working together have assuredly increased the prevailing 
interest rates, and that is a matter of government policy at both 
the federal and state level. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: Could I ask you to summarize the balance 
of your testimony because I would like to try to keep on schedule and 
we do have a copy of ... 
MR. ELBRECHT: Well, maybe I should move into the Wellenkamp 
issue because Mr. Papan specifically wanted me to do that. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: And I'll ask Mr. Papan to summarize his 
remarks as well. 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: And then close with Mr. Elbrecht's 
summary. 
MR. ELBRECHT: Now that real estate values are beginning 
to stabilize, at least in real inflation-corrected terms, and with 
the risks of creative financing better understood, it may be the 
time to begin focusing more carefully on the design of tomorrow's 
home finance process. That includes the design of alternative 
mortgage instruments, as well as the exploration of new sources of 
finance. 
One design feature of the home finance process that is 
of critical importance, and that is a particular need of careful 
scientific analysis, is the actual term or duration of the home 
mortgage loan. As noted above, financial institutions have begun 
to make short-term first mortgage loans with balloon payments due 
in some three to five years. They have done this, they have said, 
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because of the extraordinary risk of future interest rate increases 
which they were unwilling to sustain. At least three factors have 
played a role in their decision to utilize a form of lending that 
was the norm before the great depression. One is their perception 
of the inadequacy of the present limits on interest rate changes in 
adjustable rate mortgages. The second, is the absence of a secondary 
market for adjustable rate mortgages. The third, is the ruling in 
the Wellenkamp decision that makes it impossible to limit the term 
of the mortgage to the duration of the borrower's ownership of the 
property. 
All these issues must be addressed scientifically and 
competently in order to provide financial institutions with the 
legal context and opportunity that will enable them to participate 
in the long-term home finance process and to do what they can to help 
meet the home purchase credit needs of those consumers who do not 
already own their own homes as well as those who are faced with a 
balloon. During the past several weeks the national secondary market 
adjustable rate mortgages has been opened for the first time. And 
it can be anticipated that legislation will be adopted in California 
that will allow California chartered institutions and home mortgage 
borrowers to participate in the new adjustable rate secondary market. 
The remaining issue is the term or duration of tomorrow's 
mortgages, and the effect of the Wellenkamp decision on the future 
home finance process. This has become one of the most controversial 
questions this session. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: I think we are aware of that. 
MR. ELBRECHT: At the outset ... 
UNKNOWN VOICE: Some of us more than others. (Laughter) 
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ASSEMBLYr1AN COSTA: That's correct! 
MR. ELBRECHT: It is important to make a distinction between 
the design of mortgage instruments for use tomorrow, and the rights and 
obligations of lenders and home mortgage borrowers under mortgages made 
yesterday and in past years. The subject that we wish to address is 
mortgage instrument design, the crafting of tomorrow's home finance 
process. There is a mutuality of interest among lenders and consumers 
in formulating workable rules that will allow homes to be built, 
purchased, financed, and occupied. Unless workable rules are fashioned, 
tomorrow's consumers, our children and others, and ourselves when we 
move, will not be served. 
The issue concerns assumability of mortgages. If the 
mortgage is assumable, a subsequent buyer can purchase the property 
without having to procure a new first mortgage loan. The buyer can 
assume or purchase the property subject to the existing mortgage, 
paying the difference between the loan balance and the agreed purchase 
price to the seller, either in cash or by means of second-lien note 
or deed of trust or a combination. The entire unpaid balance under 
a mortgage that contains a legally enforceable due-on-sale clause 
is due upon any sale of the property. 
There are basically two ways in which a mortgage may be 
assumable by the purchaser. The mortgage itself may have no due-on-
sale clause, and in that event, the duration of the mortgage will 
depend on the term of the loan, whether one year or five, ten, twenty 
or thirty years or longer. In that kind of a mortgage, a sale will 
not result in a termination or acceleration of the loan. And a new 
buyer will be able to assume or purchase the property subject to 
such mortgage. 
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A mortgage may also be assumable even if there is a due-on-
sale clause declaring that it is not. The due-on-sale clause may be 
legally unenforceable in the context of an ordinary sale of the 
property -- if the mortgage is made by an institutional lender to an 
ordinary purchaser. That is roughly the present California rule as 
articulated by the California Supreme Court in the case of Wellenkamp 
vs. Bank of America. That rule in effect says that all mortgages are 
assumable. 
In deciding whether the present California rule should 
remain in effect -- that is, whether California law should require 
that in the future all newly made home mortgages must be assumable 
by subsequent buyers -- it is important to identify the relative 
importance and true value of assumability to the buyer who procures 
and pays for such a mortgage, and then to assess the costs that are 
likely borne by such buyer in exchange for the assumability feature. 
Like most benefits that the law requires one private individual or 
firm to confer on another, the consumer benefits from what is r~quired, 
but the consumer, or consumers generally, usually pay a little more 
as a result, or the property or service to which the benefit is 
attached is no longer provided in the market. 
In the case of mortgage assumability, the homeowner who 
is able to procure an assumable loan clearly has something of value 
because of that fact. Other things being equal, an assumable loan 
is a better loan from the consumer standpoint than a loan that is 
not assumable. But in exchange for the assumability feature there 
are costs and burdens which the person who procures and pays for an 
assumable loan must beat and in the future may be required to bear 
to a much greater extent than before. In short there is no free lunch. 
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It is tant then to idcnti these costs and burdens, 
and to attempt to measure their weight before reaching a decision on 
whether California law should continue to require that mortgages must 
be assumable. There are a variety of other mortgage contract terms 
in addition to assumability that are of equal and probably greater 
importance to the ordinary consumer. 
One obvious term is the actual cost of the mortgage, the 
mortgage contract interest rate. Indeed, the interest rate is probably 
the most important mortgage contract term of all, because it in turn 
determines the amount of the monthly payments, or, in some proposed 
mortgages, the amount of the owner's net proceeds following sale. 
Another important mortgage contract term is the duration 
of the mortgage. Mortgages can be of any term, whether one year, five, 
ten, twenty or more. If the duration is only five years instead of 
thirty years, the buyer who assumes an assumable mortgage will only 
enjoy the benefit of the mortgage until the expiration of the five 
year term. Assumability does not mandate that the mortgage remain 
effect beyond its stated term, only that it is not due upon sale. 
Another important mortgage contract term is the possibility 
I of, and especially the limits on, interest rate variability. A buyer 
who procures or assumes a mortgage whose interest rate floats with 
the market without limits in effect commits himself or herself to pay 
current market interest rates all the time. And a buyer from such a 
person will gain nothing from assumability other than an assured source 
of credit. 
The interest rate adjustability clause, if present, may be 
more important than the initial interest rate itself. 
A buyer who values assumability can expect to pay something 
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for the assumability option terms of either initial interest rate, 
or a shorter loan term, or a greater range of variability in the 
interest rate with perhaps no limits at all, or some combination of 
~ach of these. That is because the assumability feature increases 
the lender's risk, and lenders will seek compensation for the extra 
risk or require some sort of a hedge against the losses that may 
result. Another possibility is that lenders will conclude that it 
is simply too risky to make home loans and will withdraw from the 
market. 
Assumability increases the lender's risk because few 
purchasers remain owners for as long as thirty years. People move 
frequently -- on the average about every five years. Prior to the 
Wellenkamp decision, California mortgages had an average life of some 
seven to twelve years. Hence, while the buyer has an option to remain 
owner under the same loan for as long as thirty years, the fact that 
the loans were due on sale meant that the average maturity of the 
home mortgage loans in a lender's portfolio was considerably less. 
That in turn reduced the lender's overall risk. 
By increasing the probable average duration of home mortgages 
from seven to twelve years, to fifteen or twenty years or more, 
assumability as mandated by the Wellenkamp decision has radically 
increased the lender's risk that increases in market interest rates 
will lower the relative yield on its mortgage loan portfolio to the 
point where it will not have funds sufficient to pay competitive rates 
to its depositors. 
their funds. 
If and when that happens, depositors withdraw 
Looking to the future, it appears that lenders, to protect 
themselves, will attempt to compensate for and hedge against the 
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risks resulting from the assumability of home mortgages, 
which is now mandated the Well decision, and at times will 
withdraw from the long-term home finance market. 
One possible, indeed likely, response to a continuation 
of legally mandated assumability in California, will be somewhat 
higher interest rates. Lenders and investors in the secondary market 
will seek a higher return, if they can, in exchange for the greater 
sk. A more likely, indeed certain, response by lenders to a 
continuation of mandated assumability in California will be shorter 
loan terms -- for example, three-year to five-year roll-over mortgages 
without a provision for refinancing. 
Another equally probable response to a continuation of 
legal mandated assurnability in California will be a greater 
proliferation of adjustable rate mortgages in which there is little 
or no res~raint on changes in the contract interest rate. If mortgages 
continue to be assumable, lenders will not feel secure against major 
long-term changes in market interest rates unless the mortgages provide 
interest rates will float with the market. Lenders will be 
more hesitant about making fixed rate mortgages, or adjustable rate 
mortgages with reasonable caps on changes in the interest rate. If 
assurnabil is mandated, uncapped adjus le rate mortgages are 
more likely to become norm in tomorrow's home finance market. 
Consumer interests have consistently opposed mortgages 
with little or no restraint on changes in the contract interest rate. 
It would be tragic and ironic if, in an attempt to preserve assurnability, 
more important issue of interest rate variability, and the 
importance of limits thereon, were forgotten. 
From the perspective of the individual horne mortgage borrower, 
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the buyers main interest is in the procurements of the credit needed 
to purchase and own a home at a cost that is affordable in both the 
short and long term. If the loan is good for only five years, or 
if it costs more it should, or if the cost could increase dramatically 
as a result of changing economic conditions, those are features most 
consumers would deem worth avoiding even at the cost of losing the 
assumability feature. Few consumers, we feel, would want to preserve 
assumability at all costs. 
While the right and opportunity to sell one's home is 
important, it must be considered along with the right to own and 
live in one's home without confronting the need to refinance after 
five or seven years or to risk having to pay extraordinary increases 
in the interest rate. While both are important, it seems clear that 
the principal focus should be on the design of a mortgage instrument 
that is affordable during the period when the owner is living in the 
~ 
house. 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: In your statement so far, you have not 
stated if that particular lender wanted to stay on the loan and 
increase the amount as an option he would have at the market place, 
rather than be penalized for extending the same loan to a new buyer. 
MR. ELBRECHT: Well, our recommendations on Page 19 are 
that instead of making the entire unpaid balance due upon sale, 
perhaps the mortgage should give the new buyer an option to take over 
the existing loan, and should give the lender the option to increase 
the interest rate upon transfer to the lender's then current mortgage 
contract interest rate. That is one of the suggestions we proffered 
to the committee. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: Sort of a blending? 
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MR. ELBRECHT: That's correct. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: I think that your testimony is almost 
over now, but the thing that I am really interested in and perhaps 
your department could develop or maybe some of the other witnesses 
is this, and I think this is probably the basic question that the 
co~~ittee has to look at. st of all, for the average person 
that assumes a loan, what is the average assumable part of that loan, 
like is it 40 percent of the whole purchase price on an average 50 
percent we know that it is only some percentage of what the total 
cost is. And then, what happens to the average consumer in the market 
place on the rest of that credit? What do they have to pay for the 
rest of that credit, because what I'd like to know, is are we better 
off ending assumability of loans and requiring the people to get new 
loans at X amount of interest from the savings and loan or bank or 
mortgage broker, and would an average person be better off doing that 
than assuming the loan and having to get very expensive interest and 
maybe being worse off in the end financ ly. 
MR. ELBRECHT: Well, what we wou commend to the Legislature ... 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: I would like to know the facts on that, 
you know, is happening, factual 
us is more or less theory behind all 
e what you have given 
s, and that is valuable, 
but is something that the committee is pretty much aware of. 
MR. ELBRECHT: Right. Well, the consumer who assumes a 
loan will typically execute a second mortgage as part of a creative 
financing type of arrangement to pay the difference, and perhaps add 
some additional cash in the transaction. We are not suggesting ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: Lending out at the higher interest rate 
at the expense of someone else, is that what you are saying? 
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MR. ELBRECHT: I say, this is what consumers are doing 
today. 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: Most secondary financing is at a higher 
interest rate, so that people who are advancing that money are 
strongly supportive of the continuation of that Wellenkamp decision. 
Nobody is benevolent enough to say in view of the fact that there is 
a big first on it, and the seller who owns that property adds a 
premium to the sales price to that house, because he's got a great 
first loan, and then the broker -- the real estate broker who 
enjoys six percent of the $200 thousand level, he's going to squawk 
about doing anything that would modify that schedule or anything that 
would modify that assumability of an existing loan. And in many 
instances, finds a secondary market that goes somewhere between 18 
and 21 percent as a convenience to the prospective purchaser of that 
house. These terms, I think, should always be clarified. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: Well, the public is under the impression 
that assumable loans are a good thing because you get into a new 
house easier and you pay less interest, but what I am asking is, in 
fact is that true. Could it not be true that the average person 
really gets bilked by this type of a situation because although they 
may have a lower interest assumable, they end up by necessity getting 
a much higher interest loan to make up the difference and, therefore, 
are really worse off than they would be if we ended assumable loans. 
MR. ELBRECHT: In many cases, the seller who owns property 
with an assumable loan will be, in taking back the secondary financing, 
charging a higher rate •.. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: . .. and in addition ... the seller will 
charge more for the home to begin with because it has an assumable loan .•• 
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MR. ELBRECHT: I want to c ari one point though, Mr. 
Chairman. We are not suggesting that the rights and obligations of 
the lenders or borrowers under mortgages that have already been made 
We are talking about crafting mortgages for use in the 
future. We are talking about tomorrow's mortgages. We are talking 
about mortgage instrument design, and our suggestions to the 
Legislature that that assumability not be part of the home finance 
process refers to new mortgages that are made tomorrow. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: Talking about the future is something we 
would all like to have the luxury of, but we have to deal with an 
existing problem that, at least in large part, deals with what has 
happened in the past. 
ASSEMBLYMAN RICHARD ROBINSON: I think the chairman has a key 
point. You are suggesting the, that the Wellenkamp decision be in 
effect for all existing loans? 
MR. ELBRECHT: We don't have any position on that point, 
s Our concern is this, Mr. Robinson, that the debate over the 
past, over s of homeowners, borrowers, and lenders, and 
made the 1940's, 1950's, 1960's and 1970's not interfere 
the enormously important process of crafting the home finance 
process tomorrow ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: . .. (Inaudible) by even that 
stion. Most of that paper includes a due on sale clause 
provision. I think we are talking about contract rights, that the 
on sale provision is included within most of those contracts. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: You cannot look at the future without 
the past because these are ongoing instruments that include both. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: Mr. Chairman, as I understand it, 
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though, I mean their recommendation is that we not tamper with the 
past, that we change, in effect, repeal Wellenkamp for the future, 
that we allow the new buyer to assume the mortgage. However, that's 
what you might call an administrative assumption. I mean, he is 
going to get the rates updated to what the rates are now. You are 
going to limit the cost of assumption to just administrative costs. 
That, I suppose largely, is kind of a political judgment. It is 
virtually impossible to affect the past anyway. 
MR. ELBRECHT: That is the focus of the controversy 
surrounding the Wellenkamp decision. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: Members of the Legislature, among 
others, are keenly aware of the controversy that this has aroused 
and the fact that it is very difficult politically to take something 
away from people that they have. Vested interests of any kind are 
almost impregnable. 
MR. ELBRECHT: Actually, sir, this statement is a plea not 
to let that controversy prevent the Legislature from acting 
constructively in terms of crafting tomorrow's finance process. 
And our department has concluded that for tomorrow, assumability is 
not in the interests of the consumers, and therefore that's why we 
are suggesting that the Legislature consider modifying the Wellenkamp 
decision prospectively only. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: You are walking a very narrow line 
there. You are talking about hundreds of billions of dollars that 
are tied up in this paper. That has been a windfall. That money is 
not going to be freed, and so therefore we are not going to resolve 
the housing problem. You talk about interest rates, and I disagree 
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mean, you have to understand the whole .. 
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ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: is no question ... I have been 
at some homes myself , and I can see what assumability 
and how can be 
to say that as 
t to the 
are talk 
$ 0 and as 
a and selling homes. However, 
li become a much bigger factor insofar 
the loan is, that you can assume ... 
ng a $2 0 or $250 thousand house with a 
e , that frank doesn't mean a 
deal. If you have an $80 or $10 mortgage that is 
assumable at or 
has gone 
percent that means a great deal. But of 
, one would suppose that assumability course, as 
becomes less and less important on those old loans, at least if you 
assume continuation of 1 I mean if you double the value 
then, all of these recess economists say is not 
ng If you were to e the value of existing 
res s even by 30 or 40 how important is it to anybody 
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that there be assumability ... 
MR. ELBRECHT: Surely, the old assumable loans are going 
to become less and less important as real property continues to 
appreciate in nominal terms, and also as creative financing, perhaps 
when people begin to look at it a little more carefully, isn't as 
readily available as it has been in the last two or three years. As 
a result of some of the cautions that we are expressing here today, if 
the people take account of them I think that people will be a little 
more careful either as lenders or borrowers, in utilizing three-year, 
four-year, five-year balloon-payment notes. I think that as Mr. McAlister 
has indicated, the Wellenkamp issue, in terms of mortgages already in 
existence, is going to recede in importance. Many of those loans will 
be repaid when owners procure new financing, new financing under either 
new fixed-rate mortgages or adjustable-rate mortgages made by lenders 
tomorrow. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: Mr. Elbrecht, I would like to thank you for 
your testimony •.• 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: Let me ask him just for the record, too, 
Mr. Chairman. Did not Consumer Affairs come out against the Foran bill 
that would have modified the Wellenkamp decision? 
MR. ELBRECHT: We opposed it. The Foran bill did not modify 
the Wellenkamp decision. I am not aware that we were ever involved in 
the Wellenkamp issue prior to today. We did oppose the Foran bill on 
the ground that it was premature and I think events have indicated that 
it was. It is not an instrument that would have been usable in the 
secondary market ..• 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: Has it grown to maturity in the opinion 
of the Department now? 
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but adjustable-
rate proper lender borrower sa , yes ... 
AS COSTA We are two different 
i sue . one ... le s . 
CHAI~~N BOSCO: Well, f represents your first 
lvement s issue I would suggest that you are a little bit 
late lves a lot more I think your 
to at ast the statement you just 
made, Mr. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: I would 1 
is as repre the 
to take off on that, and 
Consumer Affairs, and I 
our concern here is with the consumers, those 
owners homes the se lers of homes and fully, the potential 
s new s, the ies that we are concerned about 
s state 
You have de well, we all know what 
descr is for the future is, I think, 
what s to have to take 
haven t told us as of Consumer 
Af do do next year people that have these balloons 
come due on that aren t able to the payments, that 
aren't to As the of the consumers 
out there, what are s s and the Department's suggestions? 
are you about as to how we those consumers? 
forward to these hearings, 
We would be very delighted to 
MR. ELBRECHT: We were 
and to other witnesses s 
of We would 1 to utilize these hearings as factual 
our We have several s, and I would like to 
listen to the other witnesses today before proposing specific action. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: Could I just ask a question? Why 
have we gone to thirty year loans? If you look at your tables on 
paying off loans, you only pay about 15 percent a month more on a 
loan of a given amount, on a fifteen year loan, than you do on a 
thirty year loan, and yet you pay enormously more interest over that 
thirty year loan. Why have we done this? 
MR. ELBRECHT: These are simply steps to try to reduce the 
monthly payment, and, of course, as you move from twenty to twenty-five 
years, the reduction in the monthly payment becomes less, and as you 
move to thirty years, it becomes even less, and if you are talking 
about increasing the loan term from thirty to forty years, it results 
in a miniscule reduction in the monthly payments. Now we are talking 
about negative amortization. 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: Mr. McAlister is leaving the impression 
that it is totally ridiculous ... fifteen, maybe eighteen years ago, most 
mortgages were seventeen years, and with the increase in the value of 
property, they went to twenty years, twenty-five years, to thirty years. 
I think we are fast approaching the time to lift the restriction to 
something longer, because most buyers are concerned with the amount 
of the monthly payment. Any attempt to read a deed of trust that 
lawyers drew up, most people would never understand. The basics of it 
is -- what does it cost me per month to move into that house? 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: Look at your tables. You extend 
it beyond thirty years, you haven't reduced the payments enough to 
make a bit of difference. 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: But the inflation offsets what you are 
not amortizing. Those people buying houses with thirty and thirty-five 
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year loans, if them ive s ago, the appreciation on 
that more than f s he is not being credited 
on 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: And so can borrow more money? 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: of course. And they are doing that. 
At one , we had a real traffic where an equity seller was 
a new house, and we litated the construction of homes 
I suf ... San 
Jose, I I and Sacramento were two areas that 
were up market and instances exceeding the 
of that market. We s with the private 
l I worked of new houses. We 
have sys l giant lending 
l ' _,_l s we have on the cost of money, 
and we have, I , Mr. McAlister, proceeded to mislead 
the down l Consumer Affairs 
BOSCO: , Mr. r , and then I am going 
to ask we go on to next ss. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: I ust want to underline, Mr. Elbrecht, 
as I your l of s that era ing the 
truments, we have to on th one is at 
least sane can be over and ll attract capital. 
MR. ELBRECHT: Yes r. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: And ll be the cure for the 
balloon are go to be next year or the 
after 
MR. ELBRECHT: It a cure ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN I es lly understand. I think 
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your testimony has been essentially sound this morning. The question 
I keep asking is what about those balloon payments which are going to 
start popping this year and next year? Is there going to be a need 
for foreclosure moratoriums and that sort of thing, and what is it 
you are proposing, and your answer is ... 
MR. ELBRECHT: We haven't addressed that yet, but one 
possibility would be a provision of law that would allow the homeowner 
borrower to continue the existing payments at the then current interest 
rate when the balloon comes due. In effect, the holder of the balloon 
payment mortgage would not have the right to foreclose, but would have 
a right to a continuation of the existing payments -- perhaps at the 
same interest rate, or perhaps at an interest rate that reflected the 
current economic conditions. That is simply an off-hand answer to 
your question. There are other possibilities, I am sure, too. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: My understanding that since the 
primary thrust of the hearing is to really get down on the negative 
possibilities of creative financing, I would appreciate it if the 
rest of the witnesses, rather than relitigating and redebating the 
theories of rent control and interest control would focus in on the 
short term, near term, and the long term solutions to ... 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: You take the practical approach to what 
do we do right now. 
MR. ELBRECHT: We were asked to try to describe the 
general context. That is why we have avoided proposing specific 
solutions. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: I think, though, that it would be a good 
thing if your Department could develop some specific recommendations 
on that because we know it is a freight train coming down the track and 
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we want to have some 
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, that are being sold 
today, we've assumed 
that all creative financing involves a sale, but indeed most of 
the ads that we see and the emphasis that we see, is on refinancing, 
what the economists call monitizing one's equity -- get your money 
out of your house by borrowing against it and then somehow you will 
be able to pay it back. And to be facetious for a minute, if any 
member of the committee ever wanted to make three years go by very 
quickly, the way to do it is to take out a three year second. That 
due date comes by awful fast. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: Sort of like having a two-year term of 
office. Those two years go by very quickly, too. 
MR. FRANK: I hadn't looked at it that way. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: Chairmans of Boards have only 
one-year terms. 
MR. FRANK: That's very true. 
The whole aspect of creative financing rests on two 
financial foundations. One is the assumability of the old mortgage, 
the so-called Wellenkamp decision, and the second is the premise that 
within a short period of time, all of the indebtedness can be recast 
into a new first. That is the basic flaw that I think we have to deal 
with here today, because I think that is a supposition that isn't 
going to come about. I suggest and see that Assemblyman McAlister 
has today's Wall Street Journal ... there are three articles in there 
that bear on the work of this committee. One is an excellent 
article on creative financing. Second is an article that indicates 
that the largest federal savings and loan association in the United 
States will lose $80 million this year, which after hearing from the 
realtors and other people about the greed of lending institutions, 
hardly squares with greed. And lastly, we see on the affirmation 
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from Pres s that the stration is four-
square in back of all savings and loans and other 
lending I wanted to that 
We now have start of deregulation on 
perspective for you. 
lity side, which 
means that we will be out in the market, we would be today if it weren't 
for this temporary restraining order in Washington, slugging it out 
terms of st rates on accounts of more than four years, and 
paying whatever we have to pay in order to get the money. Well, the 
way that a financ 
is to charge high 
stitution gets the funds to pay high interest 
I 't know of any other way to do it. 
And we are be told by s administration, wrongly, I want to be 
four-square on that, wrongly I think, that we want you to make any 
type of you want that the 11 permit. If Dupont 
wants to borrow money and in order to buy CONOCO, 
or if Brazil wants to borrow to interest on money 
they al owe can't repay and is willing to pay a higher 
rate, then the stration is s , "We want you to go to the 
st and should seek its own level." That's the 
so-called Secretary of the Treasury, Don Regan's philosophy of 
house. 
argument. 
is go to 
own level. I IS 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: It comes out of the stock brokerage 
MR. FRANK: Yes, it's basically the ultimate deregulation 
Let money go to whomever pays the most for it. Now what 
is that s loan associations will have 
two cho s, one, they can e make mortgage loans which probably 
won't yield as much as other investments and they will be able to 
less , and therefore, will be fewer funds available 
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for mortgage lending; or, they will be permitted to lend on any sort 
of instrument and we will make higher yields on home mortgages and 
we will be able to attract funds. 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: Mr. Frank, let me ask you sir, were you 
lending in the money markets instead of real estate at any point in 
the last five years and to what extent. 
MR. FRANK: No. 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: Were any of the savings and loans doing 
that? 
MR. FRANK: There were one or two ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: Taking it in at five percent and putting 
it out on the money market ... 
MR. FRANK: I understand. There are 178 savings and loans 
in California and I would say that one or two were doing that. 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: That's all? 
MR. FRANK: Yes, sir. 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: You are lending it in the money market. 
A lot of them ... 
MR. FRANK: We are what we call arbitraging. Some people 
were arbitraging. There were very few. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: ... money into the money market? 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: They were doing it. 
MR. FRANK: Well, that's what some people say. Some people 
say, well you are being a sucker to lend on mortgages. We think that's 
our function. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: Well what you are saying, if President 
Reagan's decontrols come through, that is probably what your industry 
will do. 
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MR. FR~NK: Yes. We 1 to Yes. I is 
very regrettable. 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: Let me ask you, sir. Have any of the 
savings and loans proceeded to package the low interest bearing loans 
and accept an offset in order to get it up to a level where a pro 
purchaser would accept those in order to better improve your positions 
and allow you the chance of capturing s higher interest? 
a MR. FRANK: There has been very of that and the 
reason is that it is sting but a technical one, and that is 
when we sell assets at a loss, we take the loss all at the time of 
sale. 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: How you measure the loss? If the life 
of that loan were five or seven years, you got the highest interest 
rate in that period. Is that computed the loss? 
MR. FRANK: No. 
ASSEMBLY~AN PAPAN: Why? 
MR. FRANK: Because we are at the mercy of regulators and 
accountants. 
ASSEMBLY~illN PAPAN: So you are saying government is hampering 
your ability to respond to these market conditions. 
MR. FRANK: We have been, I particularly asking 
for four years now, that when you have a loss, on the sale of an asset, 
you should be able to amortize that loss over the remaining life of 
the asset had you continued to hold it. 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: Let me ask you the other questions. 
Is there any effort by any of the savings and loans to end up as tenants 
in the buildings they own so that we can again capture the money and 
the cost connected with the buildings that institutions are putting up? 
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r of 
MR. FRANK: Yes, I is general. 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: They are proceeding to do that? 
MR. FRANK: Yes. 
ASSEMBLYM&~ PAPAN: They are beginning to market some of 
s and back leases? 
MR. FRANK: Yes. I can think of one institution 
here the Bay Area that has sold something on the order of ten or 
twelve llion dollars of headquarters buildings, if you will, this 
calendar year. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: How big a portion of the problem 
is that, Lou? 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: I imagine they have billions tied up 
real property that they are using in the course of business. 
MR. FRANK: It's a trade-off of course. When you sell a 
building, you have to rent back. And then you pay more, but then you 
your funds. It really is not helpful in the overall scheme 
of things. 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: We , in some instances, the price 
that you paid for the construction of those buildings, you are going 
to make a prof on it? 
MR. FRANK: Right. 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: Okay, let me ask you this. Your REOs 
as affecting citizens, and that's a matter of public record, has that 
seen an increase, and to what extent would you say for yourself and 
in the industry. 
MR. FRANK: Yes, the problem of bad assets is -- I don't 
want to overstate it too much, but it is basically zero. We have 
not completed a foreclosure on any type of property in four years and 
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is not a 
lions 
of savers 
ASSEMBLY~~N PAPAN: Another 
how do you about impos over a f 
low yielding 
want, need, deserve and 
, as an academic que 
period of , some 
level that we once say we had laws of usury saying that 
was excess of ten. Do you have a figure mind and would you on 
that -- if everybody had to live on that, what would your 
MR. FRANK: A well-run savings and loan, or indeed bank 
for matter would 1 to make at the end of the year one percent 
more on its funds than the funds cost us. That's our measure of 
success. If we can make one on assets that's doing very 
we Very few institutions and hardly any banks and relatively very 
few savings and loans did last year. 
1, one , plus expenses more than 
So we have to charge, 
money cost us, if 
you can stop money costing us more, I'm all for that. But if 
you to put usury on one side of the balance sheet and say to 
the saver, "Well if this won't pay you the highest 
rate, then call up Merrill Lynch," it won't work. 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: Let me ask you, sir. Lending 
whether they be banks or savings and loans, enjoyed in law, a limit 
as to what you could pay depositors. Did that come about as a result 
of a kind of power that they wielded at one time? 
MR. FRANK: That's very difficult to say. I think .that 





problems of the 
funds is what 
1920's and early 1930's. You have 
to take your choice. 
ASSEMBLY~~N PAPAN: Sir, is there an effort by the savings 
and loan industry that you know of, as well as the banks, in this 
state and country, to try to get a handle on something that's gotten 
loose, that conceivably is going to jeopardize the lending institutions, 
depositors' money, and cause the kind of crisis that we have with 
respect to the ability to borrow in your respective communities. 
MR. FRANK: Well, the banks are clearly thirsting for an 
environment in which they can pay as much for money as they have to. 
Eighty to ninety percent of bank's loans now are variable. In effect 
a prime rate loan is a variable loan, so banks are wildly enthusiastic 
about taking off all interest rate limits. Savings and loans which 
traditionally lent on fixed rate long-term assets say that we need 




ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: Does your savings and loan sell 
MR. FRANK: Yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: Is there a built-in interest on those 
MR. FRANK: U.S. Savings Bond? 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: Right. 
MR. FRANK: Yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: Would you consider them the worst 
investment going? 




you to cash those to s 
MR. FRANK: I so. A 
ill advised to buy one if you wanted to 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: You must 
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and on the 
one is to all can for you, 
, the same government, ours, is trying to 
slip it to the people that are buying u.s. bonds. 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: It's a gross inconsist~ncy, it's 
we shouldn't tolerate. 
MR. FRANK: are a lot inconsistencies. The 
st inconsistency I see, and I even see in the committee if 
you don't mind saying so, a lack understanding of the amount 
that the borrower pays with what saver earns. They are inextricably 
linked and there's no way of getting around linkage. We can only pay 
to our saver over the long haul what 
and if the saver knows, as he knows 
s the more money you make, that af 
business. 
borrower is lling to pay, 
now, that the shorter you 
the coloration of our 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: You were locked into long term turnover 
for the most part five to seven years? 
MR. FRANK: Well, we wish they were five to seven years. 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: Are you afraid that your industry is 
going to be absorbed now that there have been some new federal regulations 
that I haven't had a chance to examine. Within the next four years is 
it not possible that many of the savings and loans that we have will 
be absorbed by these large banking institutions for survival? 




, and both 11 bad the point of view of 
committee is looking into. Either we' be absorbed by large 
1 banks or we'll become large commercial banks, one or the 
We're being told unequivocally by this administration, we want 
to be banks. Indeed, our regulator, as the Journal said this 
morning, 11 I want my members to be banks." Whether or not we're 
absorbed is a matter only, I suppose, of concern to us and our 
stockholders, but from a public policy point of view we will no longer 
have an institution that's confined to making mortgage loans. I make 
speeches to builders and I use to make them to realtors before Mr. 
11 s and I tangled. 
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN: You're not alone. 
MR. FRANK: Thank you, and I always say two things. We 
make mortgage loans for two reasons: one, because it's the right, 
decent, the human, the American thing to do, and two, because we're 
not permitted to make any other loans (Laughter). There are many 
s in the financial cycle when isn't economic sense to make 
loans. Every Western country has a lender that's confined 
to making mortgage loans. This country, this year, is going to 
that. I think it's a great error, and it's a particularly 
great error for those people who have short-term seconds, thirds and 
fourths that they're blithely thinking that they're going to refinance, 
because they're not. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: What do you think on that point, Mr. 
Frank, is going to happen in terms of the same question that I put 
to Mr. Elbrecht? In '79 when the market got tight and the sort of 
arrangements of creative financing that we've been discussing began 
taking place with the two and three year balloon date, those loans 
- 56 -
were is 
'82 and 83. 
7 
s the sture of our 




we'll say that we don't have the 
say s to be expens because 
ASSEMBLY!4AN COSTA: How 
MR. FRANK: Well today 
81 '81, 
to 
se loans refinanced? 
one of two things. 
IS case, or we'll 
s are expensive. 
sive? 
are authoriz 
to o two and a half year accounts at the compounded rate 
of 17.4 That's what we pay the saver today. And we'd 1 
to be able to thee light 11, etc., so you have to add 
on to that, and when you something on to that it gets 
to be such a high interest rate that ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: are you talking about, guesstimation? 
Twenty percent? 
MR. FRANK: to 20 which is monstrous. 
ASSEMBLY~~N COSTA: T~at would be the cost of refinancing, 
ef of a new ? 
MR. FRANK: If these rates the way they are. Points 
don't seem to be a big factor the state. Most institutions charge 
what costs which is a po to a point and a half. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: Let me ask you one other question, and 
I'll let you-- I know you're probably famil with --a program 
that Fanny Mae is currently undertaking, which in effect allows them 
a chance to upgrade their portfolios by wrapping around the old 
existing loans with a new one to blend in the two rates between the 
old and the new ... 
MR. FRANK: Right. 
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ASSEMBLY~illN COSTA: ..• on a 1 is. Do you 
's applicable s situation or would provide any relief? 
MR. FRANK: Yes I do. I think a blended rate or melded 
rate would make a of sense, particularly if the entire mortgage 
was on a new , which goes without saying. Yes I 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: And with that new instrument, would 
you -- the Department of Consumer Affairs indicated that we should 
eliminate the Wellenkamp decision prospectively, in other words, 
future. And this sort of blended rate ••• if we establish that 
sion in California, allow that to occur on those new loans ... 
MR. FRANK: I think it would probably be the best solution 
for all concerned. It wouldn't be a very happy solution for anybody 
concerned but it probably would be the st one. We would make less 
on our money than we could if we lent at a market rate and the borrower 
might be temporarily better served by keeping the old first mortgage. 
But I , really, we have an obligation --we've got hundreds of 
, if not in the low mi ions of people who have balloons 
coming up, and we've got to figure out a way to serve those people. 
We're part of s community. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: Do you think a blended rate offers that 
opportunity to refinance those loans and would give a new loan, as 
well, at the same time. 
MR. FRANK: I understand. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: That's ending the -- or hopefully ending 
the situation that we're currently in. 
MR. FRANK: I think it would defuse that ticking time bomb 









ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: 1 




, halfway in 
Mae program is, 
trust 





. FRANK: Well, 
as that now. I guess 
what is. 1 re 
How do you determine what is the 
s. 
Mae has a that 
Western a program 
st answer I can give you is 
at 12 1/2. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: You mean if 
and the new is 16, they go to 12 1/2? 
old rate was 
MR. FRANK: That's right, they re just saying to a group 
of loans which I think average less than 10, that whatever you 
refinance will beat 12 1/2. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: And the 12 1/2 is a variable? 
MR. FRANK: Yes, then it'll be variable. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: So you'll take your fixed rate, 
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percent loan convert to a 12 1/2 rate. 
MR. FRANK: That's right! That's part of the consideration 
for the lender is to change the form of the note. As I say it's not 
a very happy situation. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Mr. Frank, do you agree that there's 
a concept known as reindustrialization going on, and it's been a 
conscious national policy to divert money into cost plus loans? 
MR. FRANK: I absolutely do! 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: So it's a conscious policy. 
MR. FRANK: Absolutely! There is nothing but dry eyes 
in Washington at the lack of hammers hitting nails. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: What percentage of the total monthly 
borrowing that's going on in the total economy, what percent of the 
borrowing is being done by the Feds or the Federal Government, half, 
a quarter? 
MR. FRANK: Well, let's think for a minute the corporate 
calendar is about $25 billion, the federal government is running a 
of $60 odd billion. 
month? 
commercial? 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: You're talking per year or per 
MR. FRANK: Per year was your question. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Twenty-five billion dollars for 
MR. FRANK: For a corporate, right! 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Sixty billion dollars for the Feds? 
MR. FRANK: Yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: The Feds are borrowing two-thirds 
of the capital available ... 
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MR s st were on 
order o l 0 l 
ASSEMBLY~~N ROBINSON: Is $25 • excuse me Mr. Frank 
$25 ll on cal Is a l of 




ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: So 
MR. FFANK: s 
doesn' count 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: ? 
MR. FRANK: s. New corporate bonds. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: So total borrowing of the money 
would go to lls 
and sort of 1 are 
MR. FRANK: Now if you just take just se two I 
there are many other sources. I mean you've state l 
, and 've got The 
are easi 're of Salomon 
Brothers and I'll be to some. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: What I'm just to out is 
who is draining down the available mortgage .•. who's draining down 
the available lending capacity? 
s 
MR. FRANK: Well, me -- I hate to bring up an extraneous 
point, I hope it's not extraneous and that is this. You have competition 
the mortgage market between people seeking to refinance and 
seeking to buy a home. And unfortunately in this country the 
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more money you the you're , the more Uncle Sam 
towards your housing cost, which is fairly zany, I think. So, 
if somebody is in a high bracket and they want to refinance, take 
money out of their home, they can do so more easily than a young 
, because a young couple is only paying 30 percent marginal 
tax rate whereas the other person is paying 50 to 70 and so they can 
afford it more. So you have competition even within the pool of 
money between people refinancing and people buying a home 
the first time, and I'm concerned about the latter. I think we 
need to do something about that, but not on a state level; it's a 
1 matter. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Just one more thing, sir, from 
industry's point of view should the balloons start to pop in excess 
of amount -- would a moratorium on your foreclosures be supportable 
the industry? 
MR. FRANK: Well, I don't want you to be misled. The problem 
foreclosures for first mortgage lenders is nil because our mortgages 
are at low balances and even those mortgages where the person 
isn't making the payment, the second, thirds and fourths are making 
the payments for him or her. So we have no problem and don't visualize, 
can't possibly visualize any problem. I mean, my own institution, we've 
got 60 thousand loans and they probably have an average balance of 
40 to 45 thousand dollars. So you're not going to have any institu-
tional foreclosures on first mortgages at all no matter how many 
balloons pop. What you're going to have is investors in these seconds, 
thirds and fourths getting brutalized, and many of them are people that 
should have never been in them in the first place. And you're going 
to get homeowners who are going to be dispossessed, but ... 
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ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: 're not directly affected, 
then would you st committee do or what kind of 
would you would be appropriate from a consumer protection point 
of view for both those lenders and those borrowers that are going to 
be ed on, or could possibly be foreclosed on? 
MR. FRANK: I really don't know! 
I just wondered if I could just add thirty seconds of some 
specific statistics which might be helpful to you and that is the cost 
of the Wellenkamp to us. We have about 15 million assumptions every 
month. We have about two and a half billion loans and if we didn't 
have , we would have additional income somewhere around $20 million 
a year, and of course it builds up each and every year. If we had 
$20 million more in income we could pay one percent more on all of 
our savings, which would be that much more attractive and which would 
bring in that much more new savings, which would mean that much 
more money going out on the mortgage market. And so we hear some 
of these theoreticians saying and the realtors, I'm sorry to say, 
saying short-term Wellenkamp doesn't anybody, but it saps 
our abi to bring new money, and it really does cost us a lot 
of money, and the less money we bring in the more we have to charge 
for what we have. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: Is there any comparison on that one 
point in those states that have not had Wellenkamp, because there is 
only ten that have had a sort of a nullification of a due-on-sale 
clause? 
MR. FRANK: I don't know, Mr. Costa. I don't know of any. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: Mr. McAlister. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: What were those figures again on 
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as ? 
MR. FRANK: We 15 of loans assumed per 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: fteen million dollars worth of 
loans •.. 
MR. FRANK: So that would $180 11 a year. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: That's your company? 
MR. FRANK: Just ours, so would be about six to seven 
our portfolio every year that instead of being paid off 
is assumed. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: On int you raised earlier 
possibi of most of your institutions either being 
by or becoming banks, isn't 
mean with the current economic phi 
il a iod of time, with the 
1 and enterprise 
almost I and 't 
se, t that be to your 
fit? I mean are diver fied. 
more or less inevitable? 
that I think is going to 
increased emphasis on 
competition, isn't 
even more -- accepting 
benefit everybody else's 
They loan to all kinds of 
peop e. You've got all your eggs one basket in essence. 
MR. FRANK: Sir, I don't want to 
I would be excellent for my 
s you in anyway. 
and for me personal 
and my stockholders to have a wide open range. I just don't 
it's in the interest of public policy to go away from having 
specialized lenders. Almost two-thirds of all the people in this 
country own their own homes and they do it because two-thirds of 
them loans from savings and loans which weren't permitted to 
make any other kind of loan. I think from a public policy point of 
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s an error, is go to , and I don't think we 
can stem the It'll be fine for the institutions. It just 
won't be very for the home buyers. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: Well at least the loans that would 
be , I mean assuming if there still are going to be any home loans, 
I mean they would be made by ... they'd be spread out over a host of 
financial tutions that didn't have all their eggs in one basket. 
MR. FRANK: But sir, just take today. Dupont is buying 
CONOCO today. They need to borrow seven billion dollars, and they're 
lling to pay at today's rate at 21 l/2.percent for that money 
because they they can leverage it. There is no home buyer that 
can afford the 21 1/2 percent, so the home buyer is going to be out-
bid. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: But deregulation •.. we're in the 
process of deregulation. You're going to have to pay more money to 
get your money and I mean you're not •.. I don't think we can go back 
to where we were five years ago. 
MR. FRANK: I agree totally. We cannot, and it won't 
happen under this administration. We will be totally deregulated, 
and it'll be fine for the institutions. It'll just be horrible for 
homebuilders and realtors and homeowners. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: Mr. Frank, you were going along quite 
well on formal testimony. It isn't written, but do you have further 
testimony? 
MR. FRANK: No sir. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Mr. Chairman, I have a question. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: I know that. Mr. Robinson. No, I mean 
this is very fast, and I just wanted to be sure you got out what 
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to. 
MR. FRANK: You're 
I should 
kind, I've been here longer 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: I want to go back to Mr. Stirling's 
1 of que that went to who was I that 
a major factor in this s , and 's where are the 
go would you say or do you know that money 
market funds have had on institutions in California, probably 
both and savings loans? You're competing, are you not, 
se other types of innovative checking accounts for your 
s s, and your depos s trans into housing? 
MR. FRANK: It's pretty to do it for California but 
's easy to see what the flow of funds are. Take 
a A bank is losing 's low cost savings and buying them back 
at the st cost. In other words, 1 CD's to the money 
market funds, so they're just dis themselves. But 
's not true for savings and loans and large. They don't 
s to so their experiencing a change 
of stment by savers. The average increase per week of money 
market in the last year to year and a half has been over two 
1 dollars a week. And money market funds a variety of 
stments. In round terms. about 40 percent goes into CDs, about 
20 percent goes into commercial paper and bankers acceptances, and 
the remainder goes into a treasury and agency securities of short-
term. They have an average maturity of somewhere around 23 days, 
money market funds. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Their yield, what would you say 
the average yield of the major money market funds are, Mr. Frank? 
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MR. FRANK: Well the money funds makes 
about -- s f a point, so after costs I guess they'd 
make about a But of course .•• 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Then no, that's not what I'm saying. 
I'm looking at it from standpoint of the investor, a deposit with 
you or a 
23 days 
passbook account with you as against the attractiveness of 
rollover in money market funds. 
MR. FRANK: Right. He's getting the advantages of an 
inverse yeild curve where the shorter the maturity the higher the 
yie , and 's taking the risk that the yield curve will change and 
that he won't be able to lock in funds that are a higher rate for 
a longer period of time. It's a trade-off, and thus far the trade-off 
has been to the advantage of the person who's stayed short. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: But even the large ones, such as 
Merrill Lynch's, are they not yielding better than 17 percent? 
MR. FRANK: Yes, most of them are yielding about 17 1/2 
to 17 3/4 percent. As I say a two and a half year account today is 
yielding on a compounded basis on 17.4, and I think that we'll start 
to see a substantial inflow into those accounts -- the rates came 
out yesterday --
work, and that 
people who think that the Reagan program will 
st rates will come down and so on. In 1975, 
when the yield curve changed from being inverse to being positive 
the money market funds lost 40 percent of their funds in a six month 
period, because they could no longer pay the higher rate. And without 
any malice I wouldn't mind seeing that happen again. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: But would it be fair, and this is 
my last question, be fair to say that that is a bigger problem in 
today's housing market and availability of funds in the housing market 
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Ca i ? stment is more 
than 
MR. FRANK: I can't ... I'd 1 to you but I 
t. They are inextricably Let's just take two years 
now when we can 1 pay anything we want to almost any 
s, a bank will make a deal Dupont at 21 1/2 percent 
two points off for expenses and profit and bid 19. And even 
on new money, if we lend at 16, 17 or 18 percent and take two 
po s off we'll only be able to bid 14 or 16. There isn't much doubt 
may 
are 
which institution get the most funds and so the 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: Along those 1 s, just one quick question. 
Dupont loans, for , it seems to me that these corporate 
take-overs that are happening now probably have an adverse affect on 
or 
st rate. Are those short-term 
MR. FRANK: They vary. 
or both, and many of them are 
some are When you a 1 
loans, though? 
they call revolvers 
and seven years, 
a bank, that's a 
of indebtedness, some f , some variable, some short, some 
, some non-prepayable, some prepayable. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: So that could a affect 
money availability I would think. 
MR. FRANK: Oh, I'm sure of it. I would think that savings 
loans would lend us here in California something on the order of 
$15 to $18 billion, and the Dupont loan alone is half of that. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: What'd you loan last year? 
MR. FRANK: I believe around $25 to $28 billion. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: Are there further questions? 
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ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: Just one. 
and Mr. Bosco stated, I m 
Obviously my concern is to try to provide 
housing for the citizens of this state. 
comments I've had with officials of 
clear to me that there is a fundamental 
off from what Mr. 
of the Housing Committee. 
goal of attainable 
From your comments and from 
stration it's extreme 
, that housing no longer 
has terms of investment capital, and of course it's 
and 
to make average person understand the necessity of investment 
when you're trying to explain to them how they can get into 
house when they need to get into that house. And public awareness 
is difficult at best on these sorts of complex issues. 
My stion to you is since s is really, when the train's going 
this way, I mean it's real clear to everybody, what do we do in 
California, particularly, on those things that in the Legislature 
we have a chance to do -- to try to still provide some investment 
capital for housing? The creative ing issue aside, how about 
the new constructions, the stimulation of that building that is 
necessary? 's some about Cal Mae Program and other 
I mean what's your industry see as any salvation 
or hope besides becoming banks? 
MR. FRANK: Well, as I say, I'm the Chairman of the state's 
Housing Finance Agency, I'm just as vitally concerned as you are. 
Frankly, all of these suggestions ..• ! just dread saying this. In 
the light of today's interest rates and today's deregulation climate, 
we are rearranging the furniture on the deck of the Titanic. We're 
kidding ourselves. We're gimmicking around with all these things. 
You cannot provide housing for people when the prime rate is 20 1/2. 
You just can't. And we can fool around, and we can do a little bit 
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here, and there, but you can't. The other thing that I wish we'd 
done, I wish we'd had free floating rates on mortgages as they do in 
England and Canada. If everybody in California paid the same rate 
on mortgages today, old and new, the mortgage rate would be 12 1/2. 
But unfortunately we've got people who are living next door to each 
other, one person's got six and the other's got 18, and the only 
difference between them, other than that, is that the one paid 
three times as much for the house as the other. It's really unfair. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: Mr. Frank, I'm going to get back to the 
question I asked earlier of the other witness. From what you say 
there really are no guarantees. The facts all point to the possibility 
if more money were made available to banks and savings and loans, 
they probably wouldn't get into the housing market, at least now. 
MR. FRANK: Well, we're seeing the all savers bill which 
Assemblyman McAlister mentioned does carry with it a requirement to 
75 percent of the net increase into housing. That was something 
some of us got the housing industry to tack on as a rider so at 
our theory being if you have a tax incentive for savings it 
should be directed into a specialized purpose. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: But absent that type of tax incentive? 
MR. FRANK: We've got another three and a half years ahead 
of us of this administration's anti-housing bias. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: Now let me ask you another question, and 
I don't want to throw a curve, but I think it's important to this 
Committee's deliberations. If we did repeal the Wellenkamp decision, 
I'm positive it would be a benefit to the savings and loans, but 
would it be a benefit to homeowners and potential homeowners in 
California? Would the savings that you .•• or the additional income 
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that you get as a result that ly show up in the form of 
more housing, cheaper housing or whatever? 
MR. FRANK: I think you have to put strings on it from a 
public policy point of view. From my own institution's point of view 
I d rather not, but I think you have to have strings on it. And I 
think this melded rate or blended rate that Assemblyman Costa spoke 
of makes the most sense. It assures that the refinance money will be 
available, and it will be available at lower than market rate, yet 
the institution gets a pick up in its income and a change in instrument. 
I think it makes a lot of sense. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: But only in exchange for keeping it in 
the housing. 
MR. FRANK: Right, right. Oh yes, I think given a choice 
right now with this pressure to pay interest rates to savers, an 
institution given its choice will go to the highest rate investment 
that it can make. It'll have to. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: It's interesting because other members of 
the savings and loans industry, and I don't think they were trying to 
be dishonest with us by any means, but, in all the testimony that we have 
had on the Wellenkamp repealer, not only this year, but the last couple 
of years, it was always put in terms of more money for housing and 
yet, nowhere did anyone suggest in the industry that what probably is 
going to happen is that money will go elsewhere. 
MR. FRANK: But we are experiencing a rate of change in 
regulation here that is phenomenal. I am testifying this morning 
about today's Wall Street Journal, and the Reagan administration 
this morning came out in favor of deregulation of savings and loans. 








se rates would stay up 
have. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Well, Mr. Frank, isn't it true 
as a condition of your state , you are required to have 
of assets ing? So if testimony was 
of basis of existing state law, it mean no other 
it to go. 
MR. FRANK: I'm not aware of that 80 percent regulation. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: It's not regulation, 's a statutory 
MR. FRANK: The Internal Revenue Service charges more taxes 
below a certain level, but when you are not making any 
, that's not much of a threat. 
CHAI&V~N BOSCO: Thank you very much. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: Would -- if the federal government 
were to decl , say $40 to $50 ss than is, is 
that to a major impact on this cture? 
MR. FRANK: It is poss , As lyman, that 
what we are reacting to is incredible mismanagement of the financial 
s of s country for the last years, and it takes more 
months to right are reputable people that 
we are on right track, and we are going to have stability, 
we are going to have a positive yield curve, and just wait and see, 
and yes, the medicine is bitter but it will cure, and we've all heard 
se things a hundred times. I think there's a darn good chance 
that could happen. I don't know how soon, but I think, I do 
we are on the right track. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: The federal borrowing is still up. 
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ROBINSON: is go to f the 
appropr 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: In te of Reagan's valid budget 
cuts, the fact that the federal budget is higher this coming next 
three years than ever has been in the past and therefore the 
of the federal borrowing encroachment of available 
credit is go to be higher. 
MR. FRANK: Plus their interest rate assumptions. For 
every one percent of interest rate that they are off, it's another 
$10 llion a year in the debt service, so right now, they are 
estimating 10 1/2 percent and they are paying an average of 13 1/2 
so there $30 billion that is not in the budget. But things can 
change and I they do. Thank you very much. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: Thank you very much, Mr. Frank. 
We will take one more witness and then have lunch. Mr. 
Burton Fehrman who is an attorney whose practice is limited to 
real estate and business matters and is editor of the Real Property 
News shed by the State Bar of California. Thank you, Mr. 
Fehrman for being here with us. 
MR. BURTON FOHRMAN: Thank you very much. Rather than talk 
theory statistics -- I have none those, I am only talking real wor 
practical. My practice is in Riverside and I have been there seventeen 
years. I think that I have a good feeling for what is going on at the 
grass roots level. In addition, I have an opportunity as editor of 
the State Bar realty publication to look at the situation on a larger 
plane than just Riverside. One of the reasons I believe that I was 
asked to speak today is that a little over a year ago, I wrote an 
article about creative financing. In the Summer 1980 issue of the 
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News, we a s ex tens dealing 
we are 't 
we are talking about. We great accuracy 
of the problems that exist today. We in with a lot 
I a of s. I believe 
a copy of Fall 1980 issue we with 
The reason I wrote the article is that suddenly I had 
to me ta about s great new thing creative 
I was curious as to what the heck they were talking about. 
the more I more I talked to people, I found out 
was absolutely nothing new. People were do ing up old devices, 
real estate instrument, in order to provide short-term 
, because I believe, as Mr Frank does, that we are 
on a time bomb. If there is no financing 
in near future, bomb is go to go off. Wellenkamp 
on the bomb. Depending on you do with 
it it go 11 determine 
'~ 
or on, that when the 
starts to will, in my opinion, be large scale 
losures. 11 be drops pr s somebody along 
is going to foreclose. That is the line of lenders, take 
the properties over and try to market them for what they can to get 
of them. 
I believe that if you want to look to what you can do for 
average person, you better start looking at what went on in the 
depression era in terms of moratoriums, and other legislation that 


























s of the '60s. I 
of that are working on articles dealing with 
is to get the out to people. But 
le issue by self and I would 1 to I'd be to 
it if want, I d 1 to a moment ..• 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: certainly isn't outs the scope 
MR. FOHRMAN: Okay, but I 
because I 
are a more invo 
to stick with the 
bigger problem and I 
And order to 
show you how problem is and how many people are involved, 
'd 1 to 
the 
ide and 
one example of one trans that I am aware of 
It's repre 
is a 
has a very 
of the entire scope of 
t some condominiums 
st rate construction loan. 
It's eking away at something like 24 percent. The bank is on s 
back to sell those condos right now, and the longer he holds out the 
worse shape he is going to be in. He obviously wants to sell without 
any conditions, but he can't find buyers who will not impose conditions 
on their sale, or excuse me on their purchase. He has a 17 percent 
permanent financing commitment. The buyers are not willing to pay 
that. So what is the builder doing? In order to move these condos 
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of four He 
interest rate, 
a condo 
for three years. At 
years, it goes to the 17 percent. He's digging 
to absorb the four percent. one form of 
today's market. Now the condo I'm 
of is sel for $165,000. The people are putting down $35,000. 
're getting financing on the first trust deed, and the seller 
is back a balloon , due three years. Couple number 
one enters the picture. They are a retired couple. They own a small 
down the 1 newer, larger condominiums. 
their condominium ten years ago $39,000, their first 
trust loan is down to $20,000, the market value today is $165,000. 
are tired of living in a small condo, they feel that they 
to move into a bigger one, so have placed their condo on 
the for $165,000, hoping to get $35,000 as a down payment so 
can turn go buy the new, big condo. When their 
to buy the new, big condo, was on the sale of 
sting condo. The builder didn't like , but he had no 
ice because he has no other customers. So these people put their 
condo on the market at $165,000. 
My friend, who is couple number two, is in a situation 
where their children are grown. They have all left the house. They 
are sitting in a big house and they're tired of taking care of it, 
so they want to move into a condo. It just happens in this particular 
case that their house is worth $165,000. Now they know they need 
$35,000 to buy the little condo, so they are looking for a $35,000 














in the market. 
to carry back an al 
old $20,000, the $35,000 
down payment is all and they will carry back at 13 percent. 
two, who have the house, 
purchased $45,000, a $25,000 first, they're 
of the same deal. They're to have $35,000 down; they'll 
carry the fference. 
Enter number Couple number three is coming 
out to Riverside from Orange County because are squeezed out of 
the market Orange County. They have three little kids and they 
need the big house. They can't afford 
are selling house on some simi 
these escrows are contingent upon one 
I'm talking about a situation is 
who three is selling to, 
who's stepping up, maybe they're the 
in Orange County, so they 
of program. All of 
This is real life. 
on today. I don't know 
somebody Orange 
time home buyer. But 
you can see what is happening, we are creating a domino effect. All 
of these escrows are contingent each they are all going 
to close. They all provide for sellers to carry back financing 
with a three year balloon. What's going to happen at the end of 
three years, I don't know. Everybody is banking on the fact that 
there will be financing available and they can all refinance. But 
at the end of three years, if it's not there, we are going to have 
a ripple effect all the way down the line. What we have is the 
number one domino. In my case, I haven't gone beyond Orange County. 
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two 
we a of 
Now s time bomb is 
t to begin. It's going to go on 
what will 
ASSEMBLY~~N MCALISTER: Can I 
one 
sures. 
This one is 
years. We don't 
ect here. Of course, 
there is nothing written down heaven that says everything 
must that there must be a savings and loan to come in and make that 
loan at the end of three years. I mean that if all the sellers are 
In 
11 to continue to carry the paper, it can go on. In fact, 
s in interest to do that rather than to start 
var 
s , isn't it? 
MR. FOHRMAN: That's right. is one of the possibili 
leads to -- earlier there was a question as to why aren't 
a lot of foreclosures. are not a lot of foreclosures for 
of reasons. One of them is 
are enough 
other, as 
11 acco~~odate them. 
Another thing s 
people are trying to work 
are caught , that 
above as have 
, however, is that some of 
se peop are going out and order to meet obligation 
are borrowing money for another year. Earlier there was some 
humor about a two year time limit or three year time limit. Well 
se people are going out today and borrowing money at 24 percent 
paying 15 points to buy one more year's life. That's why your 
not seeing some of those foreclosures. Another reason is that some 
of those people who are on the other side, not seller financing, 
but purchased a third, fourth, or fifth in order to save themselves 
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are 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: you described 
no real for that , if you assume in three 
years the bui has so out his condos and he has released himself 
s , there is no real reason him to not 
and ••• 
MR. FOHR~N: That s And may set the ripple 
8 out ... 
• 
ASSEMBLY~iliN ROBINSON: You have an emotional vender 
You don't have everyone really in the same position. That 
very well need that money for s next project. 
MR. FOH~illN: That's right, or he might need it to square 
away bank, 'cause the bank may have advanced him money based 
upon those year pay-offs and he has nowhere to go. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: 's where the ripple starts as 
well as stops. 
MR. FOHRMAN: That's , and everybody down the line is 
awful prospect of, which house do I protect, do 
I house I'm in or do I protect the old house where 
I had a lot of equity. Do I my own foreclosure and go back to 
my own house or do I try and do to work out of the problem. 
Now that's going to be the emotional crisis that each of these people 
will have to face. In my particular situation, they all have such 
big equities that my guess is that they are going to have to go back 
and try and protect their old equities on the old houses. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: Do you have any idea how wide-spread 
you think these sort of circumstances are? 
MR. FOHRMAN: I think that we are talking about millions 
- 79 -
0 are s. 
CHAIRMAN In Cal 
MR. FOHRMAN: In California. Maybe lions is too great. 
Let me just ... I said I didn't some statistics, I have one. I 
to an a of escrow associations 
and he attended a of escrow off and talked them 
about how many , how many closings they had had the 
, as a group they had 150 closings. Do you know how many there 
were creatively financed by the means of all-inclusive trust deeds. 
150. All of them. So I think that the point I'm trying to make 
i that everybody who has been selling a house in recent years, in 
some fashion, is caught up in the problem; the seller, the buyer 
the borrower. We have to keep that in mind because what has 
happened is that we have a lot of peop out there advising people 
to go into these quote "creatively financed deals" who don't understand 
sks inherent in them, and there are many, sks connected 
I'll try to deal a couple of them in a moment. 
The if you were in buyer , you have the 
that 's a purchase-money obligation and you are protected 
by the -deficiency slation. The seller is not necessarily 
protected, and we have situations where we have layers now of these 
all-inclusive trust deeds. I had somebody come to me recently 
to purchase a home and the title situation was there was an 
original first trust deed. In the days before Wellenkamp, the people 
tried to avoid the due on sale clause, so they entered into an installment 
sale contract, a real estate installment sale contract. That's level 
number one. Then when that person sold, they took back an all-inclusive 
trust deed. The property had been resold four times. We have three 
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of a real estate 
lment contract. I no who is real 
terms is at sk. It's like a 
The on totem po the of 
who ses person ses to pay 
person of him, promises to lender. 
And are all at sk. And reason are at risk, is that 
s of these a trust deeds don't correspond in terms 
to are ahead of . I some three year 
some five due dates. It's a whole sh-mash. And 
come , let s say s le we have a three 
, the guy on the five 
year is making s payments on a monthly basis, the man below 
him suddenly has a balloon igation that he is to 
pay. The llow who is the now is making his regular 
payments to pay off. llow s the three year 
loon says, "I can't, and even ~f I could I don't own the property. 
can't go out I'm not owner of 
. 
' 
on end says, "I 't want to hear about that. I've 
my in s contract it says your 
to s ahead of me. off." Well, he can't. 
Now what happens? What happens is somewhere along the line a 
closure is going to begin, the buyer on the 1 end is protected by 
the anti-deficiency legislation. No matter what happens he is home 
free, but the seller who relied upon whoever it was that told him to 
go into the all-inclusive trust deed situation, he has no protection, 
he is totally liable on that contract to his buyer. If he can't 
perform and the buyer loses s home, he's going to sue the seller. 
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se is around and says, do I sue?" He's going to 
to an attorney and attorney is going to tell him, 11 You sue the 
because broker did not proper advise you, did not warn 
you of the sks. 11 
In article that I wrote, I cted that the greatest 
was going to come out of creative financing, was creative 
1 and that's exact .•. This is going to be a relief act 
attorneys. I think that personally we've got to get out of Wellenkamp, 
but we can't cut it off right now. I think the blended rate may be 
the answer. We have to get these people out of the cycle. There are 
a host of problems that have to be dealt with. Wellenkamp is only 
one of it. 
We have to deal with the problems of all these all-inclusive 
trust deeds, and what happens with the terms that don't track each 
There is even a problem if the terms do track each other. 
Let me point that out. Where you have an old first trust deed loan 
at $25,000 at s percent interest, and the sel carries back a 
new all-inclusive trust deed that wraps around it for $75,000 at 
13 percent interest in most cases it will provide for, let's say, 
20 year amortization, or some other figure, all due and payable in 
years. What is happening is that the amortization level on 
the $75,000, very little principal is being paid on that. Where 
you have the old $25,000 loan at six percent, it's an old loan. 
A lot of principal is being paid on it. Where we originally started 
out with a 25/75 gap or $50,000, that gap is widening. Nobody can 
tell me who's getting the benefit of that principal reduction. Is 





In terms of legi 
that is ly the payments 
It sn't been dealt with. 
, I tried to about the things 
you do to try and work at handling some of the very practical 
lems that are out there. One of them is are still a lot 
of land sale contracts out , there is nothing that 
can do about se, but for the last 15 years every article, every 
author of every book that has dealt with particular problem 
po out that they are a terrible risk, and if nothing else I 
would l a commit tee to a look at that problem and eliminate 
them out once and for all. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: These are contracts under which the buyer 
does not receive 
MR. FOH&~N: Does not receive title. It began with 
vs Lassen. I thought they were dead for a long period of 
when the Supreme Court had the Tucker vs. Lassen case that gave 
the opportunity of avoiding due on sale on land sale contracts, 
theysprang back. They are sti out there. People are 
1 using them. The reasons don't exist to use them anymore, but 
there is a tremendous danger, and me point out why. The seller 
has title, the buyer does not. Many of se are not recorded. What 
happens if the seller dies, if there's a tax lien against the seller, 
a judgment lien against the seller, the seller goes into bankruptcy? 
There's a whole host of problems for that particular buyer, and 
there's no good way to protect against it. Even if the buyer is 
successful, brings a law suit and is sustained, he is wiped out, 
because we are talking about people with average homes. Whatever 
happens to the seller's title, as a practical matter, the buyer is 
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ously damaged. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: If the contract is recorded though, 
those problems don't exist, do they? 
MR. FOHRMAN: Well, maybe. Legal title still remains. It 
creates a problem. It's an impediment. It's an outmoded, outworn 
device that doesn't need to be. And it should have been wiped out 
long ago. In the '60's there was some legislation that dealt with 
it. It didn't go far enough, and I personally would like to see it 
cleaned up once and for all. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: It doesn't need to exist because of 
the Wellenkamp decision then. It would be obsolete. 
MR. FOHRMAN: That's right. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: If Wellenkamp were wiped out, of course .•. 
I guess if we wanted to fully address the problem, we'd either have to 
decide to permit contracts of sale or to wipe them out along with 
Wellenkamp. Didn't the bill we were considering wipe out Tucker vs. 
Lassen as well as? 
MR. FOHRMAN: Yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: You mean that if you wipe out Tucker 
vs. Lassen, you have to wipe out the land sale contract along with 
it, because if you wipe out Wellenkamp and you don't deal with land 
sale contracts, they'll be back full blown. There are a lot of other 
technical problems dealing with them. They're just as bad from the 
seller's viewpoint as they are from the buyer's. The only point 
I'm making is that we have a lot of unsophisticated buyers and sellers 
who are being advised by people who have no concept of the risk inherent 
in some of these devices. We have the blind leading the blind, and 
we need to try to get that cleaned up. 
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is on the all-inclusive trust deeds, 
are a whole host of problems to be dealt with, and 
one of the reasons I'm zeroing in on all-inclusives, is that they, 
opinion, are the most prevalent from of seller financing today. I 
there can be lation what happens under 
f amortizations. If the all-inclusive amortizes faster or 
slower than under , that has to be dealt with. What happens, 
and I think it is a real big problem, if the seller doesn't follow 
through on his comiT,itment to make the payments? In land sale contracts 
there is legislation dealing with what you can and can't do with the 
money. There 1 s nothing on all-inclusive trust deeds. I think that 
there are situations where the money is not being properly applied. 
The sellers are in a pinch themselves. They start using the money. 
The buyers may not find out about until the foreclosure begins. 
I think that needs to be addressed. Frankly, I think there are two 
ways of doing it. One, you allow the seller to keep collecting and 
post criminal penalties in the event that the funds are misapplied, 
treating them as trust funds. The other pass lity is that you 
require all-inclusives to be deposited with some financial institution 
to do the collecting and then the sbursing of the funds. The reason 
that it is such a problem, is that many properties today have a series 
of all-inclusives and we have this chain letter that I described 
earlier. There's great risk to the ultimate purchaser in this chain 
of money floating down between people. Again, I refer to this article 
on the wrap around merry-go-round. It talks about how many problem 
areas there are and I think there needs to be some legislation warning 
people, just like this subordination legislation that we have that 
warns right on the trust deed saying, look folks, this is a dangerous 
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under be you do whatever , you'd better real 
is, because you are as all kinds of responsibilities. I 
that there has to be a mandate that the terms must be consistent 
so that the wrap around at a minimum is meeting payment obligations 
underneath and s the same of penalty clauses, the same type of 
fire insurance requirements, all those things, because we are not 
just dealing th payments. Trust deeds have all kinds of provisions 
var in that fine print that nobody ever reads, require the owner 
to a lot of different things. And the all inclusive has to track 
that where you could get a default along the way for some reason other 
than the nonpayment money. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: Especially in cases tax liens which 
would take priority over other recorded liens. 
MR. FOHRMAN: There is a whole host of things, and I'm not 
trying to repeat what is in the article, just to bring it to your 
attention. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: Do we have a copy of this gentleman's 
art le, do we somewhere? 
UNKNOWN VOICE: We have one of them and we will get the 
one. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: I have a copy of both with my 
sclosure bill. You can get them tomorrow. 
MR. FOHRMAN: In terms of Wellenkamp it's a two-edged 
sword when I talked about -- it's the fuse on the time bomb. If 
Wellenkamp is -- if the due on sale clause is enforceable you can 
stop many real estate sales right now. You can kill the home market. 
If it's not enforceable then you're going to have these creative 
financing situations going on and we're just putting offthe inevitable. 
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The s I about earlier where the builder, that was 
correctly pointed out by Mr. Robinson, where the builder pulls the 
plug, we're then going to have the series of foreclosures down the 
Now that example dealt with three years from now. I think 
that a lot of these deals began two years ago and that a lot of 
them are going to start coming due within the next year. I believe 
that you have to give serious consideration to some type of moratorium 
legislation dealing with this. I personally believe that the long 
range effect of Wellenkamp is that the average person's a lot worse 
off because it's going to come back and haunt the average person who 
carried back one of these trust deeds without understanding 'it ~t 
all. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Let me ask a question. This 
moratorium, doesn't it take one of the few disincentives to this type 
of financing away? If we enact a moratorium, one of the things that 
could stop this or at least slow it down is the type of information 
that's out amongst the general public in the experience of their 
neighbors. I think you take one of the big checks that are built-in 
cally in a free system away the minute you enact a moratorium. 
MR. FOHRMAN: I agree with you. The problem is that you 
have hundreds of thousands of people that have no idea what they are 
doing. They didn't understand that and they're going to be led to 
slaughter in this situation. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: They didn't understand what they 
were doing, and in a lot of cases they were represented by licensed 
realtors in the State of California. What's the .•• 
MR. FOHRMAN: Who did not understand it themselves. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: And I understand that. What is 
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current state of 
affecting realtors? 
on errors and omission litigation 
MR. FOHRMAN: I think we're going to have the biggest 
of litigation against realtors the state has ever seen. I 
have realtors who are calling indicating that they have real 
concern that they're getting ripples from people that say, you didn't 
tell me this and such and I'm now faced with this situation as the 
balloon comes due, or the multiple layers of all inclusive trust 
deeds that didn't correspond in terms. I don't know what the ultimate 
feet is. I believe that the brokers have a serious problem. There 
was a recent case of Wyatt vs. Union Mortgage which dealt with the 
abil of a loan broker for failure to disclose the risks connected 
with the second trust deed loan. It dealt with a lot of other issues, 
but in that case the mortgage broker was held liable. I think it's 
just a very short jump from Wyatt vs. Union Mortgage to imposing the 
same liability on the average broker for not advising people as to 
what they were getting into on the all inclusive trust deeds. And I'm 
not being unduly critical of the brokers. There are many attorneys 
who have used all inclusive ... 
ASSEMBLY~~N ROBINSON: Is that involving civil fraud? 
MR. FOHRMAN: Yes, there was some fraud involved ••• 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: But you are separating the two 
different issues. 
MR. FOHRMAN: Right. Right. I think that it shows the 
liability aspect of the broker for failure to advise quite apart 
from fraud, and I think that same thing is going to be transferred 
over in these situations. 




MR. FOHRMAN: There was I 
that that it s not just a of tell 
of Real Estate, "Look you need a program 
" I the DRE of Real tate to 
is go sent those c areas 
that have to be a have to out. As 
have to dea more and more all trust 
deeds, more and more are I 
has to be a 1 
should be courses rea s 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA Mx. Fehrman. 
MR. FOHlli~N: Yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: you say , or you 
's to say se 
brokers are, s or 
place of to act, of 
the you say that is. 
11, se. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: ... these trans of 
MR. FOHRMAN: Yes, I that do. are the 
ones that are giving the average buyer and seller has 
purchased one or two homes in li and they are 
to these people to tell them to do. They want to buy this 
don't know how to do it. So that particular realtor is saying, 
"Look, there's a keen called an 1-inclusive trust deed, and 
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's a piece of cake. Three years from now, we all know the money 
market can't last as it is right now. It's going to break at some 
point, so sometime in the next three years you go out there and refinance 
it." A lot of people are buying that. They don't understand what 
the problem is. 
Now, I've already talked about all-inclusives and land 
sale contracts, but those are only some of the devices that are being 
used. There are other things that are out there that you don't see as 
much of but they also come within the realm of creative financing and 
if you're going to deal with legislation you're going to have to touch 
on those. 
You see leases with options. It is another way of trying 
to get around the due on sale. There are various types of .•. well, 
various types of seller carry backs. No matter what they call them 
they all basically involve the seller carrying back something. Now 
many of these, we're talking about the fact that there's nothing 
creative about creative financing other than the name. I saw an 
ar le recently that some hairbrained scheme for creative financing. 
The interesting thing about that particular device, and I don't 
remerr~er what it was because it was so hairbrained I didn't pay 
much attention to it; but somebody wrote a response in the next 
issue on this article that I read pointing out a 800 year old case 
in England that dealt with that very concept. There's nothing new, 
and that's the danger in trying to deal with some legislation that 
is going to deal across the board with creative financing. You have 
all the normal methods of real estate finance that have been abused, 
















have -- just let me 
the last two weeks. 
had no 




s a one. 
s stars 
an ad to st 
c rate of return 
1 
scover when 
out of 11 that I dealt with 
,000 a second trust 
es of situations where .•• 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: Is s commercial property or 
what kind? 
MR. FOHRMAN: 
another one exactly 
s was commerc 
on a 
property, but I also 
And the people not 
only were led to believe that they had a second, they actually wound 
up having a third, and both the second and the third exceeded the 
market value of the property. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: Well, one question that I have is I 
mean this problem has always been inherent in second trust deeds and 
in fact a number of instruments like them. Is there evidence that the 
problem is getting worse now? 
MR. FOHRMAN: I think the problem is much worse. After 
Prop. 2 we had a lot of people jump into the market as mortgage 
loan brokers and there are very little restraints on what these 
people did or could do. I think there has been tremendous fraud 
practiced, I think that ..• 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: Like Universal and Atlas Trust. 
MR. FOHRMAN: Yes. We're talking about dozens of these 
companies. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: I think one thing that we didn't pay 
enough attention to in this committee when we dealt with Prop. 2 
is that in addition to getting rid of usury, it really expanded the 
number of people that are going to be out there making these types 
of transactions. 
MR. FOHRMAN: Frankly there is nothing they can do about 
all the fraudulent transactions that have already occurred, but I 
think the door needs to be closed. I think that you need to take a 
close look at what requirements you need to impose on people that 
are going to be doing this. I'm one attorney in one small city. I 
had 11 phone calls in two weeks and they all are very similar experiences 
right down the line. We are talking about some people whose life 
savings are being wiped out in these situations and that's ..• I've 
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• 
to some o 
t s true 
-!:he s and loans and ck t 
And are go to out. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: There 
that ss and 
MR . 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: 
MR. FOHRMAN: Yes there is. 
Task Force that is cons what 
the ques 
to 
s. But s 
deeds, I want to 
seller 
not 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA Mr. 
MR. FOHR~N: Yes s 
ASSEMBLYY~N MCALISTER: Go 
se transact 
sure I 
that the seller could up 
MR. FOHRY~N: In 
a 
f. 
l the money out o 
Mouse trust deeds 
I 
these s. 
's also a Governor 
f 
was asked about trust 
t a 
ster has a que 
to statement 
1 I 
is the li 
seller has -- he 
s property he an all trust had a 
three year loon. He goes to sell , and he can 
sell on anything other a four or five year balloon. So he 
goes and carries back an all-inclusive trust deed that has a f 
year balloon. s buyer is making s regular monthly payments, 
and then the under loan comes due in three years. The buyer 
says, "Pay off." Sel says, "I can't pay it off, and even if 
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I wanted to, I don't have to the I can't go out and 
negotiate the financing.'' The buyer says, "I'm not going to pay a 
penny towards the refinancing. It's all up to you. You pick up all 
the points," and he can't. We're talking about the average guy that's 
got a small house. He cannot do it. So now he winds up getting sued 
by his buyer because the buyer is put at risk. He's going to either 
have to go out and get the financing, bear the cost of it or he isn't 
able to get the financing, and he gets foreclosed out. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: So the seller is liable because 
this previous trust deed becomes due, and the buyer who wasn't 
cipating this, conceivably might have discovered it had he checked 
the records, but he presumably isn't told all this and ..• 
MR. FOHRMAN: We're talking about unsophisticated people 
who do not check the records. They don't even ... when they get that 
title policy they don't even understand what that title policy does. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: They don't have lawyers advising 
them and in a good many cases now I guess now there -- well in 
some cases you wouldn't have a realtor involved. You may just have 
private parties. 
MR. FOHRMAN: Sometimes, sometimes. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: Well, unless you read A through X in 
the title policy exemptions you wouldn't know what the title policy 
does, and I don't think anybody does. 
MR. FOHRMAN: Well, it might not even show there. First 
of all the title company is not aware of the provisions of the 
promissory note. And the provisions we're talking about only show 
up in the promissory note. There are very few buyers who are 




AS COSTA: Or under what says . 
. FOHfu~N: It's not note is not 
have what is ahead of them. don't even know 
to ask for. And so at some s 
and s that know -- the f 
• have is sure 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: s is so ff to deal 
contracts of these 
car owner's manuals as some of 
the world. And so I don't know you real of 
You talk proper disclosure and a contract 
lude that sclosure, we s it, and 
in terms of the 
s issue earl s 
on these matters. You try to 
s, and the fact of the matter is 
are no dead bodies yet. I 
's becoming that way and I believe 1 increase next year 
t's a phraseology that we use the political arena, but there 
aren't the dead bodies, the foreclosures, yet to the degree that 
people feel that this is a problem, that, hey, I'd better watch out. 
You know, the warning signals aren't there yet. There haven't been 
lures or mergers of s and loans statewide, and so average 
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person doesn't foresee s as a problem. They have to move, their 
jobs are transferred, or they want to get into a better home. They're 
saying, "Hey Legislature, you're not doing anything to give me low 
interest rates and this is my only avenue to get into this home, 
because I have to move, or my job's been transferred, or we want to 
sell our large home and move into a different location, or whatever. 
So the fact of the matter is Dick's point about the dead bodies and the 
moratorium is extremely important. 
Any changes that we make in this area or that you discussed 
or offered as options, which all seem to make sense, seem to be areas 
that we're going to have to deal with. Any changes we are going to make 
are going to require making these changes palatable in the political 
arena. And I'm talking about all the interested players in the arena. 
I'm talking about the players being not only the lending institutions, 
but the realtors which are an extremely large force within this 
stage, and the builders, subsidized housing groups, the whole potpourri 
of the players of the housing chain. Unless you create that awareness 
and sensitivity, and unless maybe we have some dead bodies, and 
the people actually say, "Hey, this is terrible," then we're not going 
to see the changes that you outlined or some of the other changes in 
this area. 
MR. FOHRMAN: If I could stick with your dead body analogy 
for a moment, I think the real policy question is are you going to 
build a big morgue or are you going to give these poor unsuspecting 
people some first aid before they get slaughtered. We are talking 
about people who have no idea of what they are facing. They were 
led down the primrose path, and is it fair to those folks? 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: I want to thank you for abandoning your 
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I 
to us. I that was and 
the call of duty. 
would like to talk 
And I think if you would be will we 
you more about lation. And although 
it's lunch now I'm sure everyone will want to return for Mr. 
Gil s response later s afternoon. It should be very intere 
We 11 return at 2:15 this afternoon. 
MR. SAMSON: What I want to talk about is the manner in 
which an unscrupulous person, and I'm going to focus on the real 
estate broker, licensee, that has come to my attention is 
s unscrupulous scheme using creative financing 
I have a written statement, and I have handed it out to the 
members of the committee because it contains certain exhibits, and 
even though I' be without referring to my statement verbatim 
I 1 have to refer to exhibits to make my testimony somewhat 
clear. I have, by the way, eight years of experience with real estate 
s both civil and criminal. I receive a lot of publicity from 
that activity, so I get a lot of phone calls. Like Mr. Fohrman was 
, he averages 11 a week. I average three or four a day. I so 
do a lot of public speaking at brokerage houses, multiple listing 
s, I got Grubb and Ellis coming up in a couple of weeks. I've 
talked to the Escondido Multiple sting last Thursday, so my remarks 
are upon current information that I received from the industry 
out there doing it. And my remarks that I am going to make are based 
on a very small minority of the people in the industry. Overall 
really can't see the forest for the trees. They think they are doing 
good and they're trying their best. But the scheme that I'm going 
to describe is the unscrupulous person who's taking advantage of 
the fact that the public is now educated to taking paper. Because 
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they know they have to take back paper, they're accustomed to it. 
There's a book out by Mr. Robert G. Allen, Nothing Down. 
Perhaps you've read about it. It's very persuasive. In fact, there 
are clubs being formed in San Diego called RAND groups, which stands 
for Robert Allen Nothing Down investment clubs where they try to 
implement this theory of getting into property for absolutely nothing 
down and perhaps a negative price being paid back. 
The way the scheme works is that the buyer, when he comes 
into the transaction, refinances the equity and gives part of that 
equity back to the seller as his down payment. The points that he has 
to pay, and right now it's about 16 points, can only be accomplished 
by increase in the sales price. Now in the standard legitimate 
transaction, under RAND, you would increase the sales price only 
by that amount of money, the amount of points you had to pay to get 
the money for the down payment. The problem that's going to result 
is that the property will now be over encumbered. You've got some 
more loans to pay, and if you're speculating for investment purposes, 
it's doubtful whether or not you can provide enough cash for the negative 
cash flow that's going to be created. And that seller may have to take 
the property back that's now been over encumbered. And it's pretty 
widespread. 
What I've done, if you'll look on my statement, attached 
to it are some exhibits. I've got exhibit lA and lB. I point them 
out because these were submitted by licensed real estate brokers. 
Both properties were in Vista, a city in north San Diego County. One 
is typewritten and one is handwritten, but the language is identical. 
These two brokers are 40 miles apart. So the scheme is pervasive. 




the It was a sel 's agent called me 
sa 11 we have here. What do you think?" I was appalled 
two reasons. One, puts the seller at risk and in jeopardy, 
but it's done by licensees. And that bothers me. You can see 
there on document it says by the state he is a licensed real estate 
broker. But you have to look at the term. 
ROBINSON: And that's required by existing 
law. 
MR. SAMSON: Actually there is no regulation or law. I 
do as a matter of practice so they can't be sued for 
noL sclosure. I don't think you'll find it written down any place. 
~ 1 3 an interesting fact, but I don't think you can. But everybody 
s it just to avoid the problem of having this thing fall apart in 
1 litigation, have it come back that it was a failure to disclose 
the fact that they would quote the expert in this transaction. In 
the first one that you see here, you will note that there's a $15,000 
down payment (B). The language that's curious here, "buyer to 
assume subject to,n is really funny language because you do one or 
the other. You'll note that both offers use that same language . 
But the important thing is (c) , that buyer is to obtain a new second 
trust deed not to exceed 75% of the appraised value. And here is 
where the problem lies. Because that will go through a mortgage loan 
broker ••• I'm going to talk about them. By the way I was listening 
to Mr. Fehrman -- I don't want to get ahead of myself, but if 
you want to hear a horror story ..• I'm personally coordinating the 
complaints on Universal Financial, and I think the worst is yet to 
come. It's really a terrible problem that we are facing. 
But with this at hand, let's look at this, in fact, in the 
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st the property is on $99,000, we're going to 
ref that for 75 percent or $75,000 which we'll take the 
$15,000 down payment, and the mortgage loan broker 1 of course 
existing first encumbrance leaving some cash. Now this 
is not really going to generate a lot of cash for s particular 
should this transaction unwind that seller's going to have 
to back this piece of property with a brand new encumbrance 
and some new payments that he didn't think he was going to have to 
come back on. 
The rest of it you'll note under paragraphs E and F is a 
rd and fourth trust deed. The third will be some payments back to 
se and the fourth is interest only compounded note payments 
all due and payable in three years which is going to generate one big 
balloon -- three years of interest compounded over that period of 
t:i,.me! 
The second one bothers me though, because if you will note 
here you have a very low first mortgage. By the way this offer was 
, as we've heard throughout this morning, by a very unsophisticated 
seller, doesn't speak very good English, a Mexican family. The offer 
is for $78,500 with $20,000 down, buyer to assume "subject to" the 
sting VA for $9,500 -- and with that low down watch what happens 
when you refinance the second -- buyer to obtain a new loan and second 
trust deed, not to exceed 75 percent of the appraised value, $49,000, 
of which the loan broker would probably exclude $9,000 still leaving 
$40,000 of which $20,000 only goes to the seller. That buyer now 
has $20,000 cash in this transaction. Now in this particular one, 
this particular broker says he does several of these a week, and he 
expects to use that cash to help maintain the negative cash flow and 
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hope for an equity build-up so that he can sell this property in a 
couple of years at a profit. A couple of problems if there is no 
equity build-up, if prices don't continue to go up, he can walk away 
from this deal and as we've heard he'll probably have 580B purchase 
money protection, which I want to speak to in a few minutes. And 
then once again you have the third and fourth trust deeds that are 
created to over-encumber the property, and the fourth or fifth trust 
deed, which is interest only with a balloon payment to compound at 
the end of three years. Now those are technically, strictly legal, 
no problem deals, but they put the seller at a great deal of risk, 
and I think that something should be done in this area. 
Now let me show you a truly unscrupulous transaction which 
is presently being litigated. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Wait a minute. If you say something 
should be done, what do you suggest? 
MR. SAMSON: In the typical transaction, the buyer never 
sees the seller's escrow closing statement and vice-versa, the 
seller never sees the buyer's closing statement. The seller does 
not know in some cases how much cash is being disbursed to the buyer. 
I would recommend that in these creative financing schemes, like 
the ones I'm describing, where a cash or a credit is being disbursed 
to a buyer, that it be done only with the explicit approval of the 
seller, that he initial that buyer's closing statement, and further 
where over-encumbrance is occurring, and this next example I show 
you is pretty bad, that where the property is being over-encumbered 
by a new loan that the seller be required to inspect the buyer's 
financial statement and approve that loan package. In other words, 
that new finance that is corning down. The seller should be aware 
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that the buyer is paying 16 points and some other costs to get that 
cash to make the down payment, and take some cash out. He should 
be alerted to that. 
By the way, many of these deals are done through brokers 
exempt escrow. I'm recommending that the Financial Code Section 
17006 (d) be repealed. That you not allow real estate brokers to handle 
their own escrows. In eight years of prosecution, most of the really 
bad transactions that I have had to prosecute have been done through 
a brokers exempt escrow. If brokers want to do their escrows let them 
incorporate under the Financial Code. Let them operate like any other 
escrow company. From what I have seen it's very, very difficult for 
the employee of the broker, the escrow officer working in the same 
office just a desk apart, to have any independent judgment when it 
comes time to close that transaction. They're an employee of that 
broker and that broker is an agent of one of the principals -- borrower, 
lender, buyer, seller -- and he has a strong inclination to make that 
deal go through. So my recommendation is that that should be repealed 
and that if brokers want to operate escrows, let them incorporate and 
do it like anybody else. 
Also, another recommendation would be that Code of Civil 
Procedure 580(b), which provides purchase money protection, be 
amended so that it applies only to owner-occupied property. These 
transactions I'm showing you, these people did not move in or intend 
to move in. They were buying for investment purposes. I don't 
believe that 580(b) protection should be afforded to them. I might 
point out that when you get to creative financing schemes such as 
these, it's entirely probable that if the matter were litigated 
that under the 1972 Spangler case, a California Supreme Court case, 
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it's doubtful that 580(b} protection would be afforded, but it would 
have to be litigated. I think perhaps the statute should explicitly 
spell out that that type of purchase money protection should be limited 
to the owner-occupied, single family residence. 
On Exhibit 2 .•. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: Before we go over there, can I just 
ask you a question? Maybe I'm just missing something, but I'm trying 
to add up these various figures on these two purchase contracts. Well, 
• I'm thinking you just take one of them. 
MR. SAMSON: Well, they add up to a lot more than the 
purchase price. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: Yeah, they add up to more than the 
purchase price. 
MR. SAMSON: Over-encumbered. So two triggering events, 
over-encumbering the property from the purchase price and the fact 
that cash goes to the buyer not the seller. Those are the two 
triggering events when the proposals I make that independent escrows 
be used, that purchase money protection be denied, and that the seller 
approve that explicitly with an examination of the buyer's financial 
statement. Those are the triggering events where those things should 
be .•. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: I mean, if the seller looks at 
this just on the face of it, might it not occur to him that while 
there's a first that's going to be assumed ••. that of course is not the 
seller -- that's presumably the bank -- then there would be a second 
from somebody else, then he's got a third and a fourth •.. 
MR. SAMSON: Right. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: So he might never get paid. 
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MR. SAMSON: That's exactly right, and if he doesn't get 
paid and takes his property back he's got a big mortgage that he 
didn't know about. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: Why would the buyer or the seller, excuse 
me, the buyer gets cash from the-- just ..• 
MR. SAMSON: That's the way the transaction works because 
the seller doesn't understand it. That's why, and that's the whole 
thing. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: 
this transaction •.. 
(Inaudible) ... that he does get cash from 
MR. SAMSON: From the refinance . 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: 
or something. 
... as if he were borrowing it from a bank 
MR. SAMSON: The buyer gets it from mortgage loan brokers. 
I'm going to speak to that issue, private money, equity, hard money 
lenders. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: Of course the only reason those 
people were loaned money when it exceeds the value of the property, 
is that they're getting a second, I mean instead of a third or fourth. 
MR. SAMSON: The hard money equity lender's security does 
not exceed the value of the property, it's the paper that goes back 
to the seller, that exceeds the value of the property. The equity 
lender is very secure. He can come in and take this property over 
at a distressed price and be quite happy. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: Do you think that the sellers who 
will do this are ill-informed sellers? 
MR. SAMSON: Yes. In these two cases, and I'll give credit 
to the brokerage industry. It was a seller's agent that called 
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to my attention. But if five or more of these are occurring a week, 
there's a lot that I don't know about. Either the seller's agent 
is not alerting someone or it's a for sale by owner only with no 
help of a real estate agent. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: And then the buyer figures that 
eventually he's going to get cash out of it which he'll use to maintain 
the property, and then eventually the property appreciates and so he 
sells, and everybody is presumably happy, but if it doesn't happen 
he just kind of walks away from it. 
MR. SAMSON: That's right and he may claim purchase money 
protection, but he may be able to claim that until litigation occurs, 
and under Spangler he may lose. It's doubtful. That's why I'm 
talking about 580(b). 
But at the close of escrow, this buyer gets the cash for 
the down payment and maybe some in-pocket too. And the lower the 
existing first encumbrance, the more cash he getsto walk away with. 
In the second example, the handwritten one, he gets $20,000 cash, 
probably $15,000 after he pays his points. But when he closed 
escrow, he takes $15,000, pays $5,000 to the loan broker, and gives 
$20,000 to the seller, and he's sitting with $15,000 cash and 
claiming no personal liability for that transaction. If that seller 
takes back the property, he may not be able to afford that newly 
created second. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Okay. On the first example, do 
you know what the second trust deed was for? 
MR. SAMSON: Well, they always go 75 or 85 percent of 
the appraised value. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Okay, well if you went 75 percent, 
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and I assume that the property must be appraised at ... (Inaudible). 
MR. SAMSON: At the offering price. This one breaks even. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Well it would be more than that the 
way I figure it. He's got a first of $53,900. If he gets a 75 percent 
second, that's $75,000, so that's $125,000 he's got there. Then you 
get .•• 
MR. SAMSON: No, you subtract out the existing first. The 
loan broker that makes the loan up to 75 percent would subtract out 
the existing first and give you a net amount. But this still increases 
enough cash with the buyer that's buying in. It goes through a loan 
broker. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: So it goes to $75,000 after you get 
to that line. 
MR. SAMSON: Right. They'll give some to the seller for 
his down payment, give some to the loan broker for his points, and then 
use whatever's left for whatever purpose. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: What you mean s case, is that 
they wouldn't loan,$75,000. They would loan $75,000, but they would 
use that to pay off the first? 
MR. S&~SON: No, they would leave the f st, they would 
just take that out of the amount. They'd say, "We'll go 75 percent, 
but we'll cut out any existing first. You take care of that yourself. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: So, so they would give him then 
$21,000. 
MR. SAMSON: Something on that nature, yes, which provides 
the down payments and the points and the cost. buyer gets 
in for absolutely no money of his own at risk. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Why does have two different 
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notes on Items D and E? 
MR. SAMSON: Well it increases the price to the seller 
and makes it more attractive. One he's going to make payments on, 
one he's not. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Oh I see. 
MR. SAMSON: One will gallop along with interest only to 
be accumulated and compounded and due in three years, and that is a 
lot of danger, and we've been hearing in terms of balloon payments • 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Okay and now you're saying that 
he's protected under 580(b). 
MR. SAMSON: The buyer's protected. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: The buyer is. 
MR. SAMSON: He will certainly claim it. What I'm saying 
under the case law he may not be able to, but unless you litigate 
that, he will certainly walk away from it. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Okay and so the seller forecloses 
under Item E of his contract and he has to pick up the $75,000 ... 
MR. SAMSON: Well it would be a second trust deed for 
$21,000, yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: So not only is he out whatever 
payments it takes to catch up on the first at the time of foreclosure, 
but he is also out the $21,000 for the mortgage broker. 
MR. SAMSON: Exactly, and if he can't afford to do it, 
that investor that the loan broker put in there, he'll take over the 
property, which is what I foresee happening for the average person 
who doesn't have that kind of cash to feed one of these things. 
Let me give another little note that shows ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: How widespread do you think this is 
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in San Diego County? 
MR. SAMSON: Well, if they have RAND Clubs, I don't know. 
I'm just now starting to get these, in the last three or four months. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: I'm sorry, I wasn't here earlier. What 
do you mean by RAND Clubs? 
MR. SAMSON: RAND stands for Robert Allen Nothing Down 
Investment Clubs. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: Oh, okay. 
UNKNOWN VOICE: I think it's something you ought to read, 
Jim. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: No, I've read it. I went to one of 
their meetings. It was very interesting. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: How much did you buy Jim? 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: I was giving a speech on the abuses 
on creative financing. I was not very popular -- I was in the wrong 
place. 
MR. SAMSON: I think it is relatively widespread because 
I stopped in to the Department of Real Estate yesterday just to chat 
and they had five deals from this same broker that I just told you 
about that had been referred into them from all over the country. So 
he's running around doing it a lot. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: Do you think this is exclusive only 
by RAND Clubs or ..• 
MR. SAMSON: No, no I think a lot of people are getting 
into it. The word is out and people are seeing it and using it and 
starting to run with it. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: What are the means, investigative means, 
that you use to determine these sort of abuses in financ ? 
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MR. SAMSON: Well as you said earlier this morning, I don't 
get to it until they are dead bodies. That's the unfortunate -- I'm 
seeing something at the very front right now that I don't normally 
see until the foreclosure occurs and then we have to go back and try 
to figure out who did what to who. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: Do you use the County Assessor's Office? 
MR. SAMSON: Yes, we do use -- we use any recorded document. 
Usually there's a warm body corning into the office and saying, "Look 
what's happened to me." And then we go back and restructure the 
deal from whatever escrow records or recorded documents or whatever. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: Some of my friends are telling me that 
we are really dealing with a few isolated cases, that this really 
isn't the norm, and that the situation is not as widespread as I 
sometimes convey, and that maybe I'm really making a mountain out of a 
molehill. And that's really part of my concern. I'm trying to get 
a handle on how widespread this is. Your office, the District 
Attorney's office of San Diego, has been one of the few district 
attorneys offices statewide that has really taken a lead in this 
area. 
MR. SAMSON: Well as I said earlier, and you have already 
pointed it out, we don't find out until it is too late. I'm not 
going to find out how many of these deals have been going on right 
now until the seller finds out he has been had. That could be three 
years down stream. It could be a year away. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: But can you make any estimation of 
how much of a problem you think this may be in San Diego County? 
MR. SAMSON: I think it will affect five percent to ten 
percent of the market. 
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ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Do you think that the escrow being 
at arms length from the broker would have a preventive effect on this? 
MR. SAMSON: I think so. In my prosecution I have found 
that the escrow officers who are acting as a dual agency in between 
two principals take every conceivable precaution to protect themselves 
and if they see something they don't understand they're very quick 
to rewrite it or to talk about it or to make sure that the principals 
understand. Take due on sale clauses. They have a standard little 
clause they've put in there to make sure you know what you're doing 
about this and it goes right into the instructions. There is a further 
problem. When people read, they do know what they are reading. And 
I don't know how we are ever going to overcome that. The average 
person just doesn't understand what he reads, and he relies upon 
someone who tells him what's in there, typically the real estate 
broker. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Mr. Gillies, could you comment on 
that proposal when you testify? 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: I think there's been some -- this 
gentleman said something very significant. You this problem 
exists in five percent to ten percent of the sales in San Diego County. 
MR. SAMSON: I have no basis for making that opinion. I 
haven't done any research, except what's coming at me now. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: You mean the deals of the kind that 
we're looking at here in these exhibits. 
MR. SAMSON: Yes. I get that feeling, yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: How could this res on 
any kind of scientific basis so that we could determine the truth 
in that? 
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MR. SAMSON: Well you could go through all the closings 
that have been recorded. That's another problem too that's going on 
that I'm sure you're aware of, the masked sale where holding escrows 
are being used and nothing is being recorded. If anything has been 
recorded you could just contact the principals, contact the seller and 
get his copy of his escrow instructions and it would be very quick, 
but some of this staff is not recorded. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: Isn't it very difficult to determine 
that though really? 
MR. SAMSON: Determine what? 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: How widespread this is. 
MR. SAMSON: It is very difficult. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: I mean, okay for the principals, it's 
very hard to find the principals. 
MR. SAMSON: One thing that I can say is that I know that, 
like these RAND Clubs, they're very eager. They salivate over this, 
and so it's picking up. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: I think the RAND Clubs are asking for 
what they get. I mean if that is the worse example, I guess, of the 
abuses. I'm more concerned about average people, potential buyers 
of homes or people who need to sell their homes, average realtors. 
They are forced into these situations, not necessarily because they 
think it's, you know, the panacea or the best thing since sliced 
bread. But because the market's so damn tight and things are so 
difficult in the housing situation today in not only California, but 
nationwide, they view this as the last resort, the only means to 
the end, so to speak. They go forth with this hoping that, you know, 
housing will continue to appreciate at 11 percent to 14 percent per 
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and betting on that, not the best sort of fiscal prudence that one 
might normally operate under. They are thinking that this is a way 
to get by not knowing that, in fact, it is really full of pitfalls 
and that this sort of contract is not one that the average consumer 
ought to be involved in. I'm more concerned, I guess, about the 
widespread level in that area. 
MR. SAMSON: Well I think Mr. Fohrman has already talked 
about that. His remarks this morning addressed that problem, and as 
I listened to him, he seemed to think it was quite widespread in terms 
of this domino effect from one person relaying upon another on this 
creative financing. I've been focusing on what I consider the abuse 
of the creative financing. Creative financing, as he pointed out, is 
perfectly legitimate if everybody understandswhat they are getting 
into. If you are betting that the equity will be there and prices 
will rise, well I see nothing wrong in speculation, as long as we all 
deal at arms length with open honest information. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: Is that occurring today, do you think? 
MR. SAMSON: No. It does I think to a limited degree where 
you have educated real estate agents who go over carefully with 
their clients. The problem is that most agents that I ta to, and 
I think they have good intentions, but they really believe that 
there is going to be at least a ten percent increase in prices each 
year, even now. And I don't know if that's the case. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: And you think they are promoting these 
transfers of sales based upon those assumptions even with 
laid intentions? 
st 
MR. SAMSON: Yes. I don't think they have any evil 
intent. I think they're involved in a si and being 
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a salesman, they always have a positive attitude in any event. Most 
of the ones I've talked to, you know, they really think they are 
doing the best thing possible. They really can't see the problems 
that are being created; Mr. Fehrman described that. They really 
can't see these problems. Maybe the appreciation will take place 
and the problems will not occur. I don't know. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: Okay, could we go ahead and move on then 
in terms of ••. 
MR. SAMSON: Let me just talk about Exhibit II because 
this points out the really unscrupulous transaction that can occur. 
And by the way, I have more in my brief case, but I figured these 
would be the easiest to talk about. 
You will note this one here. This, by the way, was free 
and clear property, and the actual offer, I don't want to complicate 
it more than it was, it was only $85,000 and both sides agreed to 
pump it up to $97,000 because it would look better on a loan document. 
But as written here, the offer was for $97,900, a $60,000 first will 
be created and the seller will take back a $59,000 second right there. 
You start off with $85,000 sales price, but your closing end is on 
$119,000 right off the bat, which is a part of the transaction . 
Now to really show you how this works, I direct your 
attention to the closing escrow statement, 2(D), for the seller. At 
the top it shows that $13,000, which was a wash transaction to raise 
the price, the important thing is of course the broker gets $5,000 
commission, the seller gets $19,000 at the very bottom. That's his 
cash that the seller got plus his note. If you take a look at the 
page 2(E), which is the buyer's closing statement that the seller 
would never see, you find that the loan broker down here under new 
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loan charges, the lender's commission was $7,000 and the buyer in 
this case walked away with $29,800. Now if I had $30 000 in hand, 
I don't know if I would stay around to see what would happen. I'd 
take my profit. And this is occurring. This particular case is 
subject to litigation and you know there are going to be a lot of 
people that will be sued in this. I don't know what the end result 
will be, but here again you've got a year or two of litigation plus 
a lot of legal expense that's going to involved. I don't know that 
the seller would have initialed that disbursement, and if he did 
maybe he had an incompetent transaction, but what I'm saying is that 
I would suggest that the seller have to initial that disbursement to 
his buyer. That the seller explicitly approve that as well as the 
loan package. What are the terms of this loan package? We don't 
know whether it's a one or two year transaction, we don't know the 
rate of interest and the points being paid. But the seller is the 
one that should approve something like this. I think that is fairly 
easy to implement. 
Okay, finally one other thing, you know, I don't have a 
lot to say in terms of the mortgage brokering abuse, I got into this 
early in the year because of Universal Financial, which is probably 
the worst of all examples, and I included, by the way, Exhibit 3 
which is an appraisal that was furnished to an investor in Universal 
Financial on a commercial piece of property, and what they did was 
take a residential, single page document, type in the word commercial, 
and simply plug in a figure. This is so blatantly bad that it 
doesn't require further comment, and I think that Universal Financial 
speaks for itself. We've talked enough about that. 
Let me show you the next one on Exhibit 4 (A), (B), and 
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(C) because here's what I'm running into with mortgage brokers. They, 
by the way, fund the transaction that I described to you. That's where 
the money comes from. From these overencumbered properties, where 
the buyer walks away with the cash. Exhibit 4 (A) is a document 
prepared by a mortgage company with a CIMBA (California Indepedent 
Mortgage Brokers Association) logo at the top, which would indicate 
a fairly good company of some standards. And this is a brochure 
handed to investors which I think if you were to operate your business 
in this fashion, I would not have anything to say. This is about as 
good as you can do it. These two pages lay out how it should be done. 
In the middle of the page it says we use strict underwriting principles 
including independent fee appraisers. That is not the case. This 
investor who put in about three loans, this particular one was $6,500, 
and I just got this last week when the investor came in. He had been 
reading about things in the paper regarding their documents and was 
concerned about the bad publicity. The brokerage business asked 
for the appraisal and was told it was confidential. When pressed 
1 it was produced and if you look at 4 (C), it's a year and a half old 
and it's in-house. It was not a appraisal, it was an in-house 
appraisal. What I would suggest then with loan brokers is independent 
fee appraisals be required and that independent escrows be required. 
They're doing their own appraisals and escrows. 
Perhaps the Department of Real Estate should think about 
a special license for loan brokers just as they do for security 
dealers, that they have a special endorsement and pass a special test. 
Right now, my perception of much of the loan brokerage that is going 
on is that it is being done by amateurs, a lot of which is the 
result of Prop that allowed them to advertise fantastic rates, 
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and anybody with a real estate brokers license could get into the 
business. And that's exactly what Mr. Burton in San Bernardino did. 
He collected a $100,000,000 in one year, and said he had no place 
to put it and started using it himself, and I 
to see more of that. 
you are going 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: You said require a special license 
for loan brokers, require independent fee appraisers ... 
MR. SAMSON: And independent escrows . 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: ... and independent escrows. 
MR. SAMSON: And I think there's a part of that, if you 
really get into details, I haven't got into any detailed aspect of 
it, but it might not hurt to have capital requirements for loan 
brokers, to make some kind of a net worth statement mandatory. I 
don't care what the figure is, $25,000 or something, but perhaps 
they should have some basis, some substantial financial basis of 
their own at stake here. I don't think that's a horrendous requirement. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: At least posting some of bond or ... 
MR. SAMSON: A bond or simply a net worth statement 
certified by a C.P.A. that they are worth so much money 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: Aren't they required to have some sort 
of a reserve? 
MR. SAMSON: Not a loan broker. Anybody with a real estate 
license can broker a loan. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: It doesn't have to require some sort 
of reserve to protect the ... 
MR. SAMSON: No, nothing. Absolutely nothing. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: Would you advocate that? 
MR. Sk~SON: Wouldn't hurt. I there are a lot 
- 116 -
ways to go about it including an annual reporting system. For instance 
the HUD Reports by certain mortgage brokers and bankers that operate 
as agent for S & L's, or on secondary markets, they file certain 
statements that I don't think would be a burden to the industry. That 
if they had to file these with either the Department of Corporations 
or Real Estate, simply in terms of the number of loans they're servicing 
and the foreclosures or delinquincy rates, at least then there would 
be some regulatory agency that would have an early warning sign 
8 that maybe something is going wrong with this particular brokerage. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: Well thank you very much Mr. Samson. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: Excuse me, Mr. Chairman, I missed a 
point here that you covered prior to the mortgage brokers problems 
that lie in with that. You said the seller should be required to 
know certain things prior to financing potential buyers into the .•. 
MR. SAMSON: In the typical, traditional, historical real 
estate transaction the seller never sees the buyer's statement and 
the buyer never sees the seller's closing statement. I simply said 
that whenever there is going to be cash or credit and you have this 
over encumbrance over the sales price, where the buyer is taking 
cash out, the seller should approve that disbursement of cash. 
t ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: What you're saying, in effect is that 
the seller ought to at least have some confidence that the buyer 
be able to meet somewhat the same qualifications that he had to 
meet when they originally were extended the loan. 
MR. SAMSON: Essentially, yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: And that is is that not part of 
the problem that we are dealing with today as it relates to the 
Wellenkamp decision, in that on transfers of these sort of sales 
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when the due on sale clause was in effect the lending institutions 
could determine whether or not that buyer could meet those qualifications 
prior to extending the loan, whether or not you bumped up at a new 
interest rate. In extending the loan again, they were attempting to 
insure that the potential buyer meet the same sort of qualification 
standards that the original person who received the loan did. Is 
that correct? 
MR. SAMSON: I believe that to be true, yes. I think that 
under the present system borrowers and buyers are not being properly 
qualified. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: And that is one of the -- therein lies 
one of the problems under the Wellenkamp decision, and that is the 
sellers have really no ability to check or determine whether or not 
those potential buyers or those people who are assuming their loans 
can meet the same qualification standards that they had to meet. 
MR. SAMSON: Yes. But I also see that as part of the 
second trust deed hard equity market that the loan brokers don't have 
to qualify on the borrowers either. They're simply looking at the 
equity in the property. In fact I've talked to some where they 
didn't even get a financial statement or run a TRW. They simple 
made the loan. And there was a second trust deed on a new sub-division 
and the borrower didn't make a single payment. And when I asked the 
broker, he says, "No, we didn't ask for any financial statement 
because we looked at the equity in the real estate." And that equity, 
by the way, was not there. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: Everybody's betting on the apprec 
MR. SAMSON: That's right. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: Thank you very I you 
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being here and also your work. Our next witness is Sherman J. Maisel 
who's an economist and Professor of Business Administration at the 
University of California Berkeley. Did I pronouse your name correctly? 
MR. SHERMAN J. MAISEL: You're correct. Thank you Mr. 
Chairman. I'll briefly go over my conclusions which agree with others 
earlier and then give a little economic background so that you can 
stop me at any time. I know you're rushed for time. One, I think 
there is a necessity that buyers be protected against their own 
• ignorance, but my experience in trying to draft the regulation under 
Truth-in-Lending shows that this won't do much good. What you really 
have to come to is some sort of a half a page very clear statement 
that has non-legal language. Perhaps the last recommendation of at 
least initialing the both sides of the disbursements would make sense. 
Secondly, probably buyers should probably be partially 
protected against foreclosure if they continue to make monthly payments 
in accordance with initial contracts. I think something is going to 
have to be done about foreclosures under balloon payments. This would 
indicate either some form or moratorium or get a lawyer to protect ... 
perhaps strict foreclosure rather than sales under deed of trust with 
the protection of the court using their equity powers. 
Third, it seems to be clear that there is a need to make 
certain that payments go against the underlying debt, and that right 
to the title are clear so that there ought to be legislation in that 
area. 
Fourth, in terms of the second mortgage problem, again 
I'm not clear why there is the difficulty of criminal proceedings 
when we see the type of ads we see which would apparently, to me 
at least, not be authorized under most corporation laws. I'm not 
- 119 -
clear what the problem is of the law, but it seems to be clear that 
on the face of it there is some need for legislation. 
wrong with it. 
Having said that let me go into the 
is 
a bit. I 
think in any type of consumer protection there is a tremendous need 
to balance the need for the protection against the need for the lending. 
In other words, you have to look very carefully at why s is occurring. 
One obvious point is that prospective borrowers can't for 
other types of borrowing, and therefore they are us creative 
financing. There is a shortage of funds in lending institutions so 
that there is a need of another source of funds in the market. Buyers 
and sellers find it easier to come to terms if they can bargain over 
the financing rather than over the price, in other words, the seller 
kids himself that he's getting a higher price. He's not willing to 
take a lower price, and therefore it becomes eas for the 
to buy. In terms of other things, investors are speculators al 
to use maximum leverage to control the largest amount of 
with available funds. It seems to me all of se are very log 
reasons, and therefore you have to be very careful 
legislation to make sure that you don't make too diff t for 
this type of creative finance to continue, because I think it is a 
necessity. 
Now in terms of the economics, it seems to be clear that 
many people are making incorrect assumptions about future interest 
rates, money availability and housing prices. In 
underlying theory of most of these deals is wrong. seem to 
assume mortgage interest rates will be lower and be 
to refinance sometime the next three s not what 
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the experts think. You can buy a Ginnie Mae contract in the market 
three and one-half years from now for only two and one-half points 
above current Ginnie Mae rates. What that means is that the mortgage 
market as a whole is betting that interest rates won't fall by as 
much as one percent over the next three and one-half years. And 
anybody who thinks the mortgage market is wrong, they'll take bets 
up to $20-$30 million overnight without any difficulties, so that 
it just seems to me that if people want to gamble it would be 
cheaper for them to gamble in the organized market or in Reno rather 
than taking this sort of risk they are taking. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: Your statement then is that you don't 
believe interest rates .•. 
MR. MAISEL: I'm saying that most financial firms in the 
United States do not believe it because they are in the future's 
market. They are selling contracts three and a half years out at 
interest rates at less than one percent under today. And if money 
firms felt the opposite that market wouldn't be being made. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: Today's interest being? 
MR. MAISEL: Today's -- these are interest rates at 15 percent 
compared to 14 percent. In other words the rate three and a half 
1 years from now is only about a 14 percent. 
ASSEMBLY!4AN COSTA: I'm glad you told me. I have a wager 
with a known lobbyist in Sacramento on whether interest rates would 
drop below 12 percent or not. 
MR. MAISEL: Well, they may, but if you want to hedge your 
bet you could easily hedge your bet in one of the best organized 
markets in the country. 
ASSEM BLYMAN COSTA: I have a steak dinner on it. 
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CHAIRMAN BOSCO: I just wished 'd get reapportionment 
settled soon so that we can all move and buy our Talk about 
poor sales. Go ahead. (Laughter) 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: ... some real financing. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: There seem to be a number of 
condominiums for sale in Riverside. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: I didn't think it would be that bad. 
MR. MAISEL: The second part is that people don't realize 
how volatile mortgage interest rates are. If you look at the last 
three years of Ginnie Mae contracts, they fluctuated by over 30 percent, 
which means that interest rates of the last three years have fluctuated 
by over 50 percent. This is what has happened to the main mortgage 
market over the last three years. There's been over 50 percent 
fluctuation from nigh to low and all that we can say though is that 
the price that rules today is what the majority of the market, or 
the average of the market thinks. In other words, cture is 
that there is a market now for loans to be made three years now. 
That market price has to be the middle of what the average person 
in the market thinks. Those who think the market ce is wrong 
should be buying or selling ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: And that price is? 
MR. MAISEL: That price, I'll say, is a 1 over 14 
percent. It's also bad for U.S. government bonds, it s roughly the 
same. The market applies to U.S. government bonds of 20 years or 
to Ginnie Mae mortgages. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: Is that a general 
it been accurate in the last ten years? 
MR. MAISEL: No, what is accurate is 
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cannot show 
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that anybody could have used any other information to beat the market, 
but the market turns out to be wrong. The fluctuations are wide 
around the average. But there is no way of saying I want to be 
average in beating the market. That's more than a rule of thumb. 
There's several hundred studies that show this is the case. What 
the market reflects on any day is an average of what people think. 
It turns out a year from now we'll know the market was wrong. You 
couldn't have had 50 percent fluctuations in the market if the 
market was right. So people will be wrong, but there's no way of 
saying I know that the market is going to be wrong. You can bet 
aginst the market but you have to assume that what the market is 
saying today is the average of what everybody who was in this market 
thinks. And this, as I say is most of the large institutions in the 
country. Most of the large banks, most of the large mortgage firms 
and so on. 
The third point along the same line is that there is no 
reason to assume that housing prices will continue to rise as they 
have in the past faster than the average interest rate. In other 
words, if we look at the housing market historically we know two 
types of things. One, when housing prices have gone up much faster 
than the inflation rate for a period, they tend to go up slower 
than the inflation rate. During the last ten years they have tended 
to go up much faster than the inflation rate primarily because there 
were negative real interest rates after taxes in the market so that 
anybody buying in that market was getting a subsidy from the U.S. 
government to buy the house. This tended to drive up housing prices. 
Again what we would have to assume then, if we look at history, is 
that over the next ten years what should prevail is the rate of 
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inflation less some, instead of plus some. In 
prices should go up slightly less or somewhat less 
words housing 
rate of 
inflation, so that anybody who is betting that they go 
than the rate of inflation is simply projecting the trends of the last 
ten years which are not correct, historically. 
And the fourth point is that there's no reason to assume 
that institutions will have more money. Again if you bet that 
institutions will be able to do this as Tony 
you're going against the whole philosophyof s 
sa s 
stration 
which, in effect, is trying to see that money goes for other purposes 
out of the housing market. So there is no good reason it seems to me 
to bet against the President. He's been very ef making his 
points legislatively, and in other ways. I wouldn't suggest that 
anybody bet against him .. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: You agree with all the statements 
have been made this morning. 
MR. MAISEL: Yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Dr. Maisel, your assumpt 
is there's a fixed universe of capital in the States 
pie is simply being split. Isn't it possible because of 
free floating interest rates that capital might to the 
United States and therefore, increase the universe e. And, 
therefore increase the supply for home mortgages eventual 
MR. MAISEL: I don't think the orders of magnitude are ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Is the capital the 
commercial and governmental sector such 
to the home mortgage market. 
MR. MAISEL: It can, but the 
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it ilter 
is is other 
In other words, the tax bill e 
to make capital investments this ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: It 
invest in home mortgages. What is the 
now, the all-lenders, al savers 11? 
so 
s extremely profitable 
s profitable to 
that is just being considered 
MR. MAISEL: No, if you're ta about the special saving 
an existing certificate the new certi cate and you get ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: 
is earmarked for home construction or 
MR. MAISEL: No. 
five or 80 percent of that 
loans. 
of the bill that passed 
is that it says that for the next year savings and loans can issue 
savings certificates in which investors have to pay only 70 percent 
of the rate they would otherwise have to pay so that somebody in the 
40 percent or higher tax bracket 




cates, but I 
don't think that s real amount to very much. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: to my question. You 
don't think that f interest rates 1 cause capital to immigrate 
into the United States? 
MR. MAISEL: As I say, I don't -- no, because the rates 
in other countries have to ust, or 
other countries have to adjust. 
regulations of 
se, you begin to get very 
large transfers through the money markets We've had it already. You 
drive the exchange rate against se other currencies down and the 
farther you drive them down the more lt you make the transfer 
of money, so that the orders of magnitude compared to the amount of 
new money we lend in this country every year, I don't think they're 
important. 
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ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Thank you. 
MR. MAISEL: Mr. Chairman I would 
I could go on, but I know you're pressed for 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: A bas ques 
fact that even though California's ten percent or 
the gross national product of this country, are 
that are implementable by the State Legis 
to militate against this depreciation of 
housing availability in California? 
answer questions. 





MR. MAISEL: As I say I think are. If I were your 
position, my first action would be to try to ct e who are 
taking creative financing. Because I it is a necess that 
it continues. It seems to me that the first cr 
sure that they are aware fully of what they are 
Secondly, 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: We can do pro 
you take care of the problem that -- of those who 
in? 
MR. MAISEL: It seems to me that you have 




s question of 
some kind of moratorium over foreclosures s. It 
seems to me, as a minimum, you have to ist that to 
make payments as they were agreed to, 
were no payments agreed to. We had cases 
in effect, you funded the interest rates 
going to be in difficulties doing it, 




, so you're 
seems to me you can't 
s 
morning that you are creating problems. But it does seem to me 
we are a s where you want s 
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of moratoriums. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: Mr. Robinson. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Doctor, you mentioned something at 
lunch that I want to bring out. Is your professional opinion that 
the existing system, and by that I mean prior to the deregulation move 
in Washington starting with the last administration, were we allocating 
a certain component of credit to the housing market, and would the 
end result of deregulation, the repeal of Reg Q and what have you, be 
to remove that credit allocation, so that there was no special pool 
of money for the housing market. 
MR. MAISEL: As I told you earlier, my opinion is that we 
were allocating credit, that it was successful by probably lowering 
mortgage rates somewhere between one-half a percent or one percent 
under what they otherwise would have been. But as high interest 
rates have come along, as the deregulation has come along over 
last six or seven years, that one-half to one percent has been 
disappearing and may have disappeared completely. That's my 
opinion. I would also say the average person in the field would 
probably not have agreed that was large. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: Thank you much, Professor. We 
appreciate your testimony. We will now have Doug Gillies for the 
defense. Oh, excuse me Mr. Gillies. Apparently we have one witness 
who has to leave by four o'clock. Maybe we'll take him first, if 
he's here. Ken Rosen, who's the Chairman of the Center for Real 
Estate and Urban Economics, University of California, Berkeley. 
MR. KEN ROSEN: Thank you very much putting me up 
front here. It's going to be hard to match Sherman Maisel's 
excellent performance. But ... 
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CHAIRMAN BOSCO: You think 
follow Mr. Gillies! 
's bad 
MR. ROSEN: Basically my test 
bit different than some of the other things 
is 
like to talk about the restructuring of the hous 
and put creative financing in that context, 
have to look at the overall dramatic changes 
mortgage market and what effects 
for the next five or six years. 








What I'd like to talk about f st is to look at extens 
creative financing and how much is going on re 
the past, then talk about the changing sources 
And lastly, give you a potential solution to 
existing lower rate mortgages and second or 
sellers or other credit companies to the 
assume is a similar definition probably not 
te similar. 
These estimates come from bas 
The Department of Housing and Urban Deve 
new mortgage originations that are being 
calculate the absolute value of activity 
number of home transactions times the pr 




of the house. So I 
arne but 
source of data. 
out data on 
And then one can 
s the 




mortgages are being assumed, dollar amount, and so sort f 
seller financing must be going on. So what s means s 
essentially at least half of all exi lve 
s assumption of mortgages or seller At 
least f, at a a very 
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In terms of net 
to Table 2, it shows there's 
extens , if you want to turn 
a c decl in net mortgage 
extension by traditional lenders. And s real confirms s 
restructuring of the market. Commercial banks, savings and loans 
share of the mortgage market used to be about 65 percent 1978, 
there's a net credit extens that's to about 44 percent in 
1980 and this is partly because they haven't been able to attract 
the deposits because of money market mutual funds and o things 
like this, partly because of the i lity of the present or 
the previous sets of instruments. And place of that has risen 
up another type of creative financing which is different than 
seller financing we're talking about or assumable mortgages and 
that's mortgage pools, whereby f t mortgages are pooled up and 
then sold on a secondary market. And this is a Ginnie Mae pass 
through security. Some of you may be Callie Mae 
program that people are working on here. se pools are now just 
about the primary source of credit 
nationwide. 
terms of net mortgage extensions 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: That's the ect of our hearing tomorrow. 
MR. ROSEN: I just wanted to let you know that that's 
the change of structure you are 
ASSEMBLYr1AN ROBINSON: These are national figures now. 
MR. ROSEN: These are all national figures. California 
numbers are not available on s sort of information. Lastly let 
me give you what I think is the seller and lender's problem. And, 
basically there are really two separate problems. For lenders, 
we have a profitability crisis. That is, lenders stuck with these 
old mortgages which they've made from one to five years ago, are 
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stuck with mortgages that are far 
they are now having to fund the l 
we have a prof lity crisis for 











financing problem, if there is a problem as of 
affordability of housing 
that many lenders are facing 
I'll try to do it quickly. 
first home 
the market. 
Basically, as you realize, the la 
seen a dramatic restructuring of the hous 
California and throughout the country. 
really a function of the interaction of 
deregulation effort on the part of the 
conditions have 
st rates, short 
ized by 
long term 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Dr. Rosen. 
MR. ROSEN: Yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: th al 
would just tell us that you 
ease. 
lt rather than 
MR. ROSEN: Bas 
of depos side s 
ly, 
s 
preceding very rapidly. more 
s 
anticipated two years ago. It means that 
loans and commerc 1 banks have to pay 
70 percent of their sit accounts. 
wi the Treasury 
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where basically the asset side of the savings and loans and commercial 
banks also has to be And at level s ng 
new mortgages were the s and loans and also for 
commercial banks which give basically es al freedom on the 
asset side for new mortgages, ally rate s 
move completely with market rates. So we're a situation now, 
rates or nearly completely flexible where we have completely 
rates on the deposit side for 1 
the asset side. Now what this has done, this 
titutions -- on 
lation environment, 
is really what you have to look at 
is occurring. 
terms of why creative financing 
Creative financing lf, just to you some of 
how much has occurred, my estimate is that, if you want to turn on 
page 4 of the testimony, there 1 s an estimate of how much has occurred. 
Traditionally in 1970 through '78 15 percent of transactions 
on existing homes involved f By 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Doctor, you're using the same 
definition on creative 
witnesses. 
that been used by our previous 
MR. ROSEN: Well, I'm not sure since I wasn't here. I'll 
tell you what my definition This is basically assumptions of 
mortgages, these old mortgages. At same the has a 
terrible problem, an affordabili crisis. Because of these high 
mortgage rates you have buyers unable to ify for new mortgages. 
Someone trying to buy a now cannot qualify for a 17 or 18 
percent mortgage rate or 16 percent mortgage rate. So you've got 
a terrible situation for both the lenders and borrowers. And it 
seems to me that there has to be a solution other than creative 
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financing to this problem. And so what I propose st page of 
this testimony is a solution. And the so I ve been on 
for six years and finally, one month ago the 
Board was authorized to this solution. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: Congratulations. 
1 Home Loan 
MR. ROSEN: Now let me tell you what 
I think that a number of lenders have started to 
is. And 
these 
and borrowers are overwhelmingly posi The s 
who are making them, there is one in Cali 
and others are thinking about it, have overwhe 
and one New Jersey 
s 
this new mortgage. And basically the is 
a dual-interest rate mortgage. A dual- st rate 
called 
And 
what that instrument does is set two different interest rates. There's 
an accrual interest rate set which is bas a short term 
rate plus some premium. That interest rate lS can be 
varied every six months and 's usually to a treasury 11 or 
's a var le an intermediate treasury security. So 
on the accrual amount on the loan outs 
payment rate which the borrower pays 
The second rate is a 
that can set at a 
of different levels, but is usually set 
probably 300-500 basis points below the 
present 
rate 
can be set on a graduated basis. That it be set 
at 10 or 11 percent today but then it would go up one 
until it reaches that market rate. Or a 
might very well most likely fall in that per 
of this, the difference between accrual rate and the 
rate, which may be positive as it is now or 











I call the dual-interest rate , a vari of this is something 
called the graduated adjustable rate And is 
what the Federal Home Loan Board author zed. s instrument 
successful is used in Canada and a number of other countries 
and is used in England 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Is 
over in five years? 
a 
MR. ROSEN: A an rollover s a 
But they also have this adjus 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: It can one, 
MR. ROSEN: s is not a rollover 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: To 
f 
is 
rollover ch turns 
rate mortgage. 
or five years? 
neg a 
amortization? It seems to me 
with that scheme you're going to 
MR. ROSEN: If rates 
current economic environment 
amortiz 
are now, 
500 sis s; second, you first year you would 
have four; and it 
where they are now. 
But of course rates will not s 
ASSEMBLYMAN TA: Where are go 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: You 
then. Your colleagues? 
MR. ROSEN: No, I'm not 
sagree the last tness 
at all with him. He's 
talking about the futures market 
short term treasury bill rate, 
terms of rates, but the 
a very sharp decline the 
They expect the treasury 
percent ... 
11 rate to 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: 
is accrual rate, they have 
bill rate on future's market. 
on order of 11 to 12 
bel administration. 
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MR. ROSEN: No, no it's the same market. I 's 
the same market except for treasury bills. And 
with the changes in regulations that 
and liabilities side you've got to change 
make it more palatable for the lender and 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: We under 
are you making toward the interest rates 
ASSEMBLYM~N ROBINSON: I want to 
happen if this instrument has been 
MR. ROSEN: Okay, I would suggest 
simulation. They have done simulations. I 
would probably not have 
any other instrument. 
more defaults on 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: No, I 
I'm worr about is negative 
MR. ROSEN: You have 
would 
So, what you would have ... you 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: So what 
appreciation of mortgage documents. 
MR. ROSEN: If you have an 
a SAM. But if you had an upward trend 
short side, and if you not graduate 
could very well end up th something 
appreciation mortgage. It's not 
not indexed. But 's something 1 that. 
























closely like this shared apprec 
MR. ROSEN: No it isn t. Because iation depends 
would have the f. But the on the property value 
same sort of thing. And 
realize that he would not 
the borrower. 
otherwise. So there to 
it turns out, it's to be a 
It's been offered 
is the largest savings 
by San Diego Federal i 
you, is that the state ought to bas 
because I think would 
financing. Lenders would want to 
one of their low rate old mortgages 
would want to parti 
c 
borrower has to 
as much as 
sure statement. However, 
with borrowers. 
Loan New Jersey which 
1 s has been offered 
And what I'm emphasizing to 
authorize 1 this 
because trade 
s new mortgage. Borrowers 
can the 
market and buy a house. 
to 10 or 20 percent to 
s trument is not on in 
it work out. If had, let's say, a 
situation where zat occurred at percent a year 
you generally a i per year to make 
this break even for the borrower And I agree 
Sherman Maisel, that hous 
inflation rate over the next ten 
So this instrument, while 's more 
one it's the only instrument I think can 
colleague, 
roughly at the 
than the present 
both the borrower 
and the lender. And as 
for California or state 
as I'm aware this is not now authorized 
to make It is 
authorized for federally chartered st I think you're 
going to see this as a popu instrument whi may iminate the 
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need for much of the creative financing. And we 
creative financing as well. 
cons s 
ASSEMBLY~iliN ROBINSON: I guess my f st que is where 
ints do the funds come from? The total amount of 
and below in California chartered savings and 
very substantial. Where is the money coming 
in lieu of creative financing? Where is the 
from? 
MR. ROSEN: There are two aspects 
One is the assumption of the old rate 
extension of a mortgage by the seller. On the as 








of the mortgage 
very 
little difference in the amount of money. seller f 
still have to occur to some extent if f 
have that sort of money but ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Do agree 
creative financ is from the Wel 
-------'"-
the dollars of funds available to 
lender? 
MR. ROSEN: I think that's es 
Wellenkamp decis makes it very desirable to as 
mortgage. I think there is an incorrect 
sellers that they would rather take that 
their price. In essence, a free 
are rational there shouldn't be very 
give some back at 12 on a 










paper than lower 
rate is 
three s or 
• 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: I know, I'm just trying to 
understand where the money is going to come from. prospective 
buyer that right now is to use creat f ing because 
of that dual situation, how s rel some of pressure? 
MR ROSEN: I'll tell you is no with 
this instrument. If s instrument is done , there will be 
a secondary market and as I 
is coming from that secondary market. 
Association, on much effort on my 
mortgage. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: At 
MR. ROSEN: About a half ... S 
credit today 
1 National Mortgage 
s agreed to purchase this 
discount rate? 
sis to 60 sis discount 
from a fixed payment mortgage. 
already discounts this type of 
is an organized market that 
points. I think this tes 
at carefully, and see if 
and 
I would 1 




ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: Could I ? The 
a form rate interest mortgage as I , it's a 
graduated payment ? 
MR. ROSEN: It s 
the variable rate 
borrower must have in order to get into 
feature with 
feature is what the 
, a borrower who 
cannot quali for the 16 or 17 
inflation after five years a 
Probably 10 to 11 percent is most 
ini 1 But because of 
can afford higher payments. 
time buyers can afford. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: You're in effect working toward a 
goal which is about five years ahead, and presumably gets higher by 
then. 
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MR. ROSEN: What inflation has is 
interest rates, but it does not take into account 
se roughly half to one the 
present fixed payment is 
the lender. The lenders understand that. 
that, I think in many cases, because 
tilts their payment stream so 
up front and it bas ly skews 
it very difficult to qualify. And that's 
think, helps both borrowers and s. 
accepts it, but it does look 
from both sides, s these s. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: You weren' 
essence this is really the blended rate 
currently Is not correct? 
MR. ROSEN: The rate 
rate 
is f But what 
get 
a dif 
It's a new st of all. 
ASSEf4BLYMAN COSTA: On 
new loan, doesn t that 
MR. ROSEN: It 
a new 
But 






















ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: You ust it so once 
rate you t on a 
what Tony Frank terms 
s of 






ground, to allow an interest rate a 
this point in time, blending the two rates 
it the vehicle of an Afu~ or VRM so that 
current trends of the 
cou , at 
and then ng 
re 
MR. ROSEN: I 
considers this a dif 
program for this one 
s s sound s lar. Mae 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: Do you 
they have a purchase 
program. 
s instrument has 
advantages over their blended rate 
question I have is, do you bel 
trument, and I ss the second 
st rate dual 
mechanism or the rate to a prospective due on 
sale clause within it? 
MR. ROSEN: I i are technical. 
sort f LUHLL·~nation under this 
on where .interest 
Basically you can come 
dual rate rhetoric 
rate and where rate. I are 
very similar. You no due on s 
believe or not. Because 
reason you need due on sale is because 
we have had a tremendous up 
were flat you wouldn't need due on sale 









rate. The on 
One is 
If the trend 
in s instrument, 
will 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: How about prepayment penalties. 
MR. ROSEN: I 
probably would be a small prepayment 
costs in early years, but I would 
would drop to a very small amount 
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this instrument there 
ty to cover transaction 
prepayment penalty 
or four or five years. 
You have to cover some transact co s and I 
that's the reason you wou want one. 
the lender's go to rates 




will be going up to market rates as s income rise . 
ASSEMBLY~1AN STIRLING: Dr. Rosen, is 
ratio test in your instrument? 
MR. ROSEN: There isn't one. 
on so that you don't want to be in a si 
negative amortization over 100 percent. 
assumptions on the economy even if 
the lation rate on average and you start 
between let's say between 80 and 90 you're 
any problem most cases as long as you 











any I one is real no more 
or not more subject to than the pre 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: As 
I what you 
with the b 
long term that 
se is a good 
rate and that sort of 
could end owing 
store and not have a way out of it. 
concern 
t's 
MR. ROSEN: I 
is not likely. One 
that the vast 
want to 
go over 95 percent or 98 percent or 
and have an once two 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: Do you 













market conditions that are likely, I would say that the number of 
cases you have that would violate any restriction like that would be 
very small unless there was actual So I think you wouldn't 
have that as a real problem. 
I think the other thing to say about this is it's very 
essential that consumers understand this instrument. And as long 
as they understand that they may not build up equity as fast, I think 
there shouldn't be any problem with consumer acceptance. And again 
initial experiments, talking to people both in San Diego and in New 
Jersey, public acceptance is just overwhelming. They just have 
tremendous numbers of people who want this lower initial rate and are 
willing to take the variable rate feature with it. As you know there~s 
been some suggestion that the full var le rate mortgage will not be 
accepted by consumers. This is a way to get, I think, the consumer 
benefit and the lender benefit. And again we'll have to see if lenders 
and consumers like it, but it seems to me we ought to try for this 
sort of thing. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: You're not suggesting any caps on 
interest rates then on either one of the rates. 
MR. ROSEN: I think ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: The cap you suggested is the prudent 
one that is normally enforced by the federal, various regulatory 
agencies that they can't lend more than 100 percent of the values. 
MR. ROSEN: That's right, basically that. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: I guess the reason I raised it is 
because I remember the time in San Diego when Aerospace moved out, 
and people had to walk away from their homes ... 
MR. ROSEN: Yes, but that was with a fixed payment mortgage. 
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This could add a small amount extra risk, 's no about that, 
to the process. But the amount is very small. We're really talking 
about during any sort of normal period. Now's most period 
you have ever had, and we're talking about a amortization 
of five percent. But the present situation just won last for 
more than a year or two. It's also much less comp 
these creative financing schemes, and 
consumers' misunderstanding. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Is there an 




increase in home values in the non-sunbe 
states? Does a house appreciate as fast 
states versus the sunbelt 
downtown Akron, 
Ohio as it does in San Diego? 
MR. ROSEN: Well, in the last five years Cali house 
prices have gone up basically two and three times faster than other 
parts of the country. But I think that was to two circumstances. 
One, we had a tremendous immigration of people 
country as we had a strong employment 
The second, we had a set of lenders' cont s pro i 
the state where building was very diff , so you 
in demand without the supply ing So 
the rest of the 
late 70's. 
s driven 
up 1n California relative to other places. s is not true in other 
sunbe states. It is not true in Texas 's to bui 
it's not true in Florida and it is true p s such as Washington, 
D.C. and certain parts of New Jersey where they do lending 
restrictions, so I think the blame is on land use. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Let me g one ob 
and you tell me whether it seems right or not. I 




subsidized housing construction and employment in this country. The 
public didn't really win on that. The trade unions won, the savings 
and loans won, the realtor won, but the public did not win. By and 
large the more money made available the more it was absorbed in 
labor agreements and mortgage points and in the amount charged by the 
realtor to sell it. Do you believe this? 
MR. ROSEN: No, I don't think that's true. I think that 
if anyone has absorbed this rise in prices it's been land cost. The 
only major component of housing other than mortgage financing that 
has risen in price dramatically has been land. It's not labor; it's 
not construction materials; it's land because basically local public 
policies have restricted the growth of activity. In terms of what 
I think might happen in the future in this regard, I think there is 
a perception in California that our problem has been of land use 
policies. And I think that has been the main problem. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: We just commented on that. I have 
heard that rhetoric time and time again and to an extent I agree 
with it, but I want to tell you about a factual matter in San Diego 
county. The major tracts of land are owned by about six major owners. 
And there's some indication that they're doing what the DeBeers do 
with their diamonds. They just simply feed it out as they can see 
the market absorbing it. 
MR. ROSEN: I think that there certainly could be something 
there in terms of supply of land. In the San Francisco Bay Area which 
is the one I am most familiar with, it's definitely local public policy. 
It's proven by at least a half dozen studies that that really has 
been the major cause of this rise in prices. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: I simply want to remind the members that 
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our hearing is really not on all the problems in the housing market 
but simply on creative financing. Mr. McAlister. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: That's very true, however, if we 
really were to strike a blow for truth and justice it may well be 
that the best blows we could strike would be at these restrictive 
land use policies. In doing so, we may have to run counter to some 
other values that many of us cherish, such as local control, as well 
as the still strong political attachment by many segments of the 
state to restricted growth, or no growth and environmental values, 
and so forth. At some point we may have to decide which are the most 
important values. I tend to agree that these land use restrictions 
that are largely imposed on the local level are the single most important 
factor in the skewing of the situation in California as related to 
the rest of the country. You can travel through the country and there 
are only a few other parts of the country that in anyway resemble our 
ridiculous real estate situation. 
MR. ROSEN: In 1970, house prices in California averaged 
the same as the rest of the country. At the present time they are 
about 60 percent higher. And it's coincident with land use controls. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: I think the Bay Area it's more 
than 60 percent. 
MR. ROSEN: Double. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: To get that you include places like 
Dinuba and Needles. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Needles is not in the Bay Area. 
Reapportionment might bring Needles though to 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: I'm not sure 
Area. 
's local control 
only because CEQA (California Environmental Qual Act the map 
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act and the general plan requirements are all state imposed mandates. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: You left out the Coastal Act, Mr. 
Stirling. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: The state bears a share of 
responsibility. The Supreme Court of course interpreted CEQA more 
restrictively than I think the Legislature intended it to be applied. 
I'm not sure what we do about all this, but seemingly this would be 
a place to strike a blow. 
MR. ROSEN: I think a balance is needed clearly because 
I think some of the positive features of land use controls and the 
environmental movement have to be protected as well, but I think we've 
moved to one extreme. I think we might need to move back towards a 
balance realizing that if California's economy is to grow and if we 
are to provide housing at a reasonable cost for people, both new 
and existing, we really need some sort of reversal in those policies. 
I think there was a start last year by the Legislature in that regard. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Would that include rent control? 
MR. ROSEN: No. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: I think that you realize now the futility 
of trying to direct these types of discussions at one of these hearings. 
We do appreciate your testimony very much, Professor Rosen. We have 
a bill moving now that would allow state chartered savings and loans 
to use virtually all instruments that the federal government allows, so 
that could very well, if it passes, encompass yours. I think it's 
probably likely at some future time that we would want to again ask 
for your assistance when we review some of these instruments. 
MR. ROSEN: Thank you very much. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: Thank you. Here comes Mr. Gillies. I 
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hate to say this Mr. Gillies, but the Commissioner of Real Estate is 
here and he interrupted his vacation to be here. I have agreed to 
allow him to come on first, and then we'll take your testimony. 
Commissioner ..• 
MR. FOX: Thank you. I appreciate your accommodating 
my schedule. At the same time I think it's a little bit dangerous 
letting Mr. Gillies speak after me. 
To me, the term creative financing doesn't have any 
precise meaning, and our meaning is any method to finance real estate 
purchases other than long term fully amortized, fixed or adjustable 
rate interest loans. Basically, most creative financing transactions 
have been built around three basic assumptions; first, that mortgage 
loans will be available to the buyer at lower rates when the balloon 
payments for seconds or thirds mature in a short rate of time; second, 
that the buyer's income will increase sufficiently in this short period 
of time to qualify for a conventional loan when the balloon payments 
are due; and third, that real estate will continue to rise at 
substantially the same rate as inflation has occurred during the last 
few years. 
I believe that if any one of those three presumptions does 
not come true, that thousands of home buyers that have bought their 
homes recently and are buying them now through creative financing 
mechanisms stand to lose their homes through foreclosure. Also, the 
creative financing business is conducted in often a nonregulated 
environment and most of the buyers and sellers are unsophisticated. 
They lack the fundamental benefits of full and detailed sclosures 
of the true cost of financing, and what their respons lities and 
liabilities really are these It seems to me that 
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many of these buyers and sellers are basically, because of market 
conditions, forced to gamble in a game of real estate roulette 
where the house odds are stacked against them. And this may come 
to pass more and more in 1982 and 1983. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Excuse me, Mr. Fox. 
MR. FOX: Yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: You heard some of the previous 
testimony, especially from the attorneys. They indicated that the 
realtors are in a really dangerous position now as people start 
looking for scapegoats on the transactions that have gone sour. 
They're going to be back after folks that you license. Are you 
recommending any corrective steps to either insulate the realtors 
or improve their professionalism or their sustainability in a 
law suit to kind of correct this problem. 
MR. FOX: Well, basically the realtors have the obligations 
of making full disclosure of all material facts in a real estate 
transaction. That's an existing legal burden that they have. And 
we have found that in a vast majority of cases they are in fact, 
complying with that responsibility. There are some real estate 
licensees that have acted in fraudulent ways and have engaged in 
I dishonest dealings through these creative financing schemes •.. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: The ones I am aware of are folks 
that have been realtors for years and understand how to walk the 
streets and get a listing and how to make showings and how to make 
the sale. But what's confusing to them and everybody else in the 
entire world right now are the financial instruments that are 
available to them. There's no way, I think, unless the person has 
to be an expert. If they don't get many listings they are not going 
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to be up on that. So I don't think it's intentional. I'm just 
wondering if the professionalism and the licensure of the mortgage 
brokers and those sorts of things, in-service training, bonding and 
that sort of stuff are being proposed by your department to preempt 
this problem. 
MR. FOX: We have examined some of those suggestions. The 
bonding is heavily opposed by the mortgage loan brokers. And, we 
had to delete that from some legislation, Senate Bill 391. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: But you propose 
MR. FOX: Yes, we did propose the bonding. We also 
proposed a separate endorsement on the real estate license for 
mortgage loan brokers. That was heavily opposed by the CAR. And 
so that was also deleted from the legislation. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: How about the arms length transaction 
between the broker and the escrow agent? 
MR. FOX: We haven't made a proposal in that area yet, the 
idea of the independent escrow, because I haven't seen enough evidence 
that there is really substantial harm because there are broker owned 
escrows in some of the transactions. However, that's really the basic 
problem, the terms of the creative financing transaction. The independent 
escrow company is there simply to facilitate the transaction, and they 
don't have any authority over the terms of the transaction. So I'm 
not sure if that would be appropriate. At the same time, to the 
extent that the realtors feel that they need more guidance, they 
have extensive legal staff of their own and they have very well re 
legislative capacity to seek new legislation if 
the best interest of the profession. So I am looking to 
leadership in that area in terms of courses, 
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or some kind of estab shed guidelines. I haven't heard from the 
realtors yet in that area. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Well, the question is whether, in 
the public interest, there are problems emerging that, irrespective of 
whether CAR reco~~ends further encroachment on their freedom, whether 
the Administration's got recommendations. 
MR. FOX: You started talking about them as potential 
scapegoats and whether or not they were in a disadvantageous position. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: My basic concern, I think, and 
everybody else here, is about the public, the unsuspecting public. 
And I'm not indicting at all the quality or motivation of every realtor 
that I know personally. I'm only alluding to the potential for these 
balloons popping and then the realtors looked to for scapegoats. Both 
people lose, the realtor and the public. 
MR. FOX: I think that there is an issue of more disclosure 
to the public about exactly what a home buyer and a home seller are 
going to .•• about what the potential for harm is. It might take the 
form in some kind of a written disclosure that they have to sign off 
on that they've read and considered. But even in that area people, 
in my experience, when they are buying homes or selling homes have 
their minds made up and they go ahead and purchase and gamble even 
if you tell them that the odds are against them. It doesn't seem 
to have a lot of impact. We issue a public report on new subdivisions. 
A lot of time we talk about the potential problems, and people have 
been buying the homes and ignoring the problems without paying much 
attention to them because they've decided to purchase. 
And as I said earlier, they're gambling that interest 
rates will reduce in the future, that their income will increase or 
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that there'll be some kind of a new 
they can make use of, or the 
so they can ref 
are the basic considerations 
two or 
the 
disclosure would help, but I don't real 
the solution. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: You I I 
some of those points. I think when 
that's 1 they have mind. We 
have ever had, it seems to me, 
1 





disclosure statement to begin with never covers al 
It serves as a way for unscrupulous 
better guide to get around I can't 
could even come c se to being a so 
prevent se things to 
MR. FOX: I agree you. 
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seeing the other side's financ 
seller because he is now go 























want to. That's part of the condition of sale. 
ASSEMBLYr~N STIRLING: The Department of Real Estate's 
job is to regulate in the public interest. Do you see a problem 
in terms of the secondary or the creative financing? If so, has 
it manifested itself in complaints against your licensees and what 
have you done about it, and what do you propose to do about it? 
MR. FOX: Okay, yes. There are problems in creative 
financing, and we have increased our scrutiny of the activities of 
the licensees to make sure there is still disclosure of .•. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Have you gotten increased complaints 
against your licensees? 
MR. FOX: We have had an increase in the number of complaints 
over the last two years. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Are they stemming from creative 
financing and failure to disclosure? 
MR. FOX: Some of them are stemming from that, yes. We 
have brought more actions against licensees to revoke licenses because 
they didn't disclose the terms or the impact of the creative financing 
elements in the transaction. However it's not what I would call any 
kind of a epidemic. It is an increased problem and we are giving it 
t more emphasis. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Do you agree that it's only the tip 
of the iceberg now and as the ballons start coming due in the next 
three years, that this will mushroom into a serious problem? 
MR. FOX: I agree with that if those three assumptions 
don't come to pass. If we have lower interest rates, continued high 
inflation, housing prices and people's income go up, then they can 
refinance and we won't have the foreclosures, but if all of those three 
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don't come true, I agree that there 11 be a 
as people buying a house on their creative 
a two or three year balloon negative 
really buying are trust deed time bombs 
z 
are 
two or three, four years, and there will be, I 
increase in foreclosures. The members of the 
severely that are caught in that squeeze. 
instruments available that they can use 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: que 
testimony here, it is basically a of 
what the problems are, but I'm specifical 
propose as a preemptive or first-aid as was 
can we do instead of waiting around for this to b 
to preempt it from becoming a problem from your 
MR. FOX: Okay. One recommendation 
Department of Real Estate has responsibil s 
report, the public report, which a sale of 
dwelling units, and in the Atlas Mortgage case, 
be a fraud, Atlas is now in receiver , we 
report disclosing that the financing ar 
I look at it 
terms today with 
re 





in what you 
up here? What 







to use for the sale of the homes put the 
but we did not have the authority to withho 
at a severe 
our approval 
of this creative financing was 
potentially very detrimental to the buyers. One 
for your consideration is giving the 
authority to review the f 
with the new subdivis We could come 













ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Couldn't you just have the Department 
of Corporations or Franchise Tax go after them? 
MR. FOX: You mean after the sak? No, not really. It's not 
illegal. What they're doing is not illegal. They were giving home 
buyers a high-risk gamble. What Atlas said, in effect, is we're going 
to create a trust deed mortgage on the home which will cost you a $500 
a month payment for two years, but after that you're on your own. The 
reality is in the third year the payment instead of being $500 went 
up to $1,170 in today's market, which would wipe out most of the home 
buyers, and the negative amortization was $12,000. So they would 
owe $12,000 more two years later than what they started with. So if 
we had the authority to review the financing and say, "That's not an 
acceptable financing package. We won't approve this for sale to the 
public," I think that would be very helpful. Of course, that only 
goes for new construction. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: But the majority of the problem here 
in terms of the creative financing is on existing transfers? 
MR. FOX: Yes, 85 percent of the home sales in California are fol 
existing homes and what I'm talking about would only effect the 15 percent. 
The existing homes is the larger problem. There are, for example, in 
existing homes, there are transactions that are taking place today which 
are called cash-to-buyer kinds of transactions, which I think need to 
be much more regulated than they are now. This is a situation where 
the buyer makes a deal with the seller where a new loan is taken out 
by the seller and the buyer gets a substantial amount of cash out of 
the new loan; $20,000, $30,000, $40,000, $50,000 and the seller takes 
back a large second trust deed, maybe a $100,000 or 60, 70, 80 percent 
of the value of the property. The reality is that when the transaction 
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is consummated, the buyer has bought the house no cash down. 
He gets $20,000, $30,000, $40,000 in cash and walks from the 
house. The seller is left with this huge new p what's owed 
him by the buyer. These cash-to-buyer trans are te dangerous. 
It's not a major problem. It doesn't happen that to the 
extent that this is going one, I think we need some 
prohibiting that kind of transaction. 
s 
ASSEt1BLYMAN COSTA: As head of Department of Real Estate 
and the issuer of the license to those that probably 70 
or 75 percent of those transfers of sales, I 
20 percent today of transactions between two 
MR. FOX: Yes, approximately. 
s it s 
s. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: Twenty to 25 percent, so 70 to 75 percent 
of these people are licensed through your office to make these transfers 
of sale. What can you do to prevent that 
sanction of the license that you issue them? 
MR. FOX: Well there again full sc 
for the seller ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: Full sc 
to a lot. 
MR. FOX: The other possibility on 
occurr 
sort of legislation that restricts the sale of the 




-buyer is some 
to a transaction 
an 
value, without new loans that are beyond the actual va 
lated 
home. 
This is not a major problem. It's one of of 
financing, but I don't think you have s transact 
more than one half of one percent of the home s 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: You mean on te one 
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witness suggested that it was much more than that. Now there's a 
book out by Robert G. Allen that advocates this type financing, and 
maybe that will increase the number. 
MR. FOX: Yes, it's possible, although people, real estate 
agents that have gone to the seminars on no-cash-down transactions, 
when they try to put those transactions together they take it to another 
broker. On behalf of the seller, we often get a call to the seller's 
broker asking us, "Is this legitimate? Is it legal? What are our 
responsibilities in terms of disclosure?" Our experience mostly has 
been that the agents for the sellers are being responsible about making 
sure their seller fully understands what is going on. 
However, I don't know what the future holds, because there 
are these seminars, and obviously it sounds good to buy with no cash 
down. I don't think it happens that often in reality. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Well, we have a real disparity of 
opinion. The pros~cuting district attorney from San Diego County 
indicated he thought intuitively that it was about 10 percent. You 
say it's half of one percent. Isn't there some responsibility on your 
part to investigate this or do a sample survey of a thousand transactions, 
and let us know how it looks? 
MR. FOX: We can do it. I'd be glad to do it, whether or 
not we have the responsibility, sure. If you going to do something 
anyway, it's better to say you're glad to do it. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: We're glad that your glad to do it. 
MR. FOX: Give us about 30 days, we'll provide you with 
that information. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: I think that would be very significant. 
I think it could be providing a real service to the district attorneys 
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and to the public. 
MR. FOX: I appreciate the suggestion, and we have a 
mechanism to do that actually. We have an education and research 
fund available to fund research projects like that. I'll even ask 
Professor Rosen for some advice about how to do that, too. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: Well, unless there are other questions I'd 
like to move on. We very much appreciate you be here, especially 
since you had to interrupt your vacation with your family. We have 
your written testimony. 
MR. FOX: If any of the members have any questions in the 
future, I'll be glad to answer them or respond. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: Could you give the committee then a summary 
of your report, findings when you've done that. 
MR. FOX: Absolutely. Sure we'll have that done by the 
end of August. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: Can you contact the various district 
attorneys and check with them to see what kind of stuff they're getting 
into? 
MR. FOX: Yes, and I have a complaint about the district 
attorneys by the way. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Tell it to Judiciary. 
MR. FOX: Okay. Well, I just didn't want you to be too 
enamored by the testimony. In terms of the criminal aspects of 
illegal conduct by real estate licensee, they're very slow to prosecute 
criminally. Wayne Burton, who heads Universal Financial has $100,000 
invested in second trust deed investments, has yet to be charged with 
any criminal violations. Now it's August and his scheme came to 
light in January. We've already revoked s license, s alre 
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receivership and the DA's office hasn't done anything. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: What county is that? 
MR. FOX: It's in San Bernardino County. And I think that 
that invites people who are interested in violating the law to go 
ahead and make $50,000,000 and take a chance to fight it later criminally. 
Thank you very much. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: There was some mention prior to your 
arrival of the problems with the mortgage loan brokers strike force. 
MR. FOX: Yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: You might want to indicate that you are 
involved in this. 
MR. FOX: Sure. We, the Business and Transportation and 
Housing Agency has established a second trust deed mortgage strike 
force. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: I don't see what you're getting out. 
MR. FOX: Well we're coordinating our investigative efforts 
with the Department of Corporations, Savings and Loans, Banks, and 
receiving additional investigative help from other state departments. 
The strike force has 43 cases under investigation with $100,000,000 
invested in second trust deed and third trust deed schemes. To 
date, this year, the Department of Real Estate, as well as Department 
of Corporations, has filed cases with over $250,000,000 at risk from 
over 10,000 investors. That's on the investors' side, and I understand 
the focus of this committee is protection for the borrower. However 
the source of funds for the borrower often comes from these investments, 
so we have been very active prosecuting licensees that are involved 
in illegal conduct seeking the investors in the trust deeds. That's 
part of the problem, but I think the function of the committee here 
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is on the borrowers' side. 
CHAIF~N BOSCO: Thank you, Commissioner. 
MR FOX: you. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: We will now hear Mr. Dug Gill s 
from Cali Association of Realtors. 
MR. DUG GILLIES: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, gentlemen of 
the I am Dug Gillies of the Ca fornia Association of 
Realtors, as I the committee knows our Association represents 
about 130,000 realtors and other associates who are deal every day 
with buyers and lers who are vitally concerned th the topic that 
you are availability or nonavailability of 
for sale of housing. Almost 600,000 California famil s 
last year creative financing was essential to the sale or 
purchase of a home. Therefore, the subject that you are dealing with 
is a one if anything were done to, effect, stop 
creat I haven't heard anyone here today suggest 
it have prevented those 300,000 
300 000 sellers; 300,000 buyers. These 
to sell or ly could not have done so 
f s, 
because cost so 
so are not 
government s 
finance 
because money was s not 
was out of reach for them. 






year on benef 
a bit of time in creative f 
of government itself. Mr. Costa has a 
assessment districts, which is a kind of 
f ce government. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: It's been called other things . 
. GILLIES: Creative financ hous seem to 
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encompass any innovative device, whether a loan or not, which makes 
possible a provision of funds to facilitate the transfer of residential 
property used generally when conventional methods of financing are 
unavailable or unattractive. The list would include: installment 
land sale contracts, which have been mentioned here today; lease 
with option to purchase; land lease with a sale of improvements; 
or seller take-back financing through a junior deed of trust. Let 
me stop at that point to say that each of the four that I have 
mentioned earlier do not involve a loan. Seller take-back financing 
is not a loan. Mr. Papan was inquiring quite a bit about usury this 
morning. The ursury law never applied, never applied to seller take-
back financing. The courts have been very clear on that. That is a 
credit sale, an installment sale if you will, and it is the terms of 
the sale, that are involved. The parties may adjust the sale price 
upward or downward in exchange for some term in the financing agreement. 
You can not therefore isolate seller take-back financing as one item 
without analyzing the entire agreement and the entire sale and what 
the interrelationship of those factors might be. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Mr. Gillies would you define how 
you're using "all-inclusive deed of trust." 
MR. GILLIES: Some all-inclusive deeds of trust are written 
by institutional lenders and others are written by sellers. Where 
they are written by sellers, the terms of the all-inclusive also 
might be varied in connection with some change in the price or some 
other factor. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: It has been suggested that severe 
restrictions be put on all-inclusive deeds of trust and that land 
sales contracts be abolished. 
- 159 -
MR. GILLIES: Well on the land contract, if were 
to be abolished, and let me say, the witness this who referred 
to them in terms of horror may have looked at some cases 
were great difficulties. I assure you that have cases, 
particularly in recent years, since normal to 
a trustee, where title insurance is granted on 
forth, where they do not present these risks. At 
installment and land sale contracts have 
purchase of housing by buyers with no 
afforded housing any other way. A lot of run 
for example, has been transferred on installment 
because the seller wasn't willing to convey 
down. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: I'm not a lawyer, 
lot of lawyers short tenure in this is 
and colleagues, tell me that 









I ve heard a 
tuent 
contract 
MR. GILLIES: Half the lawyers 
every day. I can show you ... 
state are wrong 
the 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Does that 
Court that decided Wellenkamp? 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: That half was 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Now that was s 
MR GILLIES: Professor Hetland, 
the author of the book on financing which was 
Education of the Bar, has written very 




of Law at 
the title in trust and ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Recording. 
MR. GILLIES: What? 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Recording the contract. 
MR. GILLIES: Oh yes, yes. So I mean there may be things 
that could be done to further regulate the use of installment land 
sale contracts, but their abolition I wouldn't agree with. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: All right, would you say the same 
about all-inclusive deeds of trust. 
MR. GILLIES: Yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Should there be regulations, should 
there be requirements, impound accounts? 
MR. GILLIES: Yes, certainly in all the literature that I've 
seen from Real Estate, and by the way, we are doing, and I'm sorry 
Mr. Stirling stepped out, we are doing an educational job in this 
area all the time. Having to devise new courses as you pass new 
bills, but ••• 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Thanks to you we haven't been passing 
too many. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: Incidentally not all the bills we pass are 
1 done without your approval either. I notice that you sponsor an 
occasional one. 
MR. GILLIES: Yes, sir, and I'll be referring to some of 
those where we've attempted to deal with some of these problems. But 
everything that I've seen that our organization puts out has been 
proposed with respect to an all-inclusive or wrap that there be some 
institutional servicer and things of that nature. That's part of 
the package. Maybe that should be in the law. We'd like to examine 
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that and get back to you. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Would that inc 
escrow? 
MR. GILLIES: Well, let me get to 
when Mr. Stirling comes back because he asked me to re 
specifically, but it's possible that some of s 
law. As I might indicate to you, we've got a s 
hope to come to you in January with some propos s 
areas, and this very well could be one. 
Some of these instruments, are j 
taken back by the seller; other junior trust 
by sellers and discounted and sold to investors; j 






trust deed business now; a lot of institutional seconds, some 
originated through mortgage loan brokers and another, 
the so called bullet loan, which is the year loan with 
a 30 year amortization being written by 
buy-down loans that were referred to by one 
morning, which are the only things that are 
unload some of their inventory, which is a very es 
shared appreciation mortgages, which Mr. Costa is 
investor participation and down payment in 
equity appreciation -- these are some of what we 
financing in the market place today. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: Mr. Gillies, I 
creative financing is in part some of 
transfers of sale in today's tight money market. 













water. That certainly is not as Chairman of the Housing 
Committee, or I think the intention of any members of this 
committee. I think what we ly like to explore with you is 
what do you really see are the potential problems. I mean we dealt 
with the lien sale contract about two years ago. I remember when we 
had some of the over-zealots getting people in situations involving 
their houses that they shouldn't have been in in terms of home 
improvement type programs. 
MR. GILLIES: I wouldn't those in a category of creative 
financing. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: No, no I don't mean that. 
MR. GILLIES: 's financing. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: I know, I used the example because 
some people at that time indicated, "Oh, we ought to do away with 
the lien sale contract." The lien sale contract is a very valuable 
tool and I'd never suggest that we should do away with that. Just 
like creative financing terms of s situation and sometimes 
is the only way providing some financing. What we're interested, 
I think, in hearing 
specific problems deal 
the realtors is, what do you think are the 
in today s tight money market with 
transfers of sales where second, third and fourth deeds of trust are 
used, when the financial arrangements are made in which there's no 
equity left within the house, in which only course of today's 
current alternatives is simply buyer and seller beware. Do you 
think, furthermore, that we are going to have the problems next year 
when the balloons come due on the principal on these arrangements 
that were made two and three years ago, and what should we do about 
that? These are the same questions I'm asking you that we asked 
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everybody else here today in terms of what are the 
that can be taken, not only prospectively, but how 
the problem is going to be next year when these, 
MR. GILLIES: Let me talk about 
do you believe 
into a survey we've done which I think will answer s 
of the committee as to what's going on out was some 
guesses by the San Diego District Attorney. There were some guesses 
by other people based on cocktail party 
have some hard data for you which I think 
you, and we are prepared to present it. But let 
your question about what's going to happen two 
from now and so on. Let me say first that 
problem if there isn't going to be take-out f 






f st to 
now, a year 
to be a 
deeds of trust. That problem is created by let you 
compare a second deed of trust taken back by a seller $30,0 0 
with a bullet loan written by World Savings $9 ,0 0 as a f st 
deed of trust with a three year due date, your ta 
about a much greater problem created by 
it won't be a problem with take-out financ 
be a problem with take-out financing, and let me 
when you authorize an adjustable rate mortgage, 
payments, without any cap on interest rates, 
negative amortization and if interest rates go 
five years or three years, and some of these are 
you are going to have the same kind of lem 
that you have with the borrower of the 







whatever it is and he can plan it, but th an uncapped ARM, and 
I'm not saying I'm against an uncapped ARM, but I'm just saying .•• 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: That's a good point Mr. Gillies. 
Were there bullet loans before the Wellenkamp decision? Aren't 
bullet loans .•• 
MR. GILLIES: Practically none. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: .•. yeah, bullet loans kind of 
evolved as the lenders' answer to the inability to predict the market 
place and the inability to get this legislature to address Wellenkamp. 
They came up with their own little Canadian roll-over. That's what 
the effect of it is, isn't that true? 
MR. GILLIES: Well, I think it .•• 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Well, I don't deny your right. I 
think there is a real potential for disaster coming from bullet loans. 
MR. GILLIES: I think it comes much deeper than that. I 
think it comes primarily from the volatility in the money market. Let's 
say we didn't have Wellenkamp, and let's say that interest rates were 
17 percent. How many accelerations would occur? Very, very few 
because very, very few sales would occur, because people couldn't 
afford to sell and people couldn't afford to buy if they had to go 
out and finance the whole transaction on a 17 1/2 percent loan. So 
the sale wouldn't occur. The lender couldn't accelerate, and they 
couldn't get their money back. The problem is volatility. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: Mr. Gillies, on that point, as a 
practical matter, if I were a lending institution and interest rates 
were 17 percent and I could enforce my due on sale clause ... I want 
to do business. If I can't loan money out, then I'm not going to stay 
in business any length of time. Wouldn't I practically, as some 
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institutions did prior to Wellenkamp, bump the rates up on a gradual 
basis and give points for income level and credit I wouldn't 
refinance the loan at the existing 17 percent, but I f 
because I know the guy could pay 12 percent, or pay 13 percent. I 
mean if I were a smart institution and I wanted to ess, 
I know that I couldn't make the damn thing at 17 , but I 
this guy could probably afford 12 percent and the existing was 
eight percent, and we'd settle some middle ground, 
the transfer of sale and refinance the loan. 
MR. GILLIES: That's theoretically poss 
I could make 
does 
happen in some cases, but I can give you instances where lly 
chartered S & L's, which have not until very recently been subject 
to Wellenkamp or didn't think they were, have still bumped 
interest rate to current market at the time of an assumption. Now, 
understand that under Federal Home Loan Bank Board s they can't 
accelerate on a residential owner-occupied one to , but they can 
bump the interest to current market. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: Well, it seems to me we to ta 
about interest rates on assumable loans as divorced from the percentage 
of the total loan that the assumable loan is. 
MR. GILLIES: Can I get into my survey and I I can 
give you some data on that. I have data on that you. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: I was going to ask if you 
on that, and will be waiting with baited breath to 
conclusion on that. 
Mr. Gillies has talked against ARM's 
that we've had without ever coming out offic 




your f 1 
t them. 
may 
doing so again Monday when we still have some conversations. Let me 
talk about ARM for a minute, and let me talk about Professor Rosen's 
razzle-dazzle graduated payment adjustable rate mortgage. This is 
being offered or something very close to it by San Diego Federal 
Savings, and again I'm sorry Mr. Stirling isn't here, but you call 
up San Diego Federal Savings and say, "I'd like one of those loans." 
"Well, come around about October maybe we'll have some money to make 
them." These new instruments are coming out, and we need new instruments. 
I don't know if we need as many as are coming out, but we need some new 
instruments. But there is no money. Great Western's got, you know, a 
new instrument, but they only make the loans to their old established 
customers. The new couple who wants to buy a home, can't get one of 
those loans. The new couple who wants to buy a home, interestingly, 
our survey will show you that of the transactions that we reviewed, 
about 26 or 27 percent were for first time home buyers in 1980. They 
are still getting into the market. How? Assumed loans. Creative 
financing. These new instruments must be combined with some source 
of money. Now, I'm not going to deny that there aren't going to be 
some problems a year or two years from now if there isn't some new 
source of money. But the magnitude of that problem I don't think can 
• be perceived right now. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: Mr. Gillies do you agree with some of 
the other statements that were made about the lack of priorities that 
capital investment has in the area of housing by this administration? 
MR. GILLIES: Why I'm not sure that I'm totally competent 
to comment on that. I've read commentary that seems to point in 
that direction, but I am not an expert in that area. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: Because it leads to the point that 
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you're mentioning, that is there is no new money available. It's 
going to be a problem and obviously we're concerned about attracting 
new money for housing, so that hopefully that this won't be a problem. 
MR. GILLIES: Well, some source of money for housing has 
to be found. I am convinced that even the federal government, even 
this administration cannot turn it's back on that problem if it 
grows. And it isn't going to grow any more in California than it 
does anywhere else in the United States. Lenders with Wellenkamp or 
without Wellenkamp ••• 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: But, you don't think the demand for 
housing here is greater given the people that continue to come to 
California and the increased population. 
MR. GILLIES: I would like to ask Mr. Singer, our chief 
economist to come up. He may be able to assist in answering questions 
on this survey as well. Joel Singer, the Director of our Economic 
and Research Division and the gentleman who supervised at least 
the preparation of this survey, but who may be able to answer your 
questions as to whether housing demand increases at a greater rate 
here than it does elsewhere. 
MR. JOEL SINGER: Well, certainly as some of the other 
economists who were up here suggested, one of the best evidences for 
demand looking backwards has been the extraordinary price rise in 
California. As we look at demand factors we see them somewhat in 
excess of 300,000 units per year. We know construction is averaging 
less than half that. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: You would agree with HCD's 
housing. 
MR. SINGER: I would. A personal opinion Mr. Costa, I 
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would tend to agree yes, that housing demand in California is greater 
than the United States as a whole. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: Do you know what the average cost of a 
home was in California in 1973? 
MR. SINGER: I could check it back for you, a rough 
estimate about $33,000. 
was? 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: Thirty-nine, I think. 
MR. SINGER: Thirty-nine. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: Do you know what the national average 
MR. SINGER: It was about $2,000 less at that time. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: That's about right. Do you know what 
the difference was seven years later? 
MR. SINGER: We're looking at a difference of about 
$45,000 currently between California and the national average. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: What are the factors which increased 
our cost of housing over 34 percent? I know we're getting away 
from the other thing, talking about new money. You're talking about 
dealing with balloon payments and creative financing. We're talking 
about trying to, as Tony Frank indicated, rearrange the deck chairs 
on the Titanic. I hope that's not what we're doing. All of these 
are my concerns as we try to address this issue. 
MR. SINGER: Well, certainly looking to California, one 
would have to start with the assumption that the economy has been 
much more buoyant than the economy in any other state. The rate of 
economic growth in California has been on the order of 30 to 40 percent 
greater than the United States as a whole. Immigration is far higher. 
Population growth in terms of internal growth is much higher. 
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Restrictions on development that some of the other 
their remarks toward certainly is one of the factors 
appreciation. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: How about 13? 
sts directed 
price 
MR. SINGER: Frankly that's one that we haven sessed 
as of yet. It would be worthy of some further re I admit, 
but we have not looked at that very specifically. 
MR. GILLIES: Let me say first that as s 
there is a high utilization of creative f ing. An 
we believe that many if not most buyers and sel 
would prefer a home transfer transaction without 
I mean, the realtor doesn't want to have to run 
suggest how this deal can be put together. It's c 
he can just send a person down to the S & L and a 
first that the buyer can afford, everybody wa out 








on a ship and the ship goes down, you might want a rst class li 
boat, but if there wasn't one there, you're to whatever 
there is. And you're going to ride on it. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: We just want to 
don't have holes in them too. 
MR. GILLIES: Even one with a hole 
none at all. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: That's debatable. 
MR. GILLIES: It will keep you go 
I think that's exactly what we've been hear 
sure 
is 
for a 1 
real fact. One of you mentioned the fact that when a 






And as a consequence if they can, 're going to buy that home. And 
they're going to reach out and find the tools that are available for 
it, whatever financing tools are available for And, I think 
was you, Mr. Chairman, who mentioned that all forms of disclosure at 
that point in time may have very litt rational impact on the decision 
once the decision has initially made to buy. Now, so as I say, 
we believe that all parties prefer conventionally financed housing 
transactions. And when conventional financing that people can afford 
is available, again, creative financing will diminish and fade. It 
will still exist. It has existed for decades. The instruments that 
are being used are tried and proven instruments. There's been a lot 
of experience with them. It is just the volume of these right now 
that is important. So now let's take a look at the survey each of 
you have. It's just been completed. It isn't dated. It should have 
been dated yesterday. First let me say that for 1981 based on six 
months data the annual rate or number of housing resales in California 
will be 379,000, down from 465,000 in 1980, and down from the all 
time high of 605,000 in 1978. That data is not in the report. That's 
an annual rate based on first s months. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: So you it's going to be 379,000. 
D MR. GILLIES: Based on the first six months experience. 
That's down from 465,000 resales in 1980 or an all time high of 
605,000 in 1978. This means that California homeowners, sellers 
and buyers, are being sharply inhibited their traditional housing 
mobilityand in many circumstances in fulfilling their housing needs 
by external conditions. Obviously one factor is the price of the 
house. The median home price in California has risen from $71,500 
in 1978 to $105,838 in June of 1981. It has leveled off. 
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ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: What was 7 
MR. GILLIES: The '78 figure was $71,500 
figure was $105,800. It has leveled off. June '8 
'81 
May '81. This has occurred before. These 
It is only six percent above June 1980, so the ise 
price of resale housing in the past year at a rate f 
less than the CPI increase for the same period. Second, 
be 
the 
factor today is, of course, the financing. 
50 percent above the historic levels. Now, 
Interest costs are 
If, for example, if you look on page four, 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBiNSON: Before we start 
have survey. 
, Mr 
one thing I was reading was your paragraphs on It 
me that only 15 percent of those sampled to return the 
naire even though you were willing to pay 
than that in my district. 
po 
MR. GILLIES: You ask easier ques s. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: I'm not sure 
MR. SINGER: I think the survey return 
higher than that. There were 30 returns we 





I'm afraid that also reflects the business succes o many f our 
members and thirdly, it ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: You think 
had no transactions during that period? 
MR. SINGER: A much more significant 
than I would like to see reported that s 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: And they're not 







MR. SINGER: No. No, there ••. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: In order, statistically though to 
make some comparison we, I'm not a statistician -- I'm just trying 
to somehow figure out a way then to interpret this material. 
MR. SINGER: Given the population we're dealing with, the 
330 ballot response given us, I would have to calculate it, but plus 
or minus 7.5 percent in terms of the range of each of those percentage 
figures. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: How much of a return is usually necessary 
to have a balanced sample? 
MR. SINGER: It's not really the return. It's the number 
of meaningful responses relative to the universe you're dealing with. 
Assuming the respondent pattern is random. And again we are making 
that assumption and there's reason to believe ••. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: How did you determine your randomness? 
MR. SINGER: Well, we selected at random first. We pulled 
approximately 2lOOrealtormembers and associate members, we pulled 
them out every 30th number so to speak. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Is this geographical area ..• 
MR. SINGER: Yes, that was one of the factors because our 
8 membership list is based on geography as well. But, one of the 
reasons we can say it's fairly random, it correlates to much of the 
information we have. The median price in our sample is $102,000; 
the median price Dug just reported to you is $105,000. If you look 
at square footage that links up with many other surveys. We look 
at the bedroom sizes and so on, the age of the rooms, and so on. 
It seems to work like a fairly random sample given other information 
known to us. 
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ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: The control factors seem to low 
along, a distinct pattern in other words ... 
MR. SINGER: Yes, it's close. I'd like to see of course, 
a higher return and this was to a degree a pilot and we may 
go back and ask for higher return or may work th an 
institution in going for a larger sample, but I am very 
what I see the accuracy ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: At a later date I 
this .•. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: Why don't we just st 
little above the cocktail party chit chat that Mr .... 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Mr. Gillies, you can 






the questionnaire soliciting responses in order to enab you to 11 
the Wellenkarnp repeal bill currently before the islature Or 
was any other type of dialogue, rhetoric, fact or 
encourage a response. 
MR. GILLIES: I never saw the letter. I 
with drafting the letter. I did see the survey 
because Mr. Singer sent it to me to indicate 
on aspects of it. The purpose of the survey, was 
for what we saw corning. This hearing had not cal 
We ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: No, I wasn't re 
I was referring to the thousands of letters each one 






to s hearing. 
us rece 
MR. GILLIES: It wasn't realted to those letter let 
Mr. Singer discuss the letter itself. 
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MR. SINGER: I did draft that letter. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: You have to understand, Mr. Singer, 
we are all politicians, we know how to skew •.• 
MR. SINGER: I thought that was only my Assemblyman. I will 
be delighted to show you the letter. Perhaps I could read a couple of 
sentences from it. There was no attempt to relate it to any particular 
legislation. That's, of course, not to say that our members are not 
aware of what's going on in the Legislature. But what we suggested 
• here is that we were conducting research according to the types of 
financing being employed to facilitate the sales of residential 
properties in today's tight mortgage credit market. With mortgage 
interest rates generally exceeding 15 percent and the withdrawal 
from the market many institutional lenders, the forms of financing 
are rapidly changing. This research project is designed to document 
the types and characteristics of financing being used in the resale 
housing market. This study will examine the extent to which transactions 
in the current interest rate environment are dependent upon the existence 
of assumable first mortgage loans, and the availability of other 
alternative financing arrangements. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: If there's a question about the letter, 
why don't we just accept it in the testimony and you give us ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: I was going to request that, if we 
could have the whole package just so we could ••. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: Before we go ahead, you mentioned 
that in June '81 the median resale price was $105,800 and you gave 
some other figures and said that was only six percent higher than 
June of 80 and said it was lower than June ••. 
MR. SINGER: May of '81. 
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CHAIRMAN BOSCO: Lower than May of -- just a before 
Okay. 
MR. GILLIES: There have been some s, were some 
occas 1 dips in the mid-summer of 1980 for example. We ve 
dips, but we have reached a plateau to some extent, 
has leveled off. For example, on page four, 
rate of increase 
you will note 
that only 23 percent of homes are financed today in 
manner with a down payment and a new unassisted f st 
And some of these will' be bullets and some 
firsts taken back by the seller which we will discuss 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: What distinction do you 
relative frequency and adjusted frequency? 
MR. GILLIES: The adjusted frequency el 
cash and the miscellaneous at the bottom and you jus 






CHAIRMAN BOSCO: I'm going to have to a 
to really drastically summarize this. We have 
you 11 s, 
we have other witnesses and I do want to bring 
close. 
MR. GILLIES: Well, sir, this same 
percent of all sales required creative financ 
involve assumptions. In other words the depres 
which I have alluded to earlier would be mater 
us 
to a 
shows that 70 
most of 
on sales 
without creative financing. This would be of obvious concern to 
our membership but would be a critical concern to 
home sellers. Page five illustrates convinc 
financing typically is an assumed first plus a 







where it's indicated that the combination factor here produces the 
equivalent of 12.57 percent interest rate on a conventional 30 year 
loan. That contrasts with 15, 16 plus interest rate offered on 
conventional firsts if the borrower had to go out and finance the 
entire transaction that way. Now understand that most of these, of 
course, involve balloons. And that, therefore, the interest factor 
won't change after the second has matured or the third has matured. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: What is the standard practice among the 
professional realtors statewide in conducting such a transfer of 
sale when you issue a second or third that has a balloon on it when 
you are talking to the seller in those circumstances? Obviously we 
know the disclosures and the contract, we all talked about how 
sometimes meaningless disclosure ... What do you say when you got this 
balloon at the end of three years that you're going to have to pay, 
and you're going to have to pay it at whatever conventional financing 
is? 
MR. GILLIES: You are going to have to pay it and generally 
speaking the party would require some takeout financing or could in 
some circumstances go out and acquire another second in the 
institutional market or from another private investor. 
I ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: What I'm driving at is, is it a concern 
of your statewide organization that the realtors try to make as clear 
as possible the conventional financing? I mean to say, hopefully 
interest rates will come down, but there is no guarantee that they 
will. 
MR. GILLIES: Absolutely. That would be a basic disclosure 
you would have an obligation to make. It is one of the most material 
facts of the transaction. Under the law, under the ethics of the 
- 177 -
industry, and under the ethics of our association, 
would have to be made. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: Your realtors, your 
buyer beware. 




the end of three years, or at the end of five s you're 
to owe 'X' dollars on this loan. And you have to come up 
cash or refinance it. II Certainly a very 
transaction. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: Mr. Gi s, s morn we 
from Mr. Fohrman, the attorney from Riverside. He 
examples of, I guess you'd call some kind of a 
where there were several deals all pending, all 
secondary financing, creative financing, and he bel 
gave 





cards would collapse. Do you think his concern is justif Is 
he over doing it? 
MR. GILLIES: I found it difficult to 
testimony in context. He testified, for example, 
the 's 
that went through escrow, they were all on 
contrary to all evidence any place. It must 
situation in the world, if that occurred. 
the real property section of the State Bar pub 
s. 
the most 
alluded -- and I hope you all read it, it's kind of arnus 
based on conversation that he primarily gathered at 
from talking to doctors who were interested f 
and the other thing. Dr. Filante had the best answer to 









take off your clothes and I'll examine you." But, it is obvious 
that there can be situations where a person is both a seller taking 
back a second and then going into another property and utilizing a 
second as a means of purchasing. It is conceivable that in some 
circumstances a pyramid effect could be created. I think it's over 
done. We've seen certainly no evidence of it yet, as I've indicated 
to you creative financing is not new ••• 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: We realize that. But yet in this 
tight market, if the only way you can sell your home is by offering 
some sort of credit to your buyer and you're dependent upon receiving 
that, not because you want to move, but because as you stated and I 
think as all of us are aware, you're forced to move. You have your 
job, or something like that, and so you're dependent upon getting 
them to that next home, financing it, and it seems to me that it's 
wider spread than maybe .•• 
MR. GILLIES: If you are so capital short that all the 
money, all the equity that you have available in the first home must 
be used to get into the second home, you're not going to be able to 
take back a second. Now, an approach to that is to originate a 
second and to discount it in order to put the deal together. There's 
all kind of combinations. All I can say about the so-called pyramid 
effect of the gentleman's testimony is we haven't seen it yet. I 
can't say it won't happen in isolated circumstances. We don't look 
forward to it, you know, in a huge number of circumstances. It seems 
to me that some of this cry of doom kind of prediction is like recent 
statements of another state official with respect to what could 
happen if you were sprayed by malathion from an airplane. It leads 
to hysteria. It doesn't contribute. 
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ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: I think we ought 
thing, if my notes are correct, and it is certa 
are not. The gentleman, the lawyer from 
that all of the cases sampled involved 





MR. GILLIES: That certainly could be the case 
We have 70 percent creative financing as shows 
The question was asked earlier as to what, how much s 
assumable loan contribute to the deal. Can f that 
Joel? 
MR. SINGER: Table five will give you an the 
interest rates are under the various as 
s you'll see they vary quite dramatically among 
assumption and the degree to which the buyer also a second and 
a third. In terms of the down payments, I 
as I understood it. In the situation where 
cash to that loan assumption the loan to va 
The case where the second was also employed 
loan to value ratio was 74 percent. In the case 
third were both applied with an asurnption the 
percent. 
MR. GILLIES: Well, the chairman 
and unless you have some further questions on s 
us to pursue it, I will leave it with you for your 
commend it to you. I think it answers of 
were raised today about what's going on out there 
Now, a point ... 










Gillies, about the Table five, "Cash and New First Mortgage Loans 
13.5 percent." Now that would suggest that in the real world the 
interest rates are not as high as we've been quoted. 
MR. SINGER: Well, I think the reason for that, Mr. McAlister, 
is, of course, that 35 percent of those were originated by sellers. 
And sellers were originating loans at interest rates at about 12 percent, 
if my memory serves me,whereas institutions were originating them at 
14.77%. So the reason that figure looks so low is because you are 
now having, and this is a very unusual phenomenon in terms of history, 
that sellers are also getting very heavily involved in the issuance 
of first trust deeds. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: And becoming their own bankers. 
Their own lenders. 
MR. SINGER: To a degree, in this market with a withdrawal 
of institutional lenders, that is becoming more essential. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: So some of them have had commitments, 
haven't they, from the past too? 
MR. SINGER: average transaction sampled, I would 
estimate, was about 120 days old at this point. So we're talking 
about commitments that were written six months ago when the rates 
were in fact in the high 14/low 15 range. And that's why I'm confident 
as to the survey reliability. 
MR. GILLIES: Just one point that I do want to make and 
that is that in this survey there were only two transactions in 
which there was no down payment and no transactions in which there 
was cash to buyer. 
MR. SINGER: If I might comment further on those two. One 
was a straight, no down payment deal, with no cash to the buyer; the 
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other involved a $10,000 financing price over the 
So they certainly don't seem to resemble 
previously. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: But 
si 
very straight with each other, those types of s 
being reported by your members too, to the var 
about to give you those situations in a 
MR. GILLIES: We have learned of 
from our members who have ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: You don t 
don't occur. 
MR. GILLIES: They have been comp 
that they have been presented to them as 
they have been irate about them. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON: Those 
what I'm saying, Dug, those individuals 
are not about to report those types of transact 
voluntary questionnaire. 
MR. GILLIES: Possibly not, a 
hope perhaps that most of the people of 
state who are engaged in this kind of trans 
ls 
but it is conceivable that there are some of 








deal, they're proud to tell you about it. I r 
whoever he is, in San Diego who's peddling s 
the greatest thing since dirt. He i 
about it. He wouldn't have any hesitation to te 
So, our survey does not sc se 
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signficiant activity. Now, you know, your reservations are perhaps 
warranted, but in any event, let me comment on the situation of a 
buyer getting a loan out of a transaction. There can be a legitimate 
reason for that. Even Fannie Mae writes a loan which is a combination 
rehab purchase loan, where you're purchasing a property and you're 
going to at the same time rehabilitate that property. In fact, you 
enter into one long transaction and you get cash in addition to 
the purchase price which you use for the rehab. So there are some 
circumstances when a cash to buyer loan arrangement would be appropriate. 
We are very concerned about this, however, and I promise you that by 
January we will have some thoughts for you on possible controls, 
disclosures, whatever it may be in relationship to that part of the 
problem. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: Mr. Gillies, you responded to, I guess, 
the first part of my question, and that is that you don't believe 
that these pitfalls of creative financing will be a problem unless 
refinancing isn't available or one of those two conditions that we've 
mentioned, so I guess you've answered that part of the question. 
The other part of the question was, if financing isn't 
available, what do you think we ought to do next year, vis-a-vis a 
moratorium, if that becomes a problem in terms of the long term, and 
I know you're going to make recommendations in January, but we'd like 
you to give us a clue as to what the thinking of your association is 
as to what you do with those that are already in the problem, and 
to try to prevent or avoid, in terms of the long term, the others 
from getting into such a problem. 
MR. GILLIES: Well, let me say first that the organization 
has no position on a moratorium. The question has not been submitted 
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to them. I will see that it is, and I will have a you 
on that question. I personally feel that that have to be dealt 
with very, very carefully because of the unless there was a 
proven need for the person to get the loan are 
to have persons taking advantage of this and just not their 
balloon, even thought they have the perfect l to 
do so, merely to continue a favorable interest rate use 
to go to Vegas. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: Then you agree Mr. 
different reasons? 
MR. GILLIES: I think you have to , very 
cautiously. I think I agree with Mr. Robinson some of same 
reasons as well. But what do people do? are peop 
who find that they cannot continue to afford the they have 
purchased, some other circumstances occur, they 





s to default. A few lead to foreclosure. General 
the house is sold, and they seek other hous 
have had the benefit and the use of that home 
case 
the term s 
which they have occupied it. Whatever they pa 
in lieu of rent, and if there is an equity availab at 
sold it, they will collect that equity and have for 
It is a harsh fact of life, but it is not one that s 
present world and the present situation. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: I have two other 
I'll end my points. One, you and I have discus 
concept of applying the blended rate formula that 









middle of the road solution between the problems affecting or what 
were perceived as affecting Wellenkamp in terms of allowing the lending 
institutions that participate primarily in housing to upgrade their 
portfolios and to maintain a source of investment capital for housing. 
I am submitting those amendments into that measure of mine, and would 
like to understand whether or not you think that's an approach that 
has some middle ground that we could explore from the standpoint of 
your association . 
MR. GILLIES: Certainly, I would be happy to explore it. We 
have preliminarily explored it. We would like to see these specific 
language that you are considering. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: Do you think it's a possible solution? 
MR. GILLIES: It has possibilities, yes, sir. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: Do you think your association could 
possibly support it? 
MR. GILLIES: I will certainly ask and have an answer for 
you by January. Let me say of course, Mr. Costa, as you know there 
is nothing in the world today that prevents a lender from makirtg that 
offer to a buyer at the time of the loan transaction. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: I know. We've discussed that. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: By making what offer? 
MR. GILLIES: He can offer to refinance that property at 
that time with a blended rate. He can say to the buyer, "I don't 
have the right to accelerate, but I'd like you to consider this. You 
can avoid a short term second, you can have a new 30 year loan, 
a normal loan evaluation with a blended rate." 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: What if he's not brought into the 
transaction? 
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MR. GILLIES: That lender? 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: Yes. 
MR. GILLIES: He could advise all s that if 
have anything in mind the offer stands. Some of them have. You know 
Maurice McAlister -- I think you know him of He 
has made all kinds of offers to borrowers to get 
low paying loans in his portfolio. He's a very 
man. 
of some of s 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: There must more to 
understand. If a person can assume at the lower rate, 
would he have for agreeing to pay more. 
MR. GILLIES: Well, if he can get an 
unnecessary a second, the second might be at 18 
this way he gets a totally new loan at 12 1/2 or 13 or 
whatever the mix dictates. He doesn't have to worry 
He's got a fully amortized new 30 year loan that meets 








to prevent lenders today from offering them, Mr. Costa is 
suggesting I think is that it may be some form of of 
acceleration. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: The final question is do you believe 
that the implications of the Tucker vs. Lassen case 
in terms of its relation to liability ..• 
MR. GILLIES: Oh, no that was Wyatt vs. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: Wyatt vs. Union. 




are to realtors who may engage in such trans 
find that the buyer or the seller seeks 1 
s or sales on to 
as a result f 
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the fact that they were with the of the contract? 
MR. GILLIES: Well, s 1 I you'll read Wyatt and if 
you want, when you get up there next f you' 1 call me I'll 
get you a copy, but I'm sure Mr. Melnicoe can get one for you very 
easily. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: I'm sure we can get a copy. 
MR. GILLIES: The fact situation Wyatt looks just 
unbelievably horrible. It was gross. To try to translate that ... I 
think the gentlemen who suggested that it extended ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: You don't think 's a threat. 
MR. GILLIES: Oh, I'm sure somebody's going to be sued. 
That keeps another industry going, you know. I'm sure there's going 
to be some suits, and they will revo 
situation. 
I think around the fact 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: What do you think really are the 
responsibilities of the realtor. I know that was mentioned. Mr. 
Fox mentioned earlier that you oppo bonding concept that was 
proposed and another measure that was up slature. 
MR. GILLIES: Yes, and I do want to mention to you by the 
way, that we have our industry ng which now the bar has, 
but which real estate had before the bar. We have what we call a 
Recovery Fund, which is financed from license fees, and if a person 
has an unsatisfied judgment against a broker for acts arising out 
of his license, he can recover from the Recovery Fund up to $100,000 
against a broker. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: Have there been any recoveries? 
MR. GILLIES: Oh, yes. About $200,000 or $300,000 a year 
are paid out of that fund on such recoveries. And so we have always 
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considered that to be a substitute for bonding. Now I don't know if 
you want to get into a long discussion on bonding or not. 
We are supporting -- Mr. McAlister is a bill of 
his which, I understand, will relate to mortgage loan brokers' activities 
which, coupled with SB 391 by Senator Watson, will deal further 
disclosure to lenders. Mortgage loan brokers are now to make 
disclosure to borrowers. This will require disclosure to lenders 
rather specific terms. It will deal with appraisals, 
with credit activity, many other factors. I 
self-dealing, will require annual financial 
public accountant furnished to the department, 




to the department and deal with mortgage loan brokerage a number of 
ways. And we will be in support of that slat 
of that legislation. So that activity, and se 
arisen from the Atlas case and the Universal case 
will become law this year. 
SB 391 {Watson) is, I presume, 
has passed the Senate. As I mentioned to Mr. 
1967 sponsored a bill, SB 330 by Senator Wilson, to 
by sellers to buyers of a number of condi re 
One of those disclosures related to take-back 
We are· support 
which have 
so forth, hopefully 
s It 
, we in 
sclosures 
ng to the sale. 
of it and the facts about balloons and all s sort of 
the details 
That 
was bitterly opposed on the Assembly floor on basis we were 
trying to make a transaction so complicated everybody would have to 
hire a realtor to do it. So we didn't get the 11 that We 
reintroduced it in 1979 as AB 932. It came to s ttee, and 
it didn't come out of this committee. So 
a trimmed down version, AB 888 by Mr. Dave 
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s year we 
It came out of 
Judiciary, got on the f , and l the of an expl 
just before the roll-call, we out we didn't the votes. 
It's on the inactive file. We can use bill. We'd be happy to 
put back the disclosure with respect to take-back financing into 
that bill as a fourth item. We are getting flack on the floor from 
some of the members of s co~~ittee about that 11 being overly 
complex and burdens you're putting on people and so on. These are 
things that have to be weighed. We areas of appra al, 
the areas of loan evaluation, the areas of credit data, and many others 
which were mentioned today, and I can furnish the committee with 
a list and read it to you now if you want, should be examined, but 
they have to be wei carefully. would not, our judgment, 
eliminate creative f We ieve that some of them can be 
written in a way to increase consumer protection without placing 
undue burdens. 
Mr. Stirling asked and Mr. Robinson earlier, and 
both of them are not here about independent escrow aspect of the 
thing. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: The arms 
MR. GILLIES: Yes. The problem 
provision? 
that is that 
District Attorney of San County hasn't read the Escrow Law or 
if he has he hasn't understood Escrow Law, because if you read 
the definition of an escrow, in that , every item goes into a 
realtor's trust account -- I take a depos from you and I put it in 
instead into my pocket or in my own bank account -- I'm precluded 
from doing that by the law. I must put it in a trust account, and 
then it will go to escrow eventually when an escrow is opened. But 
everyone of those is an escrow as defined under the Escrow Law. So 
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So we would have to funnel all, you know, all our ngs through escrow 
with the costs involved and who's going to pay for those? The 
customer. So you'd have to rewrite the definition and no one has ever 
suggested -- this proposal has been made before, bills have been 
introduced to do it before. No one has ever suggested what that 
appropriate new definition would be. We believe held 
escrows can save customers money in some circumstances. Recently, 
not too recently now, it's a few years ago, a Cal State 
Fullerton, indicated that less than three of escrows are 
held by brokers, however, under their exemptions. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: Can we continue then a 
MR. GILLIES: Well, Mr. Chairman, I don't want to take more 
time. I say to you, I pledge to you that the intent of our association, 
we have in addition to securing the background material which has 
been presented to you today and it's the same survey, is first step 
to find out what is going on out there. We have a 
staff function ongoing to examine the al 
the area of creative financing with the intent of 
recommendations for legislation in this area. 
ttee and a 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: Maybe I could carry some of concerns. 
MR. GILLIES: Very well could, s 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: Love to carry a s 11. 
MR. GILLIES: We'd be delighted to talk to you about that 
sir. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: All right. Thank you. 
MR. GILLIES: Mr. Chairman, I want to 
buyers and sellers and brokers would probably 
and there may be some ff t, f 
0 -
you 
not to use 
d t have 
• 
• 
creative financing, there would be an awful lot of people in this 
state who would not be able to deal their residential property as 
they must, and until adequate conventional institutional financing 
comes back into the market place, creative financing must not only 
be sustained, it must be encouraged. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: Now what will the situation be? 
Starting very soon we very likely are going to have mostly variable 
or renegotiable or fluctuating rates . 
MR. GILLIES: I would think that's correct, sir. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: .•. and so aren't we in a different 
ballpark then? 
MR. GILLIES: Yes, sir. You'll recall that in the discussions 
of the parity bills, for example, there were discussions of sunset on 
the authority of the regulators to adopt these regulations with the 
thought that the Legislature should re-examine that situation at the 
end of three years. That sunset is in place in AB 650. It is my 
understanding that Senator Foran is going to amend it into SB 809 and 
hopefully in two and a half years, two years, three years when you look 
at this again because of that sunset provision we will be able to have 
a more stabilized climate and be able to more perceptively deal with 
the issue. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: In theory that will lead to a more 
stable market. It will presumably lead to somewhat lower rates going 
in. It has the potential for some volatility as you pointed out, and 
it makes some of us nervous. 
MR. GILLIES: Yes, no question about it, and you know Freddie 
Mae authorized some instruments along about the end of May. I have 
seen data on the first two auctions that they had for those adjustable 
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rate mortgages. In the first one nationwide they sold $900,000 worth 
of commitments for mortgages. That's a drop in the 
one, $700,000 worth of mortgages ... 
The second 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: These are var le? 
MR. GILLIES: These are the new adjustable mortgages. 
They wanted 16 percent, which isn't saving a lot of money 
advantages the lender gets. So I don't know whether se are go 
to be acceptable in the market place. Only 11 tell 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: Well, if s at 16 , I 
suspect they'll have some difficulties. 
MR. GILLIES.: That's an initial rate of 16, and interest 
rate can move up coupled with, in that case, a contract rate index 
without any cap on upward interest movement. It's scary, but 's 
the only world we're living in right now, and that's 
is so vital on the parity legislation. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: Has your 1 
position yet on AB 650? 
MR. GILLIES: They're still trying to 
amendments here. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER: Trying to 
All right. Thank you, Mr. Gillies. 




a 1 e 
amendments. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: Our next witness will be Robert L. Kemper, 
the Vice Chairman of the Board of Wells Fargo Bank. Mr. 
welcome back. I think you've testified before at one of our 
MR. ROBERT L. KEMPER: Thank you. In st o t 
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Welborn and I will do s We have 
copies of our testimony and we 11 to ize the po 
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in just a couple of minutes in the interest of your time. 
First of all, I'd like to congratulate the committee for 
looking into this matter because we do believe that the kind of 
creative financing that's been discussed today is a problem. It's 
going to be more of a problem as some of these loans come due, and 
as Mr. Maisel said we don't believe that the interest rates are going 
to be substantially lower in the very near term, and so they are going 
to be a problem. 
Creative financing has been accelerated by a couple of 
factors: (1) high interest rates; and (2) the Wellenkamp decision, 
which repealed the due on sale clause. There's no more concern that 
anyone should have than the protection of the consumer be the borrower, 
seller or private individual who is investing in junior liens. We 
feel there's a large difference between the consumer's safeguards that 
are provided in a well structured lending industry and the high risk 
environment of creative financing. 
Home mortgage transactions in the traditional market place, 
that is that provided by banks, savings and loans, and mortgage bankers, 
are surrounded by a multitude of federal and state laws and regulations. 
And I'd just like to cite two of those that helped to protect against 
some of the things we've been talking about. One is the concern over 
the borrower's ability to pay, and you've heard some situations of 
the kinds of problems people get into because of their inability to 
handle the mortgages that they have taken on. Study by one of our 
members shows that the average delinquency rate for loans assumed 
without the review and approval of the lending institution is more 
than double that of loans assumed with the credit approval of the 
bank. 
- 193 -
A second such type of protection is that the traditional 
market the lenders operate under laws that require the lender to 
provide a good faith estimate of all costs relevant to real estate 
transaction. So all parties or the borrower knows going in exactly 
what is going on. I think in some ways the point we're to make 
is that in the traditional regulated markets that we've had the 
consumer has had protection. Due to high interest rates and lack 
of ability for people to qualify for those rates, e have looked 
to creative financing, and that in itself creates a prob If 
someone cannot qualify for conventional financing, the odds are that 
if you go to creative financing, particularly in some of the types of 
situations that have been discussed today, you do find that people 
are in over their heads and you are counting on lower rates in the 
future inflation in the price of the house to bail them out. And if 
those things do come true, fine. If they don't, we believe you're 
going to have problems. So basically, we feel that the problem of 
creative financing has been and is caused by st rates and 
also the fact that under the Wellenkamp decision lenders do not have 
the right to approve these transactions or look at them before they're 
assumed. 
And now Mr. Welborn would like to give you a facts on 
some of the things that they've seen. 
MR. MICHAEL WELBORN: I will try and be equally I'm 
Mike Welborn, Vice President of Government Affairs at Crocker Bank and 
with me is Jim Hawkins, who manages our Home Products area, formerly 
responsible for Crocker's residential real estate area. 
In my testimony you'll find that we conducted, we tried 
to gather our own data on what's going on in f , so 
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that we could draw some conclusions from it to present to you as 
opposed to coming here with hypotheticals. What we did was survey 
our entire branch system, our 375 branches as well as our mortgage 
company operations. I will anticipate the question Mr. Robinson 
would ask if he were here, and I will admit that the introductory 
letter over the questionnaire was probably somewhat biased and that 
I acknowledged that we would use it in testimony in preparation for 
this hearing. Our branch managers are certainly well aware of our 
efforts in support of Mr. Costa's piece of legislation. 
I don't think it's really necessary for me to go into the 
results of that survey because quite frankly some of the stories that 
were referred to here today are quite frankly worse. There are some 
tear jerker types of case studies in that testimony, but what has 
become apparent to me sitting in the back row all day is that the 
cases we see as a lender are not at all the cases that are really 
in jeopardy. We get customers coming to us in situations of anguish, 
frustration, despair, saying, "What can you do to help me salvage 
this transaction?" Quite frankly, at that point in time there's 
very little we can do. We are absolutely, totally frustrated by the 
fact that we are not a party, cannot be a party, and are specifically 
I excluded in escrow instructions to not even be informed of this 
transaction. We don't find out until the house has changed hands 
many, many times down the road or there's a problem, a serious problem, 
and by that time it's too late. In fact, listeni~g to the testimony 
today, I jotted down these points which are also in my testimony, six 
areas of abuse that I think are due nearly 100 percent to the lack 
of presence of a financial institution in the process. There are no 
new ideas here, but if I might, I'd like to just list those six thoughts. 
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First is that buyers do not need credit or underwriting 
qualifications. The second abuse is that the value of the property 
is not independently evaluated, which often results a higher price 
or over-encumbrance. The third abuse is that homes are being sold 
with little or no equity. Very often there is little st on 
the part of the buyer to remain in that property. we heard 
tales of the buyer actually getting cash out of the transaction. 
The fourth area is inadequate consumer protection and disclosure. The 
buyer is very often relying on the seller to provide disclosure. The 
seller has an interest in the transaction. The buyer often does not 
know the proper loan amount. His payments are past due. He relies 
upon the seller or perhaps the realtor, and they are interested in 
closing the deal. The fifth area of abuse is that the buyer or the 
seller are cornmiting themselves to positions that they would otherwise 
not commit themselves to if they were aware of the risks. They are 
unaware of risks and they're taking positions they would not take 
if they were aware of what's going on. And the final abuse and perhaps 
the one we least like to see is where there are situations of a more 
knowledgeable individual taking clear advantage of an 1 who 
is less involved, less knowledgeable with the transaction. 
Now it seems to me that those six categor s of abuse, and 
I think that pretty much covers most of the transactions or most of 
the stories that have been told today, will not occur or 11 be 
significantly reduced if there are financial institutions involved 
in that transaction in one form or another. Of course the solution 
that we would prefer to see to get the financial institution involved 
in that transaction is a repeal of Wellenkamp. 












in loans, but, I'm 
actually costs the average person with the assumability 
And Mr. Gillies has through his survey, 
we could argue for a long time over the methodo 
ss he has at that the presence of 
creates overall about a 12.75 percent interest rate 
is ly below what conventional lenders 
have any facts to spute that? I mean I know 
loon that has to be weighed in, but does your industry 
of that contradicts that, that tells us in number 
where the average consumer is with or without the .•. 
MR. WELBORN: No sir, we don't have any data on that. In 
I couldn't probably dispute that number off the top of my head. 
sounds somewhat reasonable, but what I might point out is that 
of your question is on rates. And there's also a price 
as well. In other words the size of the loan times the 
st rate is the size of the payments. If the price of the 
pr of the financing were to decline, then borrowers 
to qua fy at significantly higher rates yet making the same 
So the question really can't just entirely focus 
the rate question. I don't dispute that number, but I think 's 
extreme to consider that in the absence of 
i 
of homes will decline. That's the way the market has to 
And if the prices of homes are to decline, people will be 
now ify at higher rates than they otherwise would be able 
So I think that if there's two considerations there, 
we can't isolate just the rate question from the price question. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: Are you saying then that my question can t 
- 198 -
• 
quantified, that you probably never could come up 
for answering that. 
a formula 
MR. KEMPER: Oh I think that one of the things that you 
pointed out was that you are talking about a situation that sometimes 
is as short as one, two or three years, and if you look at a transaction 
period that goes beyond that, when you are getting into refinancing, 
you may find that you're talking about people that can't get the 
refinancing, which gets into the problem itself. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: I think the frustration that I have, and 
I don't know if it's shared by other members of the committee, is that 
it's always possible to hear horror stories. You could take the most 
legitimate transaction of all time and over a period of a thousand 
times that it was repeated you'd have five horror stories. But I 
don't really feel that I have a good picture for what's happening· 
out there. Some say three year balloon payments, seven year balloon 
payments, 25 percent interest, 15 points, what you're going to be 
charging today as opposed to what you're going to be charging a 
year from now How do we really make decisions based on that kind 
of information? 
MR. KEMPER: I sympathize with your problem. We are not 
in a position to give you that kind of information because we don't 
see that transaction when the loans are assumed. So we can't give 
you that kind of data. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: Do we just sort of have to wait till the 
tidal wave either hits or doesn't hit to know what happened during 
this period of time? 
MR. FRED BIEL: Mr. Chairman, I'm Fred Biel from Lloyd's 
Bank. I run the Residential Real Estate Department. Earlier this 
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year under a program that was sponsored by 
offered to purchase lender loans if they were put 
Mae they 
the 
right way, we went into the marketplace on a trial basis to 
originate or to assist sellers in putting toge 
finance deals where the borrower/buyer of the 
underwritten by an institution with the eventual 
loan could be sold to Fannie Mae to provide 
time the balloon came due or some time when rates 




areas generally spanning the state we created one Most of the 
events that came up were what we saw. The transactions we were 
allowed to see showed, showed and really supported Mr. Gillies 
said, that the creative finance market runs around 12 to 12 3/4 
area. And we might say that is the interest rate set 
mark~tplace. That's what a buyer will pay and that's least a 
seller carry back will accept. The marketplace set that rate. To 
then try to convert that, the seller almost upon 
say, "What would you charge me to buy that loan 
would 
't want 
to own it, I really never wanted to be a lender. How scount 
to place it?" And we would tell him what it would cost to take 
to the current Fannie Mae yields. In some cases 12, 15, 20 po 
That of course came direct:'ly out of s equity. become 
an unacceptable transaction. And that's the reason that 
that Fannie Mae put forth has not turned 
we have since abandoned it. 
But, the other point that would come up on 
that went the next step and said, "Well, okay I'll do 





"Wait a minute. If I have to be underwritten by a traditional lender, 
I would have gone to him to start with. I'm not lendable. I have had 
credit problems. I'm short term on my job, or whatever. And that's 
one of the reasons I'm in creative finance, because there is no other 
way for me to buy a home." So you ask for numbers. We're almost 
blocked out, as they said, because we weren't there to start with, 
and what little bit we've dabbled with shows us that maybe we didn't 
want to be there to start with. We think it's a time bomb because 
we know the deal closed anyway. And that buyer is going to be back 
to us within a short period of time saying, "Well, I put my $10,000 
into the property. The balloon is here. Somebody has to help." And 
we said, "We told you three years ago we couldn't help." 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: Do you think that it is unlikely that 
conventional lending institutions will be able to come to people's 
rescue at that time? 
MR. BIEL: We are always seeing people at our door. We have 
people there as recently as yesterday, making application for loans 
because the seller carry back was due. And there is no way that a 
regulated financial institution could originate that loan because of 
the amount of credit that person needed because of negative amortization 
on the seller carry back and the other terms that he allowed himself 
to get into he just wasn't qualified. We would have been imprudent to 
make that loan. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: It might be wise to keep track of that 
information. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: Do you agree with the statement that the 
practice of some of the financial institutions or lenders of making 
a bullet loan with a short term balloon is no different than some of 
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the problems we're talking about within creative 
MR. HAWKINS: I strongly disagree. Because the ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: Would you like to stinctions? 
MR. HAWKINS: I would disagree in the respect when we 
at Crocker make a short term loan we're looking at borrowers ability 
to be able to refinance or rollover that loan at the of 
years, go to other assets. We're basically looking for a 
deal. We will not extend credit solely based on the va of 
property. We're always looking two, three, four, f years 
line for where that source is going to come. So for most I 
think we exercise more discretion and a 1 
on that type of loan. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: You think there are some very clear 
distinctions between comparing the two? 
MR. BIEL: Oh yes. We require complete appl 
borrower. We verify the significant entries on and 
it to normal underwriting criteria and say, "Three years 
you are going to have to do something. What 11 be your 
to handle that new debt?" 
MR. HAWKINS: I'd like to also add we go to 
to educate our customer in respect to what will 
the line. We have printed notices where we do go 
possible potential impacts, given high rates, more cont 
rates, more disclosure. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: Well, back to the s 
you know there could be an argument made that 









prudent in trying to predict what is to three to f 
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years from now, you deny people a very basic necessity, and who knows, 
maybe if they could package together a loan on perhaps a less prudent 
basis they may end up making it. People do survive sometimes against 
great odds, and I haven't ever noticed banks acknowledging that. 
MR. HAWKINS: I agree with your statement except for the 
fact that our standards are set by past experience on what we see 
as an individual's ability to handle certain levels of credit. And 
we we use ratios ourselves and I think we're just extrapolating 
from past experience. As a general statement, would you lend your 
grandmother's retirement money on this? 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: Maybe that doesn't always have to be the 
standard though for an average home loan. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: To take the point maybe in a different 
tact than Doug was trying to make. You don't have the statistics 
basically about the extent of the problem because for the most part 
you're excluded from direct involvement in the problem, and I think 
we understand that. But, what do you think are the similarities 
in terms of the change of economic climate, change of emphasis on the 
national level from housing to other areas of investment capital which 
you participate a lot in? Do you think there are any comparisons 
here? I come back again to my concern about a source of investment 
capital for housing. What are the similarities? Some person the other 
day was trying to make reference to the 1920's and the fact that they 
quit originating long term loans on residential property, and that we 
are following a similar pattern. I don't believe necessarily that 
history always repeats itself, but find it really tough out there 
to find anybody interested in getting involved in investment capital 
for housing. 
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MR. KEMPER: Well, I think that's true and the reason is 
basically because we have had volatile interest rates. We have had 
inflation over the past few years. You see the situation of lenders, 
and it's most visible in the case of the s & L's, but s ly 
visible if you look at the earnings records of the major California 
banks who also are heavily involved in the housing market. To rely 
on the fact that in the future these things are going to come to pass 
and we are going to have low interest rates and be able to do that thing 
is just an enormous gamble. It's been a tremendous problem to those 
that have been involved in that industry. 
And now you have new instruments that take some of that 
problem away, and you will find that lenders would be willing to be 
in the mortgage market if people can qualify. But the people can't 
qualify at the current high rates. And if rates go down we all 
applaud because we all make more money in a lower rate environment. 
So we would be delighted, as I said in my testimony. One of the 
things that's the big problem is high interest rates. High 
rates force people in the housing market to have to pay much more as 
a percentage of their income than they can really afford to do. That s 
the problem we have. If you drop the interest rates, not you, but 
if the interest rates in the country come down to a reasonable level 
where people can afford the kind of instruments you have, you will see 
institutional lenders back in the real estate market. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: Do you believe that creative financing 
has been a factor in the use of low interest loans and artificail 
keeping up the cost of housing? 
MR. KEMPER: Yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: When it maybe would have taken a down turn. 
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MR. KEMPER: s. 
ASSEMBLY~~N COSTA: I would 1 to see some 
to prove that. I don't know if you can. That s a that's been 
made by a number of folks. We don't have any proof of that. 
One final The back on the Mae 
program on blended rates. If we offered that as I suggested to Mr. 
Gillies as an option, some sort of a compromise that s, as 
Mr. Frank mentioned earlier this morning, not one that's neces ly 
desirable or attractive to everybody, but it's maybe a means to the 
end of trying to provide some tal and some of 
these portfolios and get away some of the s of the creative 
financing because you'd have a new mortgage in e Could you 
support a measure such as that? 
MR. KEMPER: First of all, I should have the 
beginning I am speaking today as the President of Cali Bankers 
Association. I cannot speak for that as we have not 
addressed the issue. We'd be glad to take a look at it. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: Please do. 
MR. KEMPER: I one that you have to mind 
when we look at that is that we are 1 up a rate 
situation that is ial low. And that means home 
that does not go the blended rate he is again subs zing 
the people that have the blended rate. So I you know you've got ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: What do you mean by that? Let's back 
up. 
MR. KEMPER: On the of rate example that you were using 
before this morning we were talking about a 12 percent rate, as 
opposed to putting new money out at whatever the rate is. Although 
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it's better than what you've got now, you still have a lower than the 
market rates, which means that the new rate in order to provide some 
kind of profitability to the institution is artificially high to make 
up for what you've got on the low side. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: Maybe the interest rates will come back 
to 12 percent next year. 
MR. KEMPER: That would be nice. 
MR. HAWKINS: Could I ask you a question on ... you referred 
to this proposal a couple of times, and I guess I'm not totally familiar 
with it. Maybe you can clarify it. Would such a proposal also include 
a due on sale provision? In other words, if there was not a method of 
enforceability that we would go through, everyone would either go with 
this blended rate, if it was to their advantage, so they would be 
subsidized by the banks on their new money or they would all go "subject 
to." And then you would have all the creative financing abuses all 
over again. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: Probably with parity the new mortgage 
would then have that adjustable factor and the due on sale clause 
probably wouldn't prospectively be a problem. 
MR. HAWKINS: But I thought you were referring to a blended 
rate for outstanding mortgages. All the mortgage money that's out 
there now. 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: Well, it gives an opportunity to combine 
the old with a new loan in the form of a wraparound. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: This would be on new transactions? 
MR. HAWKINS: I understand. My question is suppose an 
individual said, "No we don't want to go that route. In fact, we're 
still going subject'to. We're not even going to tell you." In other 
- 206 -
• 
words, let's assume we 
are willing to offer 
s , and we said, we 
" but customers come to us and if 's to 
their advantage they take it and if 's not to their 
because they're not credit worthy, don't quali or all these 
other reasons we've isted they don't want to go a 
lender and all these abuses occur. If we don't have the teeth to enforce 
it, if we don't have the due on sale sion, to me, the blended rate 
isn't really worth very much because you're 11 to have all 
of these creative financing abuses . 
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA: Obviously we'll have to take that under 
consideration. 
CHAIRMAN BOSCO: Thank you lemen, very much. Have all 
of you been given the testimony that you ? Tomorrow we're 
going to hear a bill by Mrs. Hughes having to do with the Cal e Mae 
proposal. I want to thank all the 
testimony was excellent and enl 
Charlene Mathias, our consultant, and Pam 
that came to 
'd also l 
leer, our 




sergeants who have been so as always. Thank you all very 
much. We will conclude this hearing. 
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August 11, '" eo 
Continued from Page One •.•••••••••••.• 
Note and Trust Deed to contain the Acceleration Clause set out on £xhibit: "A" 
attached hereto and approved by all parties, Trust Deed to contain the following 
recital: "Thie Deed of Trust is given as a portion ot the purchase price of the 
.•. herein descri~ed property,~aqd is second and aub~quent in lien to that first 
Deed of Trust bein& reco-rded concurrently herewith." 
As further security for herein described note, it is understood that buyers shall 
execute in favor of sellers, an additional Deed of Trust on other property for 
an amount not less than $70,000.00. Escrov holder shall be handed further written 
instructione.dn regards to oth~r property and ~cordation of said trust deed. 
Escrov holder is hereby authori~ed and instructed to draw and record a Request 
for Notice for the benefit of sellers on the first trust deed, and to charge 
aellers' account for drawing and recording fees for same, 
TERMS AND CONDITIONS: 
A) Eacrow holder is hereby authorized and instructed to charge sellers' account 
and credit buyers' account, at close of escrow, with the sum of $13,000.00. 
B) Sellers shall furnish a current structural pest control certification per 
attached addendua. 
C) Buyers shall obtain a new fire insurance policy covering subject property, 
11118eting nev lendar'a requiraaenta, and &hc.Ying sellers as second l!lOrtgagee. 
Escrow holder is instructed to charge buyers' account for payment of first year 
premium for aame, per billing deposited herein. 
D),Buye~ are aware that there are annual Seven Oaks Commu~ty Center du~~ of 
$'6S. ocr· b'n subject property. Escrow holder is instructed to .obtain a state:;,ent 
fro111 said center, charge sellers 1 account w1.th ·~ny deli:~quencies, ADd pro-rate 
said dues to close o~ escrow. 
E) Escrow holder is instructed that in lieu of the issuance of a CL!A Standard 
Coverage policy of title insurance, to have issued a CLTA Interim Binder, Form A, 
binding Commonwealth Land Title Ccmpany to the buyers for a period of not to 
exceed ~o years to the issuance of s policy in favor of a purchaser from the 
vestee herein. Buyers shall deposit sufficient funds herein to cover the ten 
per eent additional charge for said binder fee. 
F) Buyers to receive copies of the Covenants, Conditione, and Restrictions 
affecting the rights to subject property. 
EACH OF THE UNDERSIGNED STATES AND DECLARES THAT HE 'HAS READ THE FOREGOING 
INSTRUCTIONS AND UNDERSTANDS THEM AND DOES HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF A 
COPY OF THESE INSTRUCTIONS. 
SIGNATURE 
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are aware that of title insurance, to be issued at close of escrow, 
shall reflect a first trust deed in the amount of ,300.00. 
**It is understood that lender's shall be deducted from said ,300.00 
to their disbursement herein. and escrow holder is instructed to 
charge '·account said , per new lender's instructions. 
'It is further understood that after the $13,000.00 credit to and after 
.·the deduction of the , second trust deed sellers shall 
. $25,000.00 (less closing excess funds 
-·escrow hofde:r is instructed to disburse to· at close escrow. 
ALL OTHER TERMS AJ{D CONDITIONS REMAIN THE SAME. 
End of Amendment. 
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accounts at savings and loans, commercial banks, and credit 
unions have been tied to market interest rates in the initial 
deregulation phase. By 1986 at the latest, deposit ceilings 
on all deposit account types and maturities are scheduled 
to be removed. 
In addition to this deregulation of liabilities, in the 
Spring of 1981, Federally chartered savings and loans and 
commercial banks have authority to make a wide range of variable 
rate and graduated payment mortgages. Essentially, for federal-
ly chartered institutions, the mortgage instrument has also 
been deregulated. 
It is in this context of volatile and difficult market 
conditions, coupled \vith deregulation, that "creative financing" 
has become a significant factor in the mortgage market.· 
In the remainder of my testimony, I would like to outline 
the extent of "creative financing," the changing sources of 
mortgages, and a new mortgage instrument which may solve both 
the lenders' and borrowers' problem concerning high and volatile 
interest rates. 
A. Extent of "Creative Financing" 
The phenomenal growth of "creative financing" arrangements 
involves essentially two major mechanisms. The first is the 
"buydown" of mortgage interest rates for a 2-5 year period by 
a new home builder. Essentially, the builder is reducing his 
buyer's cost for a period of time by paying the interest for 
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Table I * 
Mortgage Home Sales '''Price''~=' Ratio(2/l) 
Originations Loan to Value 
Existing Homes 
(1) (2) (3) 




127 Billion 176 Billion 
83 Billion 154 Billion 
22 Billion 52 Billion 
* These are national figures. Presumably, because of 
the California Court's decision on "due on sale," the 
numbers would show an even greater disparity between 
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allowed to receive market rates on all their assets. As 
a result, the movement toward market rates on liabilities 
has required regulators to introduce a fully le rate 
mortgage instrument. 
Thus, from the lender's perspective a fully variable 
rate mortgage is essential to lenders with a fully variable 
rate liability structure. 
From the borrower's perspective, high inflation rates 
have also made the fixed payment-fixed interest mortgage 
outdated. The interest rate on the mortgage loan is crucially 
affected by the rate of inflation. The mortgage interest rate 
is a function of the expected inflation rate and a real inter-
est component. The high inflation rates of the past several 
years have raised the contract interest rate and so raised 
the monthly carrying costs of a conventional mortgage by over 
100%. Compared with a 1-2% inflation world, the present month-
ly carrying costs of a conventional mortgage are over five 
times higher than would be expected in a low inflation economy. 
This rise in mortgage payments, and the corresponding rise 
in the initial yearly payments/income ratio is of course the 
genesis of the "affordability crisis". In fact, it is not 
high nominal mortgage rates that have created the crisis but 
rather it is high mortgage rates juxtaposed with the archaic 
institutional mechanisms of the mortgage market that has 
created the problem. If the institutional arrangements of 
the mortgage market were flexible, then as long as the"real" 
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sets two interest rates, one for the accrual rate by lenders 
on the mortgage debt, and one that determines the borrower's 
payment rate. The difference in the two rates he added 
or subtracted from the principle balance of the loan. To 
handle the lender's problem concerning the volatility and 
trend of interest rates, the accrual rate could be variable 
with changes in the rate tied to changes in a short or 
medium term Treasury obligation. To handle the borrower's 
problem, the payment rate could be set on a graduated is 
starting at say 10% and then rising 100 basis points per year. 
Depending on the time path of the accrual rate, the graduation 
period might last for five to ten years. In essence, the 
DIM mortgage is really a variation of the Graduated Payment 
Adjustable Rate Mortgage authorized last month by the Federal 
Home Loan Bank Board. 
In summary, the DIH mortgage by solving bo the lender's 
and borrower's problem would alleviate the need for much of the 


















Yet, regardless of one's position in the debate e has been a 
paucity of hard information available as to the precise financing 
techniques engaged in today's housing market. This survey is directed 
toward partially filling this absence of meaningful data. 
A. Survey Objectives 
In addition to providing generalized informat 
financing techniques, specific prima survey 
include: 
n on present 
jectives 
0 Ascertaining the frequency of various alternative methods, 
0 Assessing the volume of ort-term financing arrangements. 
0 Gauging the degree of seller involvement in real estate 
financing and the opportunities for maintaining liqu ity. 
I 
0 Differentiating the consumer impact of institutional vs. 
private financing arrangements. 
0 Evaluating the market dynamics and demographic 
utilization of traditional vs. alternative financing 
approaches. 
0 Relating different financing approaches to the 
marketability of properties. 
B. Research Methodology 
The selected survey approach consisted of a 2,100 member 
random sampling of 800 REALTOR® and 1,300 REALTOR-ASSOCIATE® 
members. Questionnaires (and prepa return enve s) were 
mailed in two separate waves with three weeks all for 
response. Over 330 valid questionnaires were received prior 
to specified deadline dates (an add tional 30-plus 
questionnaires were received late and thus not utilized in 
the analysis). Responses were edited consistency, coded 
and keypunched prior to computer processing. 
The questionnaire requested detailed information as to the 
survey participant's most recent sing e unit residential 
resale transaction. Transactions occurring more than 12 
months previously were eliminated from the ana is. In 
total, 113 bits of information were elicited (including a 
brief policy assessment section and participant demo-
graphics) in the course of the six page survey instrument. 
Most questions required closed-ended multiple choice or 





















Final Sales Price 
$ 49,999 
















5. Downpayments - Downpayments ranged from 0 (in two 
cases) to a max of $300,000. For the sample as a 
whole, the average downpayment was $36,000 (median 
downpayment equalled $24, 0 ). The great majority 
(82.4 percent) of downpayments were in the $50,000 or 
under category. On the average, the cal 
downpayment was 24.1 percent of sales price. As a 
percentage of final sales prices, downpayments varied 
from 20.7 percent to 43 percent. 
B. Financing Characteristics: General 
Perhaps the clearest conclusion to be drawn from the 
preliminary data concerns the extent to which the current 
market is dependent on alternat ve approaches. The 
traditional 80 percent institutional first now accounts for 
a rather small proportion of activ ty, with assumptions and 
owner participation being far more s gnificant. 
Generalized approaches to financing are summarized in 
Table 3. 
Table 3 Types of Financing Utilized 
Type of Financing 
Cash and new first mortgage loan 
Cash and new first mortgage loan plus 
2nd and/or 3rd 
Cash and assumption of existing first 
mortgage loan 
Cash and assumption of existing first 
mortgage loan plus a 2nd 
Cash and assumption of existing first 
mortgage loan plus a 2nd and 3rd 
Wrap-around (AITD) 
All Cash 
Other: Installment sale/land contract 
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·Table 5: Median Interest Rate by Financing Type 
14.03% 
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Predictably, the lowest median interest rates were found in the instance 
of a cash downpayrnent to an assumable existi loan; whi a new first 
mortgage and a second produced the highest rates. 
E. Traditional vs. Alternative Financing Approaches 
1. Newly originated mortgages - Slightly more than 3 out of 10 
transactions (30.9 percent) in our sample utilized a newly 
originated first mortgage loan. Less than one-fifth (18.3 
percent) of these were accompanied by the use of junior trust 
deeds. Although firsts were written up to $400,000, 79.3 
~ percent fell below the $98,500 purchase limit of the 
institutional secondary market. The typical loan-to-value ratio 
for newly originated mortgages was 76 percent. 
Not surprisingly, newly originated mortgages were based on 
relatively high interest rates aver ing 13.78 percent 
(rnedian=l3.99 percent). Interestingly, 40.8 of new mortages 
were originated at rates below 13 percent, while 32.9 percent 
bore 15 percent or higher rates. Typical loan terms also 
reflected the impact of high inflation and economic 
uncertainty. The traditional 30 year period was featured in 
only 61.4 percent of newly originated loans, nearly one-fifth 
had terms of five years or less. Although detai ed tion 
is not yet available, seller car e ibited ency to 














Amounts assumed ranged from $8,100 with an average figure of 
$58,815 (median=$56,140). A more detailed breakdown is 
presented in Table 6. 
Remaining Balance on Assumptions 
$ 24,999 or less 13.3 percent 
$ 25,000 - 49,999 2 . 6 percent 
$ 50,000 - 64,999 23.9 percent 
$ 65,000 - 79,999 19.4 percent 
$ 80,000 - 99,999 8.9 percent 
$100,000 or more 8.9 percent 
100.0 percent 
For assumptions as a whole, the average first mortgage 
loan-to-value ratio was 47.3 percent. This relatively low 
figure required fairly substantial downpayments (averaging 30.4 
percent of final sales price) and extensive use of secondary 
financing (see below). 
I 
c. Interest Rates - Given adequate fund availability, the 
principle advantage to assumption lies in the preser-
vation of significantly lower interest rates. The average 
rate on existing formally assumed firsts was 9.97 
percent. Even with interest rate adjustments accompanying 
formal assumptions, all first mortgages assumed carried an 
average rate of 10.4 percent (median=lO.O percent). 
Although the advantage of these below market rates was 
often reduced by higher cost secondary financing, overall 
payments were generally held well below the levels of 
newly originated loans. 
d. Assumption Procedures - Although analysis in this area 
has not been completed, it appears that "subject to" 
assumptions were accompanied by only nominal charges and 
procedures. The most common charge was for a bene-
ficiary statement with lender record changes also being 
frequently required. 
e. Secondary Financing - With the soaring appreciation of 
the last several years, the relatively low loan-to-value 
ratios attached to assumption possibilities frequently 
necessitated secondary financing. Only 25.9 percent of 
all assumption based transactions were completed without 
junior trust deeds. In nearly one-half of the cases (48.1 
percent), an assumed first was accompanied by a second, 
while 25.9 percent required both second and third trust 
deeds. Although seconds (accompanying assumptions) ranged 
in amounts from $1,600 to $161,000, over 50 percent fell 
below $24,300. Thirds were generally of lower dollar value 
and ranged from $3,500 to $73,000 (median=$14,000).For 
both types of junior deeds, interest rates varied from 8.5 
percent to 21 percent (with averages in the 13-14 percent 
range). The great majority of junior loans involved owner 
participation. (More detailed analysis on secondary 





































associations, commercial banks and credit unions. Only 6.5 
percent of second TD's were financed through loan brokers or 
third party investors. Twelve percent of the owner-carry-backs 
were discounted and sold to a third party investor. Although 
seconds were originated in amounts up to $261,000, 75 percent 
were for $40,000 or less, with the average-sized second being 
$31,397. The average interest rate on se trust deeds was 
13.81 percent. 
Only 10.5 percent of second trust deed monthly payments were 
structured to cover less-than-interest-only. Slightly more than 
46 percent had monthly payments covering principal and interest. 
The remainder, 43.1 percent, had monthly payments which covered 
only interest. Because more than half of second trust deeds 
involved interest-only or less-than-interest-only monthly 
payments, and because the average term of seconds (6.3 years) was 
not sufficient to allow for full amortization, 79.6 percent of 
seconds involved a balloon payment at maturity. Nearly half of 
all seconds, 47.7 percent, were assumable by subsequent buyers. 
I 
2. Second Trust Deed Characteristics varied by the source of 
financing. Owner carried-back seconds tended to be smaller than 
those originated through institutional lenders, $22,289 compared 
to $30,050. Seconds originated through loan brokers or third 
party investors averaged $18,100. 
Interest rates on second trust deeds also varied by source of 
financing. (See Table 9: Second Trust Deeds: Interest Rate by 
Source of Financing.) Owner-carries averaged a 12.9 percent 
interest rate; interest rates on owner carry-backs ranged between 
8.0 percent and 18.0 percent. By contrast, institutional seconds 
had an average interest rate of 16.13 percent with rates ranging 
between 10.75 percent and 18.0 percent. Second trust deeds 
originated through loan brokers carried an average interest rate 
of 14.1 percent, and ranged between 8.5 and 18.0 percent. 
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Median Term 3.9 ars 12 0 ars 3.5 
Balloon payment 92.1% 44.0% 100 0% 
rd Trust Deed? 21.0% 51.4% 60.0% 
Source of Third Trust Deed: 
0Hner carry-back 81.8% 94.4% 8 .3% 
Institutional lender 0 0 0 
16.7% wan 3rd Party 13.6% 5.6% 
Other. 







Third Trust Deeds 
Thi trust deeds were originated or assumed in y 19 7 percent 
of all transactions The major thirds, 87 per ent, were 
owner carry-backs; 10.2 percent were originated loan 
s or ird party investors. None of the third trust d s 
were originated institutional lenders. 
irds ranged in size up to $73,000, but e majority were less 
an $14,500. e average sized third trust deed was $14,400, 
and carried an av e interest rate of 13.96 percent. Interest 
rates on thirds rang between 10.0 and 21.0 percent. Monthly 
nts on third trust deeds were most often structured as 
either interest-only (44.7 ent) or as less-than-interest y 
(40 4 percent). Only 14.9 percent of third trust deed monthly 
payments were structured to include principal and interest. 
- 13 -
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The. term to maturity of third trust deeds averaged 3.0 years, 
though ranged as high as 10 years. The vast majority of thirds, 
95.7 percent, involved a balloon payment at rna uri 
F. Consumer-Impacts - Buyer and Seller Demographics 
Table 12 
Though further analysis of the data is required, general 
information on the characteristics of all buyers and sellers is 
available, and presented below in Table 12. 
Buyer and Seller Demographics 
Percentage of properties to be occupied 
by buyer as primary residence 
Percent first-time buyers 
Median age of buyers 
Median age of sellers 
Median income of sellers 
Percent of sellers occupying property 







Perhaps the most unexpected finding, the percentage of buyers 
purchasing a horne for the first time accounted for fully 28.8 
percent of all buyers. This is in sharp contrast to earlier 
studies which placed the percentage of first-time buyers at 
Table 13 
less than 18 percent nationwide, and at less than 17 and 14 
percent in the Los Angeles and San Francisco areas respectively. 
Table 13 presents the differences between first~tirne and repeat 
buyers, although financing strategies and dernograhic 
characteristics were similar among both groups, first-time 
buyers typically purchased lower priced (and smaller} s with 
less down. First-time buyers were generally younger, and d 
lower incomes on the average than did repeat buyers. 
First-Time Buyers vs. Repeat Buyers 
First-Time 
Homebu~ers 







Median age 30 years 
Median income $31,904 
G. Marketability 
The analysis of the impact of the various 
on the marketability of rtics is incompl 
Initial findings, however, sugg st th t prope 
assumption of an existing first was invo ved 
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Thus, it ppea th t to xtent, market f exibi is 
enhanced by he availabi alternativ financing in a t t 
money market. Further a es examining these and other issues 
of mar tabili are forthcom g. 
Preliminary Conclusions 
Though more in-depth analyses of i format on 




First, it appears t t curre t market is d ndent to a 
great extent, on the availabili of a ternative financing 
approaches. With the effective wi rawal from market of 
institutional lenders, and the exorbitant interest tes 
involved ¥Jhen new first mortgages are originated, alternative 
financing has been critical in maintain ng even e present 
reduced transaction volume. 
I 
Second, the most common of alternative fin ncing involves 
e assumption of an existing first mortgage loan and the 
origination of a second trust deed. General , t is the seller 
who originates the second gh institutiona lenders account 
for 23 percent of these loans. 
Third, to some extent alternative financ approaches appear 
to enhance the flexibility of the transaction, and us, the 
marketability of the proper es ith which these aches are 
used. 
Finally, first-time homebuyers appear to se a more 
significant share of e rna t than has g ral 
believed. e extent to which var ous factors can ex ain is 
finding is under st 
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